Many recent arguments for trans-state and global democracy would offer broad leeway on constitutionalized right standards to states, and few formal mechanisms for individuals to challenge domestic rights rejections beyond the state. Such a stance, it is shown here, tends to be rooted in implicit presumptions of domestic consensus. Challenges are offered to this and related presumptions in accounts of cosmopolitan democracy, as well as global variants of liberal nationalism and political liberalism. An alternative, primarily instrumental approach to trans-state and global democracy is detailed. It would give emphasis to ways in which formal suprastate participation, complemented by challenge mechanisms for individuals, could play a crucial role in helping to strengthen individual rights protections within states. The case for adopting such an approach is reinforced through attention to the efforts of a persistent domestic democratic minority – Dalits in India – to reach out to the global human rights regime for help in pressuring their own state to better protect rights against exclusion and subjugation.

The article attempts to illuminate how the concept of accountability is diversely shaped and signified in the theoretical legal discourse. It engages in a threefold mapping review: (i) it portrays, according to the basic divide between the angles ‘within the state’ and ‘beyond the state’, the geographical and functional contexts in which real-world political accountability mechanisms exist and interact; (ii) it interprets an influential legitimating discourse that is being used as a benchmark to appraise institutions and political processes beyond the state – the Global Administrative Law project (GAL); (iii) it highlights how this sort of accountability discourse is tied with demands for legitimacy in global governance that cannot be detached from the old political ideals. Largely oriented towards due process, I argue that the GAL project, in order to maintain a normative appeal, should not ignore larger political ideals, however controversial they might be. Otherwise, it remains a manipulable and hence unreliable cause to be endorsed.

In this article, I ask about the extent to which the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) has advanced democracy in the European Union. I critically engage with the claim that the CoFoE’s success should not be measured by whether it enabled constituent power, or ultimately results in treaty reforms, but by the fact that, by introducing citizens’ assemblies to EU politics, it has laid the foundation for participatory democracy in the European Union. Drawing on established theories of participatory democracy, I argue that this interpretation misses the point. To put forward an alternative view, I revisit James Bohman’s concept of a democratic minimum. The best democratic defence of permanent EU citizens’ assemblies is that they could provide citizens with the capacity to initiate deliberation about common concerns – and thus function as a nucleus for constituent power in the European Union. Nevertheless, the idea should be viewed with caution, as permanent citizens’ assemblies could just as well become a democratic fig-leaf allowing EU institutions to reject calls for fundamental reforms. Much therefore depends on their institutional design.

In A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Kant, Constitutional Justice and the European Convention on Human Rights, Alec Stone Sweet and Clare Ryan reconstruct Kant’s legal philosophy as a program of cosmopolitan legal order (CLO). A CLO is defined as a multi-level, judicialized, transnational system of rights protection that confers on all persons, by virtue of their humanity, the entitlement to challenge the rights-regarding decisions of public officials, who are under an obligation to assure the equal juridical status of all. The authors illustrate this claim with respect to the development of the ECtHR and the Court of Justice of the European Union. While generally agreeing with their argument, I claim that they minimize the republican aspects of Kant’s political philosophy in favour of strong judicial review. After outlining republican and democratic objections, I claim that their book illustrates a model that I call ‘dialogic constitutionalism’. Dialogic constitutionalism does not neglect legislative authority, but places it in a conversation with judicial authority, whether domestic or transnational; such conversations can serve to upgrade standards of rights protection over time and are not frozen precommitments. Constitutions also have a representative function of standing for the intergenerational continuity of the people, whereas legislatures are bound by electoral cycles.

The idea of a perfect national political community, entirely confined within the contours of a corresponding state, is one of the foundational fictions of global modernity. Its formal crystallisation in the legal grammars of the right to self-determination has been however, particularly in the post-colonial era, highly problematic and full of ambiguities. Drawing on this background, this article contends that diplomacy offers frequently a more promising venue for dealing with the challenge of political pluralism than appealing to either the unstable grammars of the right to self-determination or a reified understanding of the principle of territorial integrity of states. In so doing, firstly, the right to self-determination is critically examined. Instead of attempting to articulate its formal content, the malleability of its legal grammars and political realities, will be emphasised. Secondly, based on the discussion of a variety of historical cases, the notion of ‘constituent diplomacies’ will be advanced, aiming to show how the agonistic accommodation of political and territorial pluralism through diplomacy was crucial not only in the formative processes of modern sovereign states but also nowadays. Finally, this relational understanding of the historical forms of governance of political pluralism within and beyond state boundaries will be re-examined, beyond its ethno-political dimensions, through the prism of the complex interplay between the material and ideational conditions for the co-production of sovereignty in the context of new global capitalism.

This article seeks to confront the contemporary condition in which cosmopolitan law – meant to resonate as something citizens across borders author and live together – instead is increasingly a source of detachment, confusion, and alienation. Taking the European Union’s twin crises of democratic legitimacy and social solidarity as its starting point, the article offers a critique of existing approaches to supranational constitutionalism that are insufficiently responsive to this disenchantment. The article’s purpose, in turn, is to present perspectives from philosophy and legal theory that might promisingly recast, in this new cosmopolitan frame, our thinking about law as a mode of social integration. Specifically, the article’s central claim is that time – as a seldom-examined, yet essential dimension of law – is closely linked to law’s cosmopolitan potential and, concurrently, to the motivational resources for cosmopolitan solidarity. It is through a sensitivity to time – our awareness of the past passing into the present in anticipation of a future – that citizens can meaningfully hold together cosmopolitan law’s dual, ostensibly divergent hopes: shared commitment and self-decentring plurality. Drawing on Seyla Benhabib’s ‘democratic iterations’ and its roots in the work of Jacques Derrida and Robert Cover, the article elaborates the following two concepts: ‘cosmopolitan promise-making’, a diachronic form of cosmopolitan political agency; and ‘cosmopolitan legal narrative’, a set of plural, evolving constitutional interpretations open to mutual engagement over time. These concepts, in temporalizing our understanding of political identity and constitutional law, together serve to underwrite a cosmopolitan legal order without also thinning solidarity’s social and democratic foundations. The article concludes with a critique of the contemporary role of European courts and a concrete vision for the cosmopolitan development of EU jurisprudence. Reinterpreting Article 4(2) TEU as the right to constitutional narrative, the article advances new modalities and normative aspirations for constitutional interpretation beyond the nation-state.

The article considers implications of contested multilateralism for the processes and normative standards of global constitutionalism. The focus is primarily on aspects of CM regarded as a mode of constitutional change, considering what to make of such a form of ‘extra-constitutional’ procedure. Research challenges for political science, law and normative political theory are identified. Challenges by CM to the stability of international law are argued to be overdrawn. Of greater concern is that CM lends itself to piecemeal adjustments rather than reforms with an eye to the systemic effects. However, these worries must be tempered by the non-ideal nature of the present legal structure which should make us wary of imposing normative standards drawn from settings where institutions are fully just and generally complied with.

The article has sought to clarify the phenomenon of constitutional transfer through an analysis of the introduction and implementation of the individual complaint procedure in Turkey. Individual access to constitutional courts has recently attained prominence as an effective tool of human rights protection and it is viewed as an example of the broader phenomenon of transfer of constitutional ideas from a point of origin to a new host environment. Critically applying the IKEA theory of constitutional transfer to the Turkish experience of the individual application to the Constitutional Court, we argue that the transfer process involves more than a simple interaction between the promoter and the importer, both of whom have converging as well as diverging expectations. The Turkish experience has proved a useful case to demonstrate the dynamic and multifaceted nature of the process of constitutional transfers. The Venice Commission, the European Court of Human Rights, the Turkish Constitutional Court and the Turkish Government all have important stakes in the success of the transfer to realise their own policy objectives.

How can we account for the normative dimension of international practices? Silviya Lechner and Mervyn Frost’s Practice Theory and International Relations answers this question by proposing, with a considerable degree of epistemological sophistication, what the authors call ‘normative descriptivism’, which they combine with a focus on ‘macro practices’. In this contribution, I start by examining the authors’ engagement with IR’s practice turn, and the insights this engagement may offer on the underlying objective of their approach. I then turn to Lechner and Frost’s decision to eclipse history. The contribution concludes by using the evolution of international law as a cursory illustration of the types of analyses Lechner and Frost’s approach would lead to. It thereby emphasises potential challenges inherent in the authors’ combination of internalism as rooted in individual self-consciousness and a focus on ‘macro practices’, including the possibility that it might limit the potential to critically question the standard that becomes identified as universal.

This article addresses the conservative opposition to Iceland’s recently liberalised abortion laws. It argues that the opposition belongs to a long and rich history of conservatives willing to employ diverse measures to oppose progress. It further claims that the rhetoric employed has strong roots in the conservative tradition. This is demonstrated by the fact that the discourse in Iceland fits within Hirschman’s analytical framework, through which he analyses the main arguments of conservatives in the past. Icelandic conservatives argued that the proposed legislation would lead to the perverse effect that healthy foetuses would be aborted, that the legislation was futile, as the system was already well-functioning, and that it would jeopardise women by giving them the sole responsibility of deciding whether to terminate a pregnancy. The article sheds light on the underlying resistance to women’s bodily autonomy and right to self-determination. It also illustrates the importance of hierarchy and conservatism’s opposition to equality that is perceived to be taken too far. In light of global trends, where conservatives have tried to implement policies that are hostile towards women and women’s interests, it is important to explore national contexts where legislative success has been achieved despite global backlash.

Through an account of white feminisms and white privilege, this article examines the tensions between local and international knowledge frames. The article considers the possibility of a feminist approach to global constitutionalism and argues for a twofold critique: first, a feminist interrogation of the dominance of a specifically male history of Western and Anglo-European knowledge frames; and second, a self-critique within feminist approaches to global legal regimes that acknowledges the complicity of mainstream feminist tools in the racist histories of knowledge production. To this end, the article examines the space of gender expertise to explore how this can be both an aperture for plural feminist encounters and a refinement of diverse feminist approaches into a form digestible by the contours of international institutions. To explore alternative, decolonized encounters, the article centres Lusophone African feminist silence and action in Luanda, the capital of Angola. The article explores how Angolan gender relations, informal labour and histories of protest unsettle the frame of a feminist manifesto, to argue for a place for active silence as a methodology for undoing the status quo of global constitutional expectations of how knowledge arrives at the global and transnational levels.

The Russian war against Ukraine has challenged fundamental norms such as sovereignty, non-interference and the prohibition of the use of force. It has led to diverse reactions from the international community. Only very few states sided with Russia, some states remained neutral, while the vast majority condemned the attack and supported Ukraine in its right to self-defence. Thus, although there is no legal obligation, many states display behaviour that goes beyond diplomatic support. They support Ukraine financially and even deliver weapons to support Ukraine in its right to self-defence. In this article, we conceptualize different types of actors’ behaviour in world politics. We distinguish between responsible, irresponsible, appropriate, and inappropriate behaviour. We apply this typology to states’ reaction to the Russian war against Ukraine. The typology enables us to analyse the variation of the responses with reference to norms and responsibility, two core concepts of International Relations (IR) Theory and global politics. Counterintuitively as it might seem, we argue that the support of Ukraine with weapons can be categorized as responsible behaviour as it displays an over-fulfilment of the right to self-defence norm, which leads to the emergence of a new norm: the responsibility to support norm.

The article explores the relationship between religious pluralism and national-majoritarian models of social cohesion in European human rights jurisprudence. Comparing the German, French and British interpretation of the ‘social cohesion limitation’ of freedom of religion it contends that, at the national level, concerns for social cohesion are fuelled by attitudes towards religious diversity that range from indifference to intolerance and that are difficult to reconcile with the normative premises of religious pluralism in a democratic society. The second section of the article traces the relationship between religious pluralism and social cohesion in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The analysis suggests that the diversity of national-majoritarian approaches to social cohesion in Europe prevents the Court from ensuring an effective trans-national protection of religious pluralism. The third section turns to the controversial Lautsi judgments of the European Court of Human Rights to place the Court’s approach to religious minority protection in the context of trans-national judicial politics in the European legal space. The concluding section suggests an alternative approach to religious pluralism and social cohesion that vindicates religious diversity and does justice to the counter-majoritarian telos of human rights protection.

Debates about ‘constitutionalism’ have become an important trend in WTO scholarship. Despite over two decades of interest, however, a coherent definition of the term and its content remain out of reach. This paper argues that ‘constitutionalism’ should be approached not as something that can be measured or assessed empirically, but rather as a ‘discursive contest’: a debate in which participants intervene on behalf of particular understandings of how the system does or should operate. Approaching constitutionalism as a discursive contest adds to the literature by shifting the focus to an analysis of how ‘constitutional talk’ produces knowledge about the WTO, and how this knowledge in turn structures perceptions about the way government works and the possibilities for action. Providing examples from scholarly debates and WTO practice, the article aims to make concrete the relationship between truth and government and the implications of discursive contests over constitutionalism in the field of WTO law.

Silviya Lechner’s and Mervyn Frost’s book Practice Theory and International Relations offers a new approach to theorise international relations in terms of ‘practices’. It is a welcome contribution to an intensifying debate about ‘praxis’, ‘practice’ and ‘practices’ because Lechner and Frost actually engage key authors of praxis, such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, who, in IR, have often only been referenced in passing. While the rediscovery of Wittgenstein as praxis theorist is welcome, the reading of his approach to praxis is irritating because ‘internalism’ and ‘descriptivism’ – two concepts which Lechner and Frost highlight as central in both Wittgenstein’s work and their new practice theory – are interpreted in ways which are difficult to reconcile with Wittgenstein’s late philosophy. This critique offers a different reading of Wittgenstein’s approach to praxis and argues that such an alternative reading opens up an understanding of praxis which, if adopted more widely, would also free IR theorising from self-imposed strictures.

How have Asian nations conducted, or how are they conducting, constitution-making in the face of pressures associated with globalisation, and how do they balance those forces with domestic interests and realities? This article aims to develop an analytical framework that can capture this global–local interplay. It introduces the concept of ‘glocalised constitution-making’ to denote the co-existence and relationship between the two governance levels as manifested in the forces, actors and norms pertaining to the process of drafting a new constitution as well as its substance. Glocalisation permeates the entirety of a constitution-making episode, from the impetus to initiate the process, to its design and inclusiveness of interests featured, and the scope of topics considered. The effects of glocalised constitution-making for domestic drafters are arranged along a continuum with approbation and aversion as the polar opposites. The precise location on the continuum will depend on the value preferences of the domestic stakeholders and the matters under consideration. The application of this analytical framework is illustrated with reference to recent constitution-making exercises in Bhutan, Nepal, Thailand, East Timor and Sri Lanka.

In this article, we argue that the 2022 Chilean draft Constitution helps to articulate the distinction between a transformative constitutional project and a utopian one. Whereas a transformative project lays down markers for social change that will take time to achieve, a utopian project sets out goals that are unlikely to be achieved within any reasonable timeframe. Utopianism is a product of two relationships. The first is the internal relationship between the transformative goals laid out in a constitution and the institutional pathways through which changes will occur. The second is the external relationship between the goals in the text and the views and support of key groups. In Chile, both relationships were problematic. First, the Convention adopted a draft that was heavy on ambitious programmatic content but lacked a clear vision of how to implement it. Second, the Convention produced a draft that was supported by the ephemeral civil society groups galvanized by the 2019 protests but divorced from the vision of Chile’s parties and public opinion. Some of this was a product of the peculiar electoral context in which the Convention acted, which has already been corrected. But some of it reflects deeper tensions within transformative constitutionalism.

Presidential term limit provisions are often perceived as a feature of modern democratic systems. It has been argued that their existence is a key intervention mechanism to pre-empt some undemocratic outcomes associated with incumbency advantages. In 2008, the Constitution of Cameroon was amended to abolish the presidential term limit. More than ten years on, there are ostensible signs of a democratic decline. This article takes a retrospective look at the constitutional amendment to assess its constitutionality. It is argued that a conclusion on the constitutionality of the amendment may not be unequivocal. Nevertheless, there are substantial grounds for considering the constitutional change as a constitutional dismemberment. This is premised on the fact that, although the amendment followed the normal rules for constitutional amendments, the transformation amounted to a fundamental break with the constitutional commitment to democracy that underpinned the adoption of the 1996 Constitution.

Recent years have seen considerably more attention being given to constitution-making as a field of deliberate study and practice, particularly with regard to the challenges and opportunities posed by constitution-making in conflict-affected states. A consequence of this work has been a more explicit recognition of the interconnectedness of peace processes and constitutional processes as mechanisms of political settlement. Within this context, this article argues for the more deliberate use of interim constitutions as a peacebuilding mechanism with potential to be effective in highly divided contexts in grounding a more inclusive and sustainable political settlement. This article argues that while interim constitutions are indeed commonly found in conflict-affected contexts, their use appears ad hoc and their design poorly conceived. The article reflects upon the potential strengths and weaknesses offered by interim constitutions in fragile and conflict-affected states. Reflecting on both the existing scholarship and the author’s own practical field experience, the article concludes that if a more modest and realistic approach to what constitution-making can achieve in fragile and conflict-affected states is coupled with more attention to design, interim constitutions can provide space and time to undertake more comprehensive discussions regarding the longer-term settlements.