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DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMATION OF DELEGATED LEGISLATION—A COMPARATIVE VIEW ON THE AMERICAN, BRITISH AND GERMAN LAW

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 April 2009

Hermann Pünder
Hermann Pünder
Affiliation:
Professor, Dr jur, LL.M. (Iowa). The author holds the Chair of German, European and International Public Law, Science of Public Administration and Comparative Law at Bucerius Law School in Hamburg, Germany.
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Abstract

This article addresses the problem of democratic legitimacy posed by the executive branch's use of delegated legislative powers. After some remarks on the need for delegated legislation and the problem of legitimation the study identifies in a comparative perspective three approaches of ensuring that delegated legislation carries sufficient democratic legitimation. A first means of democratic legitimation is parliamentary predetermination of the executive role. German law proves that the proper legislature under the Damocles sword of unconstitutionality is in many cases well able to prescribe for the executive a substantive programme of delegated legislation. A second technique of democratic legitimation is that parliament in some way participates in the rule-making procedure. German and British law show that by means of subsequent approval the proper legislature assumes political responsibility for subordinate legislation beyond the original empowerment. The US Supreme Court, however, considers the legislative veto to be unconstitutional. Therefore, American law developed a third approach to solve the problem of democratic legitimacy. American experience makes clear that the democratic legitimation of secondary legislation can also be secured by means of comprehensively involving the public in the delegated legislative process. The author assesses the different models for legitimation and explains that the different approaches suggest valuable solutions to each country's problems.

Type
Article
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 58 , Issue 2 , April 2009 , pp. 353 - 378
Copyright
Copyright © 2009 British Institute of International and Comparative Law

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References

1 For a broader comparison of the American and German law see H Pünder, Exekutive Normsetzung in den Vereinigten Staaten und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1995) with a summary in English.

2 This article treats delegated, subordinate and secondary legislation as synonymous. The study does not, however, cover executive norms which are directed primarily toward the internal affairs of the agency as such internal rules may not need specific legislative delegation. Furthermore, the comparison is restricted to rule-making by the executive branch, and does not include the delegation of legislative powers to parliamentary institutions like the Scottish parliament. Compare in this context McHarg, ‘What is delegated legislation?’ (2006) PL 539 ff.

3 In the US the terminology is ‘neither consistent nor scientific’. See Schwartz, Administrative Law (3rd edn, 1991) 143. A rule may be a decision, a decision may be an order, an order may be a rule. The most significant attempt to define basic administrative law terms was made in 1946 when Congress enacted the Administrative Procedure Act. The following study, therefore, will follow its terminology.

4 In the UK there is also a ‘bewildering variety’ of names for delegated legislation. See Craig, Administrative Law (5th edn 2003) 370–371. The term ‘statutory instruments’ refers to rules governed by the Statutory Instruments Act 1946. For the classification of primary and delegated legislation (esp to Acts of the Scottish Parliament) see McHarg (n 2).

5 German terminology in contrast is clear. ‘Rechtsverordnungen’ have the same legal effect as ‘Gesetze’ but are made by a part of the executive branch.

6 J Locke Two Treaties of Government (1690) Second Treatise, Ch XI § 141.

7 Compare BVerfGE (Bundesverfassungsgerichtsentscheidungen) 7, 267, 274; 8, 274, 311, 321; 42, 191, 203; 55, 207, 228, 241.

8 Mistretta v US (1989) 488 US 361, 371–372.

9 Compare eg Craig (n 4) 369–370; Griffith, ‘The Place of Parliament in the Legislative Process’ (1951) 14 Mod. L Rev 279, 292 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar; O Hood Phillips, P Jackson and P Leopold, Constitutional and Administrative Law (8th edn 2001) 668 f; I Loveland, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights (3rd edn, OUP, Oxford, 2003) 132 ff; EC Page, Governing by Numbers (2001) ch 2. See also Donoughmore Committee on Ministers' Powers, Report Presented by the Lord High Chancellor to Parliament by Command of His Majesty (1932) Cmd. 4060; and the compilation of the justifications of delegated legislation in the Sixth Report form the Select Committee on Procedure, HC 539 of 1966–7, Appendix 8: Memorandum by Mr Speaker's Counsel, para 6.

10 See also the Council Dec 99/468 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission as amended by Council Dec 2006/512/EC. Compare PP Craig and G de Búrca, EU Law (4th edn 2007) 118 ff; Smismans, S, ‘Functional Participation in EU Delegated Regulation: Lessons from the US at the EU's “Constitutional Moment”’ (2005) 12 Ind J Gobal Legal Stud 599 ff.Google Scholar

11 Compare the compilations of primary and secondary legislation in the US (http://www.gpoaccess.gov/legislative.html), UK (http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/uk.htm), and Germany (http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de). Note that while the statistics are indicative of overall proportions, the definition of secondary legislation to an extent varies between the compared jurisdictions.

12 The term refers to the Statute of Proclamations 1539, giving Henry VIII extensive powers to legislate by proclamation. Compare to the nomenclature in Loveland (n 9) 135 f.

13 Charles de Montesquieu, De l'esprit des lois (1748) Livre XI, Ch. VI.

14 Blackstone Commentaries on the Laws of England (1765) as cited by Phillips, Jackson and Leopold (n 9) 12: ‘In all tyrannical Governments … the right of making and of enforcing the laws is vested in one and the same man, or the same body of men; and wheresoever these two powers are united together there can be no liberty.’

15 Lord Hewart, The New Despotism (1929).

16 Compare for an early response Donoughmore Committee on Ministers' Powers (n 9). See also Griffith (n 9) 279, 294 f; J Kersell Parliamentary Supervision of Delegated Legislation—The United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada (1960) 2.

17 Craig (n 4) 368.

18 Compare A Bonfield, State Administrative Rule Making (1986) 145; J Kersell (n 16) 2 ff.

19 Compare for a broad view on the legitimacy D Beetham, The Legitimation of Power (1991).

20 Dahrendorf, ‘Effectiveness and Legitimacy’ (1980) 51 Political Quarterly, 393, 409, warns, that ‘the response to a crisis of legitimacy will be authoritarianism and illiberty’.

21 See for the US eg Bowen v Georgetown University Hospital (1988) 488 US, 204, 471; and for the German law BVerfGE 34, 52, 59–60.

22 Art. 34, 37 of French Constitution. Compare eg Favoreu et al. Droit constitutionnel (10th edn, 2007) 197 ff, 777 ff, Chapus, Droit administratif general, vol I (15th edn, 2001) 209, 652 ff; Gaudemet, Droit administratif (18th edn, 2005) 252 ff; and Schwartz, Administrative Law and the Common Law World (1954) 89 ff; O HoodPhillips, P Jackson and P Leopold (n 9) 11; LN Brown and J Bell, French Administrative Law (5th edn, 1998) 11; Lindseth, P, ‘The Paradox of Parliamentary Supremacy: Delegation, Democracy, and Dictatorship in Germany and France, 1920s–1950s’ (2003–2004) 13 Yale L J 1341, 1404 ff.Google Scholar

23 The room for inherent legislation, however, is rather limited. Compare to the ‘decretos-leyes’ eg JJ Gomes Canotilho, Direito Constitucional (4th edn 1989) 649 ff.

24 See for instance O Hood Phillips, P Jackson and P Leopold (n 9) 318 ff; C Turpin, The British Government and the Constitution (5th edn, 2002) 415 ff.

25 Compare on the ‘decretazione d'urgenza’ eg P Caretti and U de Sievo, Instituzione di diritto pubblico (1992) 273 ff; Baschiera, , ‘Introduction to the Italian Legal System: The Allocation of Normative Powers’ (2006) 34 Int'l J Legal Info 279, 289 ff.Google Scholar

26 Compare on the ‘decretos-leyes’ Santamaría Pasto, Fundamentos de Derecho Administrativo, vol I (1988/1991) 627 ff.

27 C Carr, Delegated Legislation: Three Lectures (11921) 2.

28 See Pünder (n 1) 53 ff.

29 EW Böckenförde, Gesetz und gesetzgebende Gewalt (2nd edn, 1981) 381.

30 Compare the decision of the Swiss Bundesgericht (1978) BGE 104 Ia, 305, 310–311. See also U Häfelin and W Haller, Schweizerisches Bundesstaatsrecht (3rd edn, 1993) 449, 450 ff.

31 cp to Art 202, 211 ECT – ECJ (1970), C-25/70 (Köster) ECR, 1161, 1172; ECJ (1979), C-230/78 (Eridana), ECR, 2749, 2765; ECJ (1992), C-240/90 (Germany/Commission), ECR, I-5383, 5434; ECJ (1995), C-417/93 (Parliament/Council), ECR, I-1185, 1219; ECJ (1996), C-303/94 (Parliament/Council), ECR, I-2943, 2969. Note, however, that the ECJ has never annulled so far a measure on these grounds.

32 Compare Craig and de Búrca (n 10) 139 f; Smismans (n 10) 623 ff.

33 Compare eg BVerfGE 7, 282, 302; 33, 125, 158 ff; 40, 237, 249; 49, 89, 126 f; 58, 257, 278; 80, 1, 20; 85, 97, 105. See also Cremer ‘Art 80 und Parlamentsvorbehalt’ (1997) 122 AöR, 248 ff; Lindseth (n 22) 1395 ff.

34 See for examples in the constitutional judicature Rubel, ‘Art 80’ in Umbach and Clemens (eds) Grundgesetz vol. 2 (2002) 25 ff.

35 Compare BVerfGE 8, 155, 171; Ramsauer, ‘Art 80’ in Denninger et al. (eds) Grundgesetz (3rd edn, 2001) 41.

36 Compare BVerfGE 8, 155, 163.

37 It should, however, be recognised that the accountability of government and ministers is limited due to the governmental dominance of the legislature.

38 Compare Wayman v Southard (1825) 23 US, 1 ff; Field v Clark (1892) 143 US, 649 ff; Consolidated Coal Co. v Illinois (1902) 185 US, 203 ff; Grimaud v US (1911) 220 US, 506 ff; J.W. Hampton Co. v US (1928) 276 US, 394 ff; US v Chicago M St P & P R Co (1931) 282 US, 311 ff; Panama Refining Co. v Ryan (1934) 293 US, 388 ff; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Co. v US (1935) 295 US, 495 ff.

39 Compare Mössle, Inhalt, Zweck und Ausmaß (1990) 42 ff; Wolff, B, ‘Ermächtigung zum Erlass von Rechtsverordnungen’ (1952–3) 78 AöR, 194, 197Google Scholar; Tilman Pünder, Das Bizonale Interregnum (1966) 223 ff; Lindseth (n 22) 1392 ff.

40 See eg Yakus v US (1944) 321 US, 414 ff; Lichter v US (1948) 334 US, 742 ff; American Trucking Assn v Atchison (1967) 387 US, 397 ff; NAACP v Federal Power Commission (1976) 425 US, 662 ff; Industrial Department AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute (1980) 448 US, 607 ff; American Textile Manufacturers Institute v Donovan (1981) 452 US, 490 ff; Mistretta v US (n 8) 361 ff; Touby v US (1991) 111 Sup Ct, 1752 ff. Compare generally Aman and Mayton, Administrative Law (2nd 2001) 9 ff.

41 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise (2nd edn 1978) 27. Similarly Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980) 132 (‘Find the problems in this area and solve them’); Central Forwarding, Inc v Interstate Commerce Commission (1983) 698 F 2d, 1283 (5th Cir: ‘Go forth and do good’).

42 Marshall in Federal Power Commission v New England Power Co (1974) 415 US, 352. But note the application of the non-delegation doctrine in South Dakota v Department of Interior (1995) 69 F3d 878 (8th Cir). Furthermore in the states the non-delegation doctrine is used rather extensively so that ‘there has never been a suspicion of its death’. See Aman and Mayton (n 40) 27. Compare Pierce, Shapiro and Verkuil, Administrative Law and Process (3rd edn, 1999) 60 ff.

43 See Synar v US (1986) 626 F Supp 1374, 1398 (D C Cir).

44 Gellhorn, Aranson and Robinson, , ‘A Theory of Legislative Delegation’ (1982) 68 Cornell L Rev 1, 25.Google Scholar

45 The ideological foundations were laid by Wilson, Woodrow, ‘The Study of Administration’ 2 (1887) Pol Sci. Q 197 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

46 Commodity Futures Trading Com'n v Schor (1986) 478 US, 833.

47 Compare in this context for example Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Study on Federal Regulations (1977–1979) Doc No 26, 95th Cong, 1st Sess, vol I, 95 ff.

48 Humphrey's Executor v US (1935) 295 US, 602 ff.

49 Wiener v US (1958) 57 US, 349, 358.

50 McGarity, , ‘Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era’ (1986) 45 Md L Rev, 253, 254Google Scholar (providing for further references).

51 Compare eg C Schmitt, ‘Vergleichender Überblick über die neueste Entwicklung des Problems der gesetzgeberischen Ermächtigungen’ (1936) VI ZaöR, 252 ff; Jellinek, Gesetz und Verordnung (1887) 333, 338; Lindseth (n 22)1357 ff.

52 Compare Report of the Hansard Society Commission on the Legislative Process (‘Rippon Commission’) Making the Law (1993) 89. See also Hayhurst and Wallington ‘The Parliamentary Scrutiny of Delegated Legislation’ 1988 P L, 547 ff; Wade and Forsyth, Administrative Law (9th edn, 2004) 860 ff; Page (n 9) 35 ff; McHarg (n 2) 556–557.

53 Craig (n 4) 370. See also Ganz, ‘Delegated Legislation: A Necessary Evil or a Constitutional Outrage?’ in Leyland and Woods (eds) Administrative Law Facing the Future: Old Constraints and New Horizons (1997) 63–64.

54 The use of such clauses has increased as of late. Compare eg Lord Rippon, ‘Henry VIII Clauses’ (1989) 10 Stat L Rev 205; Barber and Young, ‘The Rise of Prospective Henry VIII Clauses and Their Implications for Sovereignty’ (2003) P L, 112 ff. The Deregulation and Contracting Out Act 1994 and the Regulatory Reform Act 2001 are notorious in this context. See Ganz (n 53) 65–66; McHarg (n 2) 539 ff; Freedland, ‘Privatising Carltona: Part II of the Deregulation and Contracting Out Act’ (1995) P L 21, 21–22. Note, however, that courts have indicated that a power to modify the provisions of a statute by delegated legislation should be narrowly and strictly construed. See for references Hood Phillips, Jackson and Leopold (n 9) 671.

55 See eg Magiera, , ‘Allgemeine Regelungsgewalt zwischen Parlament und Regierung’ (1974) 13 Der Staat, 1, 22Google Scholar (with further references).

56 See Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (1962) 111 ff; Stewart, , ‘The Reformation of American Administrative Law’, 88 (1975) Harv L Rev 1669, 1696 ffCrossRefGoogle Scholar; Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process (1980) 123 ff; Sargentich, , ‘The Delegation Debate and Competing Ideals of the Administrative Process’ (1987) (1987) Am U L Rev 419, 430.Google Scholar

57 See Wright, ‘Beyond Discretionary Justice’ (1972) 81 Yale L J, 575 ff; Jaffe, ‘The Illusion of Ideal Administration’, 86 (1973) Harv L Rev, 1183 ff; McGowan, ‘Congress, Court, and Delegated Power’, 1977 Colum L Rev, 1119, 1132 ff; Freedman, Crises and Legitimacy (1978) 6–7; Lowi, The End of Liberalism (2nd edn, 1979) 92 ff; Harter, ‘Negotiating Regulations—A Cure for Malaise’, 71 (1982) Geo L J 1, 17 ff; Aranson, Gellhorn and Robinson (n 44) 1; Schoenbrod, ‘The Delegation Doctrine—Could the Court give it Substance?’ (1985) 83 Mich L Rev 1223; Mayton, ‘The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Art I and the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies’ 1986 Duke L J, 948, 962–3; Gellhorn, ‘Delegation of Powers to Administrative Agencies—Returning to First Principles’ (1987) 36 Am U L Rev 347 ff; Sarvis, ‘Legislative Delegation and Two Conceptions of the Legislative Power’ (2005–2006) 4 Pierce L Rev 317 ff. For a summary of the debate, compare Sunstein, ‘Nondelegation Canons’ 67 (2000) U Chi L Rev 315, 317 ff.

58 Justice Douglas, cited after Dolzer, ‘Verwaltungskontrolle in den Vereinigten Staaten’ (1982) DÖV, 578, 579.

59 See above all the Symposium on ‘The Uneasy Constitutional Status of the Administrative Agencies’ (1987) 36 Am U L Rev.

60 The President's Committee on Administrative Management: Report with Special Studies, ‘Brownlow Report’ (1937) 39.

61 See Humphrey's Executor v US (n 48) 602, and Schwartz (n 3) 22.

62 Starr, ‘Tribute to Bernard Schwartz’ (1988) Annual Surv Am L, XIII.

63 Pierce, Shapiro and Verkuil (n 42) 103.

64 So quoted by Schwartz (n 3) 22.

65 See Staupe, Parlamentsvorbehalt und Delegationsbefugnis (1986) 322; Staats, ‘Die Formelermächtigung’ in Kindermann (ed) Studien zu einer Theorie der Gesetzgebung (1982) 192 ff.

66 See also Cutler and Johnson, ‘Regulation and Political Process’ 84 (1975) Yale L J, 1395, 1400; Woll, American Bureaucracy (2nd edn, 1977) 173; Ely (n 41) 3; Fiorina, ‘Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms—Legal Process or Administrative Process’ 39 (1982) Public Choice, 33, 46 ff, 53 ff; Dripps, ‘Delegation and Due Process’ (1988) Duke L J, 657, 668; Lowi, ‘Delegation of Powers to Administrative Agencies—Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservativism and Administrative Power’ (1987) 36 Am U L Rev, 295, 318; Sargentich (n 56) 430.

67 See Schoenbrod (n 57) 1225.

68 Separate opinion in Industrial Department AFL-CIO v American Petroleum Institute (n 40) 687 ff; dissenting opinion in American Textile Manufacturers Institute v Donovan (n 40) 490 ff.

69 Craig (n 4) 370. Compare also Turpin (n 24) 404 ff.

70 Fourth Report (1995–6) HC 152, para 14. Compare also Report of the Inquiry into the Export of Defence Equipment and Dual-Use of Goods to Iraq and Related Prosecutions (1996) HC 115 (‘Scott Report’); Rippon Commission (n 52) 89–90.

71 Compare eg Sunkin, ‘Grounds for Judicial Review: Illegality in the Strict Sense’ in Feldman (ed) English Public Law (2004) 745 ff.

72 Compare Himsworth, ‘The delegated powers scrutiny committee’ (1995) P L 34 ff.

73 See McAuslan and McEldowney, Law, Legitimacy and the Constitution (1995) 23.

74 Compare for similar arguments in the US Wright (n 57) 575 ff; Jaffe (n 57) 1183 ff; McGowan (n 57) 1128 ff; Freedman (n 57) 78 ff; Ely (n 41) 131 ff; Aranson, Gellhorn and Robinson (n 44) 67; Bardach and Kagan, Going by the Book (1982) 46 ff; Dill, ‘Scope of Review of Rulemaking after Chadha—A Case for the Delegation Doctrine?’, 33 (1984) Emory L. J., 953 ff; Garland, ‘Deregulation and Judicial Review’ (1985) 98 Harv L Rev, 507, 568 ff; Mayton (n 57) 965; Gellhorn (n 57) 352–3; Dripps (n 66) 662 ff. Stewart, ‘Beyond Delegation Doctrine’ (1987) 36 Am U L Rev, 323, 324, asserts, however, that there are no ‘judicially manageable and defensible criteria to distinguish permissible from impermissible delegations’. Similarly Pierce, ‘Delegation of Powers to Administrative Agencies—Political Accountability and Delegated Power’ 36 (1987) Am U L Rev, 391, 403 ff.

75 Compare Anschütz Die Verfassung des Deutschen Reiches (14th edn 1933) Art 48; März, Die Diktaturgewalt des Reichspräsidenten (1997); Lindseth (n 22) 1361 ff.

76 Reichsgesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich, 24.3.1933, RGBl. I, 141. Compare Mössle (n 37) 28 ff; Lindseth (n 22) 1370 f.

77 See Lindseth (n 2) 1387 ff; Ossenbühl ‘Gesetz und Verordnung im gegenwärtigen Staatsrecht’ (1997) ZG, 305, 307 ff.

78 Compare Glaeser, Schmitt, ‘Partizipation an Verwaltungsentscheidungen’ (1973) 31 VVDStRL, 179, 199.Google Scholar

79 Schoenbrod, , ‘Separation of Powers and the Powers that Be—The Constitutional Purposes of the Delegation Doctrine’ (1987) 36 Am U L Rev 355, 386.Google Scholar

80 The term ‘dilemma’ is used to describe the problem in German and American scholarship. See eg Ossenbühl (n 77) 314; and Schoenbrod (n 57) 1227.

81 Eichenberger, ‘Gesetzgebung im Rechtsstaat’ (1982) 40 VVDStRL 7, 29–30.

82 Compare BVerfGE 8, 274, 326; 11, 234, 237; 21, 1, 4; 28, 175, 183; 58, 257, 278; and v Danwitz, Die Gestaltungsfreiheit des Verordnungsgebers (1989) 128–129.

83 See eg Mashaw, ‘Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions’ (1985) 1 J L Econ & Org. 1 ff; Pierce (n 74) 391 ff.

84 cp Pünder (n 1) 150 ff.

85 See, for the time before 1919 G. Jellinek (n 51) 99 ff, 366 ff; Reich-Erkelenz, Das Verordnungsrecht des Monarchen im deutschen konstitutionellen Staat (1966); and, for the Weimar republic, Huber, Deutsche Verfassungsgeschichte seit 1789, vol. VI (1981) 440.

86 See § 2 II of the ‘Gesetz betreffend Rechtsverordnungen der Bundesregierung zur Durchführung von EG-Richtlinien’. Compare with British Law eg Craig (n 4) 379–380.

87 See BVerfGE 8, 271, 319 ff; 8, 274, 321; 59, 48, 49 ff. Some federal and state constitutional norms even provide explicitly for the participation. Compare Art. 109 paragraph 4 Basic Law, Art. 9 paragraph 2 Bavarian Constitution, Art. 47 paragraph 1 Constitution of Berlin.

88 BVerfGE 4, 193, 203.

89 See also for a comparative perspective Kersell (n 16); Lindseth (n 22) 1352.

90 See Craig (n 4) 374 ff. Compare also Hood Phillips, Jackson and Leopold (n 9) 672 ff; Wade and Forsyth (n 52) 898 ff; Allen, Law and Order (3rd edn, 1965) 122 ff; Campbell ‘Statutory Instruments—Laying and Legislation by Reference’ (1987) P L 328 ff; Hayhurst and Wallington (n 52) 547 ff.

91 Turpin (n 24) 414; Loveland (n 9) 134. Kersell (n 16) 82, notes that the affirmative procedure is, of course, less popular with Governments as it requires parliamentary time in every case and provides the Opposition with more chances to be obstructive if that is its inclination.

92 See Turpin (n 24) 496; Craig (n 4) 376. Compare also Beatson, ‘Legislative Control of Administrative Rulemaking: Lessons from the British Experience’ (1979) 12 Corn I L J 199, 213–215. Compare for suggestions of improvement Rippon Commission (n 52) 91–93, 149.

93 It is the duty of the ‘Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments’ which was formed 1973 from the committees of the Commons and Lords to examine every subordinate legislation laid before Parliament in order to determine whether the attention of the House should be drawn to an instrument. See for details Craig (n 4) 377 ff, 395–396; Hayhurst and Wallington (n 52) 547 ff; Hood Phillips, Jackson and Leopold (n 9) 676 ff; Wade and Forsyth (n 52) 901 ff. For a comparative perspective on the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada see Kersell (n 16) 43 ff.

94 See, for a comparative study of Anglo-American law, Schwartz and Wade, Legal Control of Government: Administrative Law in Britain and the United States (1972) 90.

95 An inventory of these statutes as of 1983 appears as an appendix to the dissenting opinion of Justice White in Immigration and Naturalization Service v Chadha (1983) 462 US 919, 1003.

96 Immigration and Naturalization Service v Chadha (n 95) 919 ff with a dissenting opinion of Justice White (967 ff). See also Process Gas Consumers Group v Consumer Energy Council of America (1983) 463 US 1216 ff. Compare generally Strauss, ‘Was there a Baby in the Bathwater? A Comment on the Supreme Court's Legislative Veto Decision’ (1983) Duke L J 789 ff.

97 See eg Alexandria v US (1984) 737 F 2d 1002 (Fed. Cir.). Generally Aman and Mayton (n 40) 626 ff; Pierce and Shapiro and Verkuil (n 42) 67 f.

98 See Schwartz (n 3) 217 (with further references).

99 Compare for objections Staupe (n 65) 317 ff; v Danwitz (n 82) 112 ff; Sommermann, ‘Verordnungsrechtmächtigung und Demokratieprinzip’ JZ 1997, 434, 438 ff.

100 Compare Brohm, ‘Die Dogmatik des Verwaltungsrechts vor den Gegenwartsaufgaben der Verwaltung’ (1972) 30 VVDStRL 245, 269–270; Klein, ‘Die Kompetenz- und Rechtskompensation’ (1981) DVBl, 661, 662; Novak, ‘Gesetzgebung im Rechtsstaat’ (1982) 40 VVDStRL, 40, 52.

101 See eg Bäumlin ‘Die Kontrolle des Parlaments über Regierung und Verwaltung’ (1966) ZSR 165, 241 ff.

102 Compare Craig and de Búrca (n 10) 118 ff; Smismans (n 10) 601 ff.

103 See Craig (n 4) 376. Compare also in a comparative perspective Kersell (n 16) 81.

104 Second Report of the Joint Committee on Delegated Legislation (1972–1973) H L 204; (1972–1973) H.C. 408. Compare also Rippon Commission (n 52) 31.

105 Compare Himsworth (n 72) 41. See for the ‘super-affirmative procedure’ pursuant to the Regulatory Reform Act 2001 Craig (n 4) 378–379; Hood Phillips, Jackson and Leopold (n 9) 678 ff; Turpin (n 24) 408 ff; Miers, ‘The Deregulation Procedure: An Expanding Role’ (1999) P L 477 ff.

106 See BVerfGE 2, 237 ff; 8, 274 (319, 323). A different opinion is voiced by Ossenbühl (n 77) 315.

107 See v Danwitz (n 82) 130. Compare concerning the American law eg Scalia, ‘The Legislative Veto—A False Remedy for System Overload’ (1979) 3 Regulation, 19, 22; Elliott, ‘INS v Chadha—The Administrative Constitution, the Constitution and the Legislative Veto’ (1983) Sup. Ct. Rev, 125, 150–151.

108 See Turpin (n 24) 496; Wade and Forsyth (n 52) 990.

109 Compare Sommermann (n 99) 438 ff.

110 See Craig (n 4) 376. Compare also Beith, , ‘Prayers Unanswered: A Jaundiced View of the Parliamentary Scrutiny of Statutory Instruments’ (1981) 34 Parliamentary Affairs 165, 170Google Scholar; Hayhurst and Wallington (n 52) 547 ff.

111 Compare Allen (n 90) 136. See also Beatson (n 92) 213–215.

112 Beatson (n 92) 222.

113 Compare BVerfGE 8, 274, 323.

114 Compare for a British perspective eg Craig (n 4) 384–387; Garner, ‘Consultation in Subordinate Legislation’ (1964) P.L. 105, 122 ff; Wade and Forsyth (n 52) 897.

115 See for details § 553 (b) APA. Compare for the notice and the ‘pre-notice part’ of rulemaking Aman and Mayton (n 40) 44 ff.

116 Fox, Understanding Administrative Law (1986) 128.

117 § 553 (c) sentence 1 APA.

118 To secure public participation American courts force the rulemaking authorities to explicitly consider the ‘significant comments’. See Aman and Mayton (n 40) 55 ff (with references to the judicature).

119 § 553 (c) sentence 2 APA. See for example Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (1983) 463 US, 29 ff.

120 Cp Ehlers, ‘Die Klagebefugnis nach deutschem, europäischem Gemeinschafts- und US-amerikanischem Recht’ (1993) VerwArch 139 ff; Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen, Controlling Chemicals: Politics of Regulation in Europe and the United States (1985) 108 ff.

121 See above all Association of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v Camp (1970) 197 US, 150 ff; US v Student Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (1973) 412 US, 669 ff. Generally Aman and Mayton (n 40) 379 ff.

122 Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen (n 120) 108.

123 See above all Abbot Laboratories v Gardner (1967) 387 US, 136, 148–149; Lujan v National Wildlife Federation (1990) 110 S.Ct., 3177, 3190–3191. Generally Aman and Mayton (n 40) 414 ff. For the UK compare the concerns voiced by Craig (n 4) 386.

124 See Mintz and Miller, A Guide to Federal Agency Rulemaking (2nd edn, 1991) 323 (with reference to the judicature and legal scholarship).

125 Similarly Brickman, Jasanoff and Ilgen (n 120) 116 ff; Scharpf, Die politischen Kosten des Rechtsstaates (1970) 24.

126 See above all Schechter Poultry Co v US (n 38) 495 ff.

127 Dworkin, Law's Empire (1986) 177 ff, compares the political decision-making to roulette: ‘Fairness in politics … is now generally understood … to mean procedures that give all citizens more or less equal influence in the decisions that govern them.’ Pierce, Shapiro and Verkuil (n 42) 454, explain: ‘Obligations of fairness are seen as alternatives and supplements to political accountability as a method of bureaucratic control.’

128 See Pierce, Shapiro and Verkuil (n 42) 224; Bonfield (n 18) 151 ff.

129 Compare for different approaches Sunstein, ‘Beyond the Republican Revival’ (1988) 97 Yale L J, 1539 ff (‘republicanism’); Colburn ‘“Democratic Experimentalism”: A Separation of Powers For Our Times?’ (2004) 37 Suffolk U L Rev 287 ff.

130 See Bonfield (n 18) 15–16; Stewart (n 56) 1669 ff; Garland (n 74) 510 ff, 576 ff, 581 ff; Breyer and Stewart, Administrative Law and Regulatory Policy (1979) 34–35; Diver, ‘Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law’ (1981) 95 Harv L Rev, 393, 423–424.

131 See Black, The Theory of Committees and Elections (1958); Buchanan and Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962); Tullock, ‘The Problems of Majority Voting’ (1959) 67 J of Pol Ec 571 ff; Parsons, Sociological Theory and Modern Society (1967) 223 ff. Compare also Pierce, Shapiro and Verkuil (n 42) 18 ff.

132 Bonfield (n 18) 15.

133 Aman and Mayton (n 40) 36. See also Davis, ‘A New Approach to Delegation’ (1969) 36 U Chi L Rev 713 ff; Stewart (n 74) 323–324; Sunstein, ‘Interest Groups in American Public Law’ (1985) 38 Stan L Rev 29, 60–62.

134 Lowi (n 66) 297.

135 See Lowi (n 57) 51; Bonfield (n 18) 146; Scalia, ‘Two Wrongs Make a Right—The Judicalization of Standardless Rulemaking’ (1977) 1 Regulation, 38 ff; Aman and Mayton (n 40) 41; Davis, Discretionary Justice (1969) 219; Fuchs, ‘Development and Diversification in Administrative Rule Making’ (1977) 71 Nw U LRev, 83, 105; Pierce, Shapiro and Verkuil (n 42) 24 ff (with further references).

136 On the importance of courts in the ‘interest representation model’ Garland (n 74) 510–511.

137 See also Batterton v Marshall (1980) 648 F 2d, 694 ff (DC Cir); Starr, dissenting opinion in Community Nutrition Institute v Young (1987) 818 F 2d, 943, 951 (DC Cir); Stewart (n 56) 1683.

138 Compare Pünder (n 1) 140 ff.

139 Compare Ramsauer (n 35) 74b.

140 See generally for examples Schneider, Gesetzgebung (1982) 150.

141 BVerfGE 42, 191 (205).

142 Critical of this assessment Pünder ‘Verwaltungsverfahren’, in Erichsen and Ehlers (eds) Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht (13th edn, 2006) § 12, n 14.

143 Compare Staupe (n 65) 204 ff (with further references).

144 Ossenbühl, ‘Rechtsverordnung’ in Isensee and Kirchhof (eds) Handbuch des Staatsrechts (1988) 414.

145 Compare Kopp, ‘Verfahrensregelungen zur Gewährleistung eines angemessenen Umweltschutzes’ (1980) BayVBl., 97, 101 ff.

146 Compare BVerfGE 66, 82 ff; Ossenbühl (n 144) 414–415; Stern, Das Staatsrecht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (vol. II 1980) 667 ff.

147 See Böckenförde, ‘Mittelbare/repräsentative Demokratie als eigentliche Form der Demokratie’ in G. Müller et al (eds) FS Eichenberger (1982) 301 ff. Compare also Hartisch, Verfassungsrechtliches Leistungsprinzip und Partizipationsverbot im Verwaltungsverfahren (1975) 90 ff (with further references).

148 See Craig (n 4) 381; Garner (n 114) 105 ff; Jergesen, ‘The Legal Requirements of Consultation’ (1978) P.L. 290 ff; Turpin (n 24) 408 ff.

149 Note that a limited legal duty to consider objections was imposed by the provisions of the Rules Publication Act 1893 that the rule-making authority must consider any written representations made within the forty-day period of preliminary publicity. Wade and Forsyth (n 52) 896, assert that this produced so little benefit that it was repealed by the Act of 1946.

150 Compare Bates v Lord Hailsham (1972) 1 W.L.R. 1373, 1378. See also R v Devon County Council, ex p Baker (1993) COD 138; R v Liverpool Corporation, ex p Liverpool Taxi Fleet Operators' Association (1972) 2 QB 299, C.A.

151 The right to reasoned decisions under the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992 is expressly excluded in the case of rules, order or schemes ‘of a legislative and not an executive character.’ See s 10 (5) (b).

152 See for details Craig (n 4) 381–383; Jergesen (n 148) 290 ff.

153 See for cases Craig (n 4) 380–381. Compare also Wade and Forsyth (n 52) 884–885; Jergesen (n 148) 310 ff.

154 See R. v Brent London Borough Council, ex p. Gunning (1985) 84 LGR 168, as cited by Craig (n 4) 381 with further examples. Compare also Jergesen (n 148) 302 ff.

155 See eg Craig (n 4) 383–388. Compare also Galligan, Due Process and Fair Procedures (1996) Ch 4; Rippon Commission (n 52).

156 www.cabinet-office/servicefirst/index/consultation.htm See Craig (n 4) 388; Turpin (n 24) 411. Compare also Select Committee on Public Administration, First Report, Public Participation, Issues and Innovations (2001) HC 373-I.

157 See Wade and Forsyth (n 52) 897; Garner (n 114) 105 ff; Jergesen (n 148) 290 ff; Griffith (n 9) 279, 288 ff.

158 Compare for the UK Craig (n 4) 383–387; for Germany Dienel, ‘Partizipation an Planungsprozessen’ (1971) 4 Verwaltung, 151, 152 ff; Hufen, Fehler im Verwaltungsverfahren (1986) 198; Lübbe-Wolff, ‘Verfassungsrechtliche Fragen der Normsetzung im Umweltrecht’ (1991) ZG, 218, 227 ff; Denninger, Verfassungsrechtliche Anforderungen an die Normsetzung (1990) 60 ff.

159 Scharpf (n 125) 62.

160 See Lübbe-Wolff (n 158) 235 ff.

161 Scharpf (n 125) 65. Compare also Choper (n 56) 13.

162 Compare Black (n 131) 61 ff, 156 ff, 178 ff; Tullock (n 131) 571; Parsons (n 131) 231 ff; Hovenkamp, ‘Legislation, Well-Being, and Public Choice’ (1990) 57 U Chi L Rev, 63 ff; Hovenkamp, ‘Arrow's Theorem: Ordination and Republican Government’ (1990) 75 Iowa L Rev 949 ff Critical Mashaw, ‘The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public Law’ (1989) 65 Chi-Kent L Rev, 123 ff; Sunstein (n 133) 29; Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (3rd edn, 1986) 496 ff; and Pierce (n 74) 408 ff.

163 In Germany, ‘Politikverdrossenheit’ was 1992 the ‘word of the year’. Compare for the UK Dunley and Weir, ‘Public Response and Constitutional Significance’ (1995) 48 Parliamentary Affairs, 602, 615; Smith, Trevor, ‘Citizenship, Community and Constitutionalism’ (1996) 49 Parliamentary Affairs, 262 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

164 See also Schmitt Glaeser (n 78) 236; Lübbe-Wolff (n 158) 246–247.

165 (n 54) 897.

166 Compare Sunstein (n 133) 61 ff, from the German perspective Hoffmann-Riem, ‘Selbstbindungen der Verwaltung’ (1982) 40 VVDStRL, 187, 204 ff. For scepticism about the agency capture thesis compare Posner, ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’ (1974) 5 Bell Jnl. of Econ. and Mgmt. Sci., 335, 342; for an empirical analysis, see Page (n 9) 129 ff.

167 See Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v Environmental Protection Agency (1983) 705 F 2d, 506 f (D C Cir); Harter (n 57) 17 ff; Stewart (n 56) 1684–5.

168 Bonfield (n 18) 151.

169 Compare Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren (1969) 210 ff.

170 Compare for Germany Pünder (n 1) 293 f; for the UK eg Garner (114) 105 ff.

171 Compare on the problem of apathy Schmitt Glaeser (n 78) 239–240, on the role of organised interest groups Leach in Mullard (ed) Policy-making in Britain (1995) 34–5; for Germany Dagtoglou, ‘Partizipation an Verwaltungsentscheidungen’ (1972) DVBl, 712, 714 ff.

172 The US Supreme Court stresses in Bowen v American Hospital Association (1986) 476 US, 610 ff: ‘Our recognition of Congress’ need to vest administrative agencies with ample power to assist in the difficult task of governing a vast and complex industrial nation carries with it the correlative responsibility of the agency to explain the rationale and factual basis for its judgment.'

173 Cp Craig (n 4) 384.

174 Cp Schmitt Glaeser (n 78) 189.

175 See Pünder (n 1) 202 ff, 219 ff, 233 ff, 271.

176 Cp eg Pietzcker, ‘Verwaltungsverfahren zwischen Verwaltungseffizienz und Rechtsschutzauftrag’ (1983) 41 VVDStRL, 193, 218 f; Hufen (n 158) 295 ff.

177 Craig (n 4) 384.

178 Cp Stewart (n 56) 1760 ff.

179 See above all Sargentich (n 56) 433 ff (with further references).

180 Similarly Brohm (n 105) 270; Schmitt Glaeser (n 78) 240 ff.

181 Cp Craig (n 4) 384 ff.

182 Scharpf (n 125) 38.

183 Scalia, ‘Back to the Basics: Making Law Without Making Rules’ (1981) Regulation, 25 ff.

184 Davis, quoted by McGarity, ‘Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process' (1992) 1 Duke L J, 1385.

185 Cp DeLong, ‘Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy’ (1979) 65 Virginia Law Review, 257, 319 ff (with further references).

186 See Aman and Mayton (n 40) 61.

187 See for a detailed solution to this problem Pünder (n 1) 228 ff.

188 Craig (n 4) 386.

189 Bonfield (n 18) 448.