There are few more controversial questions in international law than the proper limits of the right of self-defence. The rules are being challenged in the light of what are seen as new threats from terrorism and from the possession of weapons of mass destruction. The UN High-level Panel, in its report to the Secretary-General of 2004, concluded that in all cases relating to decisions to use military force ‘we believe that the Charter of the United Nations, properly understood and applied, is equal to the task’.4 The Principles that follow are intended to provide a clear statement of the rules of international law ‘properly understood’ governing the use of force by states in self-defence.

International soft law as a legal metaphor has become part of legal discourse. The author argues not only that the term itself is misleading and contradictory, but that the terminological problem indicates deeper doctrinal difficulties which soft law theories should overcome. Identifying two main streams of these theories, the article provides a short review of the fundamental arguments for the existence of soft law. It distinguishes between two lines of arguments, ie functional arguments and proximity arguments, evaluates their coherence and explanatory power, and finds that these arguments fail to lay a coherent and persuasive foundation for international soft law. The author concludes by pointing out that non-legal norms may have essential regulatory functions in international relations but the law and non-law distinction should be maintained, and separating soft law as a distinct category is unwarranted.

The preamble to the Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1972 (the ‘World Heritage Convention’),1 adopted 30 years ago, testifies to the conviction of the States Parties ‘that deterioration or disappearance of any item of the cultural…heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of all the nations of the world’.2 It speaks of the recognized ‘importance, for all the peoples of the world, of safeguarding this unique and irreplaceable property, to whatever people it may belong’3 and declares ‘that parts of the cultural…heritage…of outstanding interest…need to be preserved as part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole’.4

Unlike the original 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and trade (GATT), the 1994 Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement)1 covers a much wider range of trade. It extends beyond goods and now embraces services, intellectual property, procurement, investment and agriculture. Moreover, the new trade regime is no longer a collection of ad hoc agreements, Panel reports and understandings of the parties. All trade obligations are subsumed under the umbrella of the WTO, of which all parties are members. Member States have to accept the obligations contained in all the WTO covered agreements: they cannot pick and choose.

This article examines the controversies over and implications of the 2010 French ban on the covering of the face. It carries out an internal critique of the new law and, in a broader European context, questions its compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights. It argues that the ban has strayed away from the confines of laïcité (the separation of State and religion in the public sphere) by encompassing activities and people who in no way emanate from the State. Far from being a flagship of a secularism—à la française—or a French way of life, the ban—it is argued—goes against entrenched French legal traditions and unduly conflates the concept of national identity at the cost of individual liberties, thus forgetting the true goal of secularism: the conciliation of different beliefs and values. Assuming that the defence of secularism is nevertheless (for reasons we will explore) upheld by the European Court of Human Rights as a legitimate aim pursued by the law, the French ban, it is argued, is likely to fall foul of European requirements for lack of proportionality.

The ongoing development of diverse maritime autonomous vehicles for varied ocean activities—ranging from scientific research, security surveillance, transportation of goods, military purposes and commission of crimes—is prompting greater consideration of how existing legal frameworks accommodate these vehicles. This article brings together the core legal issues, as well as current developments in relation to commercial shipping, the law of naval warfare, and maritime security. This article captures how these issues are now being addressed and what other legal questions will likely emerge as the newest technology impacts on one of the oldest bodies of international law.

The development of international organisations and the increasing significance of their role in a wide range of fields, has put at issue the adequacy of the rules governing their operation, with regard to the needs of modern justice. In particular, the question of the scope of the immunity from jurisdiction of international organisations is the subject of some debate, as the multiplication of disputes involving international organisations has led courts to address this topic with increasing frequency.1

Article 55 of the United Nations Charter commits the member States to promote “universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion,” recognising thus for the first time the individual as a subject of international law. This would have certainly been a very welcome step—yet we can hardly overlook the fact that very little has been done during the years since 1945, to enable the individual to enjoy this right, guaranteed by the Charter. The “Bill of Rights,” promised in 1946, is far from being completed and ripe for ratification. Rescinding a decision of its fifth session in favour of the inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights in the Draft Covenant of Human Rights, the General Assembly voted during its sixth session in favour of the drafting of two Covenants, one to guarantee civil and political rights and the other economic, social and cultural rights. The drafts of these two documents in the form they emerged from the ninth session of the UN Commission on Human Rights (April 7 to May 30, 1953) do not provide possibilities for the individual to petition an international authority in case of an alleged violation of the Covenant's provisions—in spite of the opinion expressed by the General Assembly at its third session in 1948, that “the right of petition is an essential human right.”

This article challenges the widespread view that existing WTO rules are insufficient for dealing with State capitalism in China, which has been further emboldened by the latest rounds of State-owned enterprise (‘SOE’) reforms. Through a careful review of WTO agreements and jurisprudence, it is argued that new rules are not necessarily needed because the unique challenges created by China's State capitalism can be appropriately addressed by the WTO's existing rules on subsidies coupled with the China-specific obligations. A more realistic approach would be to encourage China to undertake market-oriented reforms through WTO litigation based on existing rules rather than trying to negotiate new rules.

Article 103 of the United Nations (UN) Charter stipulates that the obligations of UN Member States under the Charter prevail, in the event of a conflict, over their obligations under any other international agreement. While this important provision is often mentioned, its precise meaning remains something of a mystery. The present article tries to shed some light on the scope of this ‘supremacy clause’ by discussing, first, its operation with respect to treaties, and then by looking at its relevance to various other contractual arrangements and to customary international law.

The rights and obligations of Parties … include a series of policies and measures aimed at protecting and promoting the diversity of cultural expressions, approaching creativity and all it implies in the context of globalization, where diverse expressions are circulated and made accessible to all via cultural goods and services.

The relationship between the global and the local is one of critical importance to all regions of the world. In the resolution of the tension between the irresistible surge of globalisation and the undeniable facts of society as it actually exists in the various localities which together comprise the very world which is presumably the object or the subject-matter of globalisation, law lies at the forefront. It is, one might say, the very intellectual battlefield which we have selected for the resolution of the major problem facing human society at the turn of the century. The purpose of this article is therefore to investigate, in a somewhat narrative fashion the relationship between the global and the local in the context of law in South East Asia. The topic is clearly too large to be dealt with in a short space with the rigour and articulation it really deserves, but it is hoped that the approach adopted will provide some kind of a frame of reference for regarding, studying, and hopefully improving, the law in the South East Asian region; and will perhaps focus a pencil of light on the problems of the global and the local in this particular regional context.

The Third Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Climate Change Convention) was held from 1 to 11 December 1997 at Kyoto, Japan. Significantly the States Parties to the Convention adopted a protocol (Kyoto Protocol) on 11 December 1997 under which industrialised countries have agreed to reduce their collective emissions of six greenhouse gases by at least 5 per cent by 2008–2012. Ambassador Raul Estrada-Oyuela, who had chaired the Committee of the Whole established by the Conference to facilitate the negotiation of a Protocol text, expressed the view that: “This agreement will have a real impact on the problem of greenhouse gas emissions. Today should be remembered as the Day of the Atmosphere.” This note seeks to outline in brief the science of climate change, and international activity to combat global warming prior to the Kyoto conference. It then attempts to analyse the terms of the Kyoto Protocol and to draw some conclusions on its significance.

The right of peoples to self-determination is an elusive concept. There is no clear definition of “peoples” or of what the right entails. Instead, there are numerous and at times conflicting interpretations of self-determination. The existence of these various interpretations is not merely of academic or theoretical interest. It can have considerable practical implications.