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CONTRACTING OUT WAR?: PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES, LAW AND REGULATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 January 2008

Walker Clive  and
Whyte Dave
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Abstract

It was Robert Nozick who, distinguishing the classical liberal ‘night-watchman State’ which protected citizens against violence and enforced contracts on their behalf, conjured instead the ‘ultra-minimal State’1 in which the task of the State is confined to the monopolization of violence rather than the actual provision of security (unless paid for by citizens by choice). On the face of it, it seems that Western governments are increasingly keen to move towards this model of the ultra-minimal State and to allow even the provision of force to be assumed by private enterprise on a contractual model in which the rich or the desperate may choose to avail themselves of fortifications at the going rate while the rest take their chances in life. The ultra-minimal State is left with a residual steering2 policy role in which the parameters of contractual engagement for protection can be set. In short, it appears that nothing is sacrosanct in the onward march of the principles of neo-liberalism. Even the ultimate bastions of establishment—Her Majesty's armed forces—are not immune from processes of commodification and marketization that have previously been applied to core functions such as policing3 and imprisonment.4

Type
Research Article
Information
International & Comparative Law Quarterly , Volume 54 , Issue 3 , July 2005 , pp. 651 - 689
Copyright
Copyright © British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2005

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