The margin of appreciation (MoA) has become the central conceptual doctrine in the institutional and jurisprudential architecture of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This article critiques the existence and operation of the MoA within the ECHR system and defends its use. It is submitted that as each of the central justifications for the MoA under the ECHR applies equally to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), so the doctrine should be applied by the Human Rights Committee.

In 2001, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights concluded consideration of a communication under Article 55 of the African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights which dealt with alleged violations of human rights of the Ogoni people in Nigeria.1 This communication is important and special, because, for the first time, the Commission was able to deal in a substantive and groundbreaking way with alleged violations of economic, social and cultural rights which formed the substance of the complaint. In addition, in dealing with the communication, the Commission took a firm and dynamic approach that may contribute to a better and more effective protection of economic, social and cultural rights in Africa. This article discusses the case before the Commission and tries to characterize the decision of the Commission as an application of recent approaches to strengthen implementation and supervision of economic, social and cultural rights.

The ‘selling arrangement’ is a judicial device which removes national law from thescrutiny of European Community law relating to the free movement of goods. National provisions affecting the marketing of products may fall for consideration as ‘selling arrangements’ where the treatment of the domestic and imported goods has been even handed. Measures relating to the substance of the goods remain subject to Community law rules on the free movement of goods. The prime example of the selling arrangement is the advertisement, but in the years since creation, other areas of national activity with respect to the free movement of goods have been enveloped inthe selling arrangement. Certain measures which have related to the conduct of business may also fall for similar treatment as selling arrangements. A recent development would appear tomean that the concept of the selling arrangement may apply where the obligation imposed by the national measure has beenidentified as being general, as opposed to specific in nature. Were this to be so, the selling arrangement would have the potential to break free of the traditional boundaries established for itunder Criminal Proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel Mithouard.1

This article seeks to present an integrated conception of sustainable development, with particular emphasis on the contribution of international human rights law and theory. Part II considers a structural conception of sustainable development. Part III considers parallels between sustainable development and self-determination. Part IV provides some general reflections on international environmental law and international human rights law in terms of analogous concepts, principles and systems. What similarities are there and what differences? Part V considers the progress made towards recognition of a “human right to the environment”. Part VI considers how international environmental claims could be brought within the existing international human rights complaint systems. Part VII analyses the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the Lopez Ostra case (1994), the leading case on environmental claims to have reached that Court.

Currently there is no clear understanding of the meaning of ‘slavery’ in modern international law. While generally it is accepted that the authoritative definition of slavery is provided by Article 1 of the Slavery Convention 1926, in recent times slavery has been understood in such a wide variety of ways that effectively it is a meaningless term. This paper reflects on this interpretation problem and aims to redress this balance by reclaiming the core meaning of the legal definition. It applies property law perspectives to explain the conception of ownership invoked by Article 1, to argue that it remains relevant and to explore how it might be applied in identifying modern cases of slavery.

A rule of customary international law is binding upon all States. One controversial question is whether a State should be permitted not to be bound by such a rule in the event that it objected to it in the early stage of its formation and did so constantly thereafter. This is the theory of the ‘persistent objector’. Articles recently published about the theory focus on its specific application in different areas of international law, including international investment law,1 international humanitarian law2 and human rights law.3 The present article intends to examine the concept of persistent objector in general international law.4

Can a person who has agreed to an out-of-court settlement for a certain offence in country A still be prosecuted for the same offence in country B? What if a person is found guilty of theft in country C and is subsequently prosecuted in respect of the same facts, but under the charge of swindling in country D? Suppose two persons are suspected of having set up a money-laundering scheme, which involves financial transactions in several countries. Can the offenders still be prosecuted in one country concerned, after they have been acquitted for moneylaundering in one of the other countries?

Is legal transplant possible? The stark bipolarity of a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer attracted by such a question is much less interesting and revealing than the question: what shapes the life of legal transplants? The answer to the latter question is contingent on a wide range of variables triggered by the particular transplant; the result can occupy any point along the spectrum from faithful replication to outright rejection. This case study of the transplant of the English doctrine of undue influence into Singaporean law asks why the Singaporean courts have applied the doctrine in family guarantee cases to such divergent effect, when they profess to apply the same law. The answer owes less to grand theories than to a careful examination of the nature of the transplanted law and the relationship between the formal and informal legal orders of the originating and the recipient society raised by the particular transplant.

Not many decisions of the Court of Justice have stirred such an intensive academic debate in Germany1 as the Court's well-known Centros judgment,2 dealing with a Danish couple that had registered a private limited company in England and had then applied to register a branch in Denmark. The Danish authorities refused a registration for the reason that under Danish law a ‘foreign limited company’ which does not transact business in its state of incorporation has to fulfil certain requirements of Danish company law, in particular the paying-up of the minimum capital fixed at DKK 200.000. The competent Danish Court referred the question to the Court of Justice whether the Danish regulation was compatible with Article 52 (now Article 43) ECT in conjunction with Article 58 (now Article 48) ECT.

This article discusses the importance of the recently concluded Paris Rulebook, the extent to which it limits national discretion, instils discipline and generates ambition and accountability, and the challenges that lie ahead in implementing the 2015 Paris Agreement. It discusses, in particular, the rules on mitigation, transparency, the global stocktake and the implementation and compliance mechanism, in order to highlight the choices Parties made on three overarching issues that have long bedevilled the climate change regime—prescriptiveness (the level of detail of the rules), legal bindingness (the extent to which particular rules are legally binding) and differentiation (the extent to which particular rules accommodate differences between Parties or apply uniformly to all Parties).

The number of states participating in the Council of Europe's system for the protection of human rights has grown rapidly over recent years. Established in 1949 with an initial membership of 10 states, the Council has now grown to a membership of 46,2 dwarfing the EU in its geographical reach. The most significant period of enlargement has been since the end of the Cold War as the formerly Communist states from central and eastern Europe flocked to the Council of Europe seeking assistance with the process of democratisation. The Council's most prominent human rights treaty, the European Convention on Human Rights, has entered into force for all but one of the 46 member states.3 This paper questions whether the European Court of Human Rights' recognition of a national ‘margin of appreciation’ has allowed these new Contracting Parties too much leeway in the way they choose to protect, or more specifically, to limit, the exercise of human rights.

“Perhaps the greatest difficulty the civilians have in accepting the trust is caused by what I have come to regard as an English peculiarity logically detachable from the trust, namely, the distinction between the legal and the equitable estate. In Scots law, which, even if it did not invent and develop the trust for itself but took it over from England—the point is doubtful—has accepted it without inhibitions or reservations, no such distinction has ever been known. There the trustee becomes owner and the beneficiary acquires a contractual right against him.”1

International tribunals and legal scholars have been considering the relationship between International Humanitarian Law (‘IHL’) and International Human Rights Law (‘IHRL’) for a number of years.1 The International Court of Justice famously or infamously (depending on your perspective) considered their relationship in its Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion in 1996.2 The Court concluded that while IHRL did apply in times of armed conflict, when it came to the prohibition of arbitrarily taking human life in Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966, the content of that prohibition had to be found in the lex specialis of IHL.

Pluralism is a main feature of Nigeria as a country. There is ethnic pluralism.1 The pre-colonial Nigeria comprised of over 250 nation states embracing over 500 ethnic and linguistic groups.2 These ethnic groups spread across the three main geographical units in the country, namely, the north, the west, and the east. The north was dominated by the Hausa-Fulani and the Kanuri peoples, the west by the Yoruba speaking tribes, and the east by the Igbos.