This article raises the question of how the evolution of constitutional structures in international history can be conceptualized and narrated. This question is nurtured by the divergent historical accounts found in the literature on global constitutionalism and the historical-comparative literature on international societies. Although both literatures have so far largely ignored each other, they share a number of common conceptual problems and should therefore engage in a dialogue. The article sketches out the contours of such a dialogue to reveal the insufficient sensitivity of both literatures to the historicity of constitutional structures as well as their inherent political dimension. This article proposes to conceptualize constitutional structures as a set of fundamental and prioritized principles and rules that serves as a framework for the self-ordering of relations between polities. It thereby differentiates between a meta-constitutional and a legal-constitutional dimension and proposes seven analytical tools for more nuanced and empirically sensitive constitutional histories of interpolity relations. Such a historical perspective helps to account for the conditions of emergence as well as to delineate the novelty of contemporary global constitutionalism.

In A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Kant, Constitutional Justice, and the ECHR, we sought to demonstrate the power of Kantian theory to explain – or at least meaningfully illuminate – (1) the defining characteristics of modern, rights-based constitutionalism; (2) the evolving law, politics and constitutional architecture of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR); and (3) the emergence of a global, cosmopolitan commons, featuring inter-judicial dialogue at its core. This article responds to contributors to the special symposium on the book. In Part I, we defend our account of a Kantian-congruent, domestic system of constitutional justice. Part II reflects on the ECHR as an instantiation of a cosmopolitan legal order, and on the European Court’s case law – particularly its enforcement of the proportionality principle. In Part III, we assess the evidence in support of a broader ‘constitutionalization’ of international human rights law.

Presidential term limit provisions are often perceived as a feature of modern democratic systems. It has been argued that their existence is a key intervention mechanism to pre-empt some undemocratic outcomes associated with incumbency advantages. In 2008, the Constitution of Cameroon was amended to abolish the presidential term limit. More than ten years on, there are ostensible signs of a democratic decline. This article takes a retrospective look at the constitutional amendment to assess its constitutionality. It is argued that a conclusion on the constitutionality of the amendment may not be unequivocal. Nevertheless, there are substantial grounds for considering the constitutional change as a constitutional dismemberment. This is premised on the fact that, although the amendment followed the normal rules for constitutional amendments, the transformation amounted to a fundamental break with the constitutional commitment to democracy that underpinned the adoption of the 1996 Constitution.

Critics challenge international courts for their interference with domestic democratic processes and alleged violations of rule of law standards: they claim that these guardians of the rule of law are not well guarded themselves. These concerns should not be dismissed too quickly as mere disgruntled venting by populist politicians. This article focuses on regional human rights courts and argues that the same interests and values that justify rule of law standards of impartiality, independence and accountability domestically also justify similar standards for international courts. Focusing on the European Court of Human Rights and its doctrine of the margin of appreciation, the article demonstrates how this doctrine may contribute to fulfilling the rule of law but at the same time may also endanger it. This requires changes to the doctrine to ensure that the core rule of law standards of predictability and protection against arbitrary discretion are respected.

This article explores the extent to which (if at all) the concept of a constitution is undergoing change in the conditions of globalization that characterize the early decades of the twenty-first century, to an extent that might be described as transformation. The question is prompted both by familiar manifestations of the interdependence of domestic constitutional and international law and practice, and by the interpretation placed on them by some of the literature on global constitutionalism. Some – although by no means all – of the literature and the experience on which it draws relate to the extent of transnational influence on the way in which constitutions now are made or changed: constitution transformation in the narrow, or more particular, sense. The article seeks to answer this question with reference to global constitutional experience, including – critically – experience in Asia, as one of the largest and most diverse regions of the world, too often omitted from studies of this kind. To this end, the article considers whether the concept of a constitution can be regarded as having been globally shared in any event; examines the phenomena associated with globalization that might suggest a paradigm change; and considers the arguments that mitigate against change, at least on a global scale. In exploring these factors, it necessarily considers the extent to which states in different regions of the world diverge in their experiences of the internationalization of constitutional law. The article concludes that, on balance, it is not plausible to argue that the generic concept of a constitution has changed, with global effect. It does, however, acknowledge that current conditions of globalization present a series of challenges for national constitutions. Responding to them might itself be regarded as an exercise in global constitutionalism.

International law sometimes fails to regulate cross-border affairs due to a lack of consent or pace among the states. As a consequence, transnational governance arrangements, which are established by contract mainly among non-state actors, step in to fill the gap. The arrangement that allocates domains on the Internet offers the most sophisticated example to date. The present article argues that a new approach to the horizontal effect of constitutional rights may both account for the emergence of such arrangements and offer a solution to the problem of their legitimacy. According to this understanding, constitutional rights at the same time enable and restrict transnational regulation. In this way, they guarantee a comprehensive protection of freedom under conditions of globalisation. As long as transnational governance arrangements are not able to generate constitutional rights of their own, however, the national legal orders must complement them. Hence, the legitimacy of law in world society may only be ensured through a dialectical process of internal and external constitutionalisation, resulting from the interaction of its various constituents.

The Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE) was the first initiative to include citizens in deliberations about the future of European democracy since the failed Constitutional Convention of 2002/03. Although embedded within broader trends to involve ordinary citizens in the political process, it is of specific relevance in the European context because it raises expectations of democratic catching up and relates to ongoing discussions and struggles about the constitutional character of the European Union. This article argues for a citizen-centred perspective on constitutional renewal in the European Union that places European citizens as constituent subjects at centre stage. It outlines how making the European Union accessible as a political arena allows citizens to regain control over developments that have evolved behind people’s backs. It concludes that deliberative tools of citizen participation should be used to pave the way for a wider reorganization of public authority and a renewal of the European Union’s constitutional basis.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has widely been seen as a failure of the international legal order, which could neither stop Russia from launching a war of aggression, nor prevent the perpetration of international crimes. In such a reading, great power politics have (once again) trumped international law. We argue instead that international law plays a crucial part in the conflict by providing a semantic infrastructure, which the opposing parties use to justify their actions, try to re-draw limits of permissible action and negotiate changing ‘red lines’ with the enemy. Drawing on the notion of lawfare, we show how the pragmatic (mis-)use of international law flexibly delineates boundaries and stabilizes expectations between adversaries even as they are contested in the current war. We focus on claims about self-determination and self-defence to justify the use of force; categorizations of combatants; and weapons transfers and the status of third states. That international law can be violated or reinterpreted to breaking point does not make it irrelevant. To the contrary, it recalls its important role as a language of conflict and compromise, beyond strictly legalist as well as dismissive realist views.

The notion of legal space is increasingly being used to address the challenges of multiple and overlapping spheres of legality that the notion of legal order cannot capture. This article shows how legal space can serve as an alternative (or at least complementary) concept to legal order in view of the limitations of the latter. It sketches out a notion of legal space that is inspired by topology, an approach that analyses the qualitative nature of spaces. It is concerned with understanding the ways in which legalities interact, rather than with ‘measuring’ their spatial dimensions. A topology-inspired approach to legal space can contribute to conceptualizing, in a novel manner, the inner structure of legal spaces, the boundaries of these spaces and their interrelations with other spaces. It offers an analytical toolkit for better understanding multiple legalities, providing categories to characterize sets of legal elements as well as phenomena such as overlaps and hybridity. It is conceptually less constrained than the concept of legal order, and thus allows us to address various bodies of law ranging from classical domestic law, EU law and international law to global administrative law, corporate social responsibility law, platform law and lex sportiva.

As long as the American Constitution serves as the focal point of American identity, many constitutional interpretative theories also serve as roadmaps to various visions of American constitutional identity. Using the debate over the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, I expose the identity dimension of various interpretative theories and analyse the differences between the roadmaps offered by them. I argue that according to each of these roadmaps, courts’ authority to review legislation is required in order to protect a certain vision of American constitutional identity even at the price of thwarting Americans’ freedom to pursue their current desires. The conventional framing of interpretative theories as merely techniques to decipher the constitutional text or justifications for the Supreme Court’s countermajoritarian authority to review legislation and the disregard of their identity function is perplexing in view of the centrality of the Constitution to American national identity. I argue that this conventional framing is a result of the current understanding of American constitutional identity in terms of neutrality toward the question of the good. This reading of the Constitution as lacking any form of ideology at its core makes majority preferences the best take of current American identity, leaving constitutional theorists with the mission to justify the Court’s authority to diverge from majority preferences.

The European Union has transcended many of the old prerogatives of national independence bringing about the very function of interdependence among Member States. Within the latter there are sub-state communities claiming simultaneously both self-government and ‘more Europe’. The future intent of this political process in the Old Continent is to make territorial subsidiarity consistent with home rule within European framework legislation and continental institutions. The first part of this article focuses on the idea of a closer European Union based upon the implementation of territorial subsidiarity, as well as on the challenges posed by democratic accountability, multi-level governance and the preservation of the European Social Model (ESM). The second section illustrates some of these challenges in practice through an analysis of how the meaning of independence has developed in a ‘stateless nation’ such as Catalonia. In Spain, the lack of territorial accommodation, together with a long-standing centre–periphery controversy, has fuelled claims for secession by some Catalan nationalists. The conclusions ponder on how ‘cosmopolitan localism’ can optimise both independence and interdependence of stateless nations like Catalonia in the global context.

Scholars of global constitutionalism have recently come to examine international criminal law (ICL) and its associated institutions, in particular the International Criminal Court (the ICC). This article prolongs these efforts by pointing to and remedying two deficits of that project with particular emphasis on the Rome Statute crimes. First, how does one account for the role of the international trial in global constitutionalist terms? Second, can global constitutionalism insightfully explain the content and scope of these crimes – that is, both their substantive definition and the predominant modes of liability developed by the ICC? This article answers both questions affirmatively and offers an account of their nexus. It first shows that the Rome Statute crimes are often perpetrated through a hierarchically organized apparatus of control, and interprets their global constitutional significance via the principle of constituent power. It then makes use of Antony Duff’s relational account of criminal liability to offer an account of the international trial. In the international context, one can conceive of the trial as allowing state or state-like authorities to call each other to account, which renders justice to the core function of enabling and limiting political authority on which global constitutionalism centres.

This article addresses the problématique of giving voice to homegrown traditions of constitutionalism in individual African countries. The scholarly discussion is combined with an applied concern about whether this could instil a wider grassroots embrace of the country’s constitution, thereby consolidating constitutionalism and ensuring longevity. The investigation is carried through the lens of two sub-categories of the concept of constitutional identity: a representative one that reflects a country’s particular political, social and cultural makeup, and an aspirational one that sets goals and ideals. The challenge, in both scholarly and applied terms, is how to ensure that a constitution instils a sense of public ownership by becoming more representative of a country’s underlying makeup while also giving voice to modern aspirations to protect and promote individual human rights, and in doing so, also becoming self-sustaining as the foundational basic law guiding future generations. Attention is paid not only to the forms of constitutions but also to their function in both reaching ideals (in the positive sense of success) and staving off pitfalls (in the negative sense of success). The article also discusses whether these are best achieved through gradual terms over time or through the sudden big bang of mega reforms.

This article sheds a critical light on judicial dialogue when its purpose and meaning are taken beyond cross-fertilization and comparative reasoning. It cautions against a conceptualization of judicial dialogue as a means to foster commonalities between courts and to legitimize judicial governance. The argument develops from an idealized notion of a ‘transnational judicial public sphere’. In this sphere, domestic, regional and international courts ideally form common opinions through dialogue and pursue common purposes. The danger of this understanding is to construct a new paradigm that not only overlooks important differences in the interest, influence and opinion of courts, but also overstates the socio-normative significance of exchanges between courts and of judicial governance in general. The critical potential of judicial dialogues lies less in the formation of commonalities or in the legitimization of judicial authority than in bringing alternatives and a plurality of opinions to the fore.

The essential role of parties in democracies makes it important to keep them democratic. This article argues for sortition-based citizens’ assemblies (CAs) organized in and by civil society to formulate democratic standards for political parties to follow, to evaluate them individually and to criticize them publicly if they do not. This is a third and potentially complementary way to keeping parties democratic, placed between militant democracy on the one hand and citizen vigilantism on the other. Militant democracy is challenged by the fact that few democratically problematic parties are ostensibly anti-democratic and therefore likely to fall under the legal criteria for issuing party bans and other legal sanctions. Militant democratic measures are also likely to be ineffective and are vulnerable to abuse. Citizen vigilantism, whereby active democratic citizens take on the responsibility for protecting democracy, deals better with the ambiguous nature of democratically problematic parties but suffers from a lack of democratic authorization and clear standards of critique. While not perfect, the proposed model remedies many of the shortcomings of both approaches. Contributing to an emerging literature on CAs as instruments in the protection of democracy, the article evaluates the model’s normative justifiability, feasibility and likely effectiveness.

Private actors and institutions, and by extension private law itself, are increasingly being forced to reckon with a multiplicity of challenges that extend beyond the domain of private law as it is traditionally conceived. They reflect threats to the global constitutional order and liberal constitutionalism, and threats to individual and collective fundamental rights and constitutional values. As a result, the role of private law in framing and facilitating the development of the global economy and globalization often does not fall within the direct purview of public international lawyers. This editorial aims to examine the role of private law in the litigation and enforcement of public interests against the background of the public/private divide. This is done in light of the increasing role adopted by private actors, including corporations, beyond the private realm.

The constituent power theory, which served critical functions for several years, has outlived its utility as the preeminent yardstick to measure the normative legitimacy of a constitution. As the theory stands, it cannot apply on its own terms to most instances of modern constitution-making. At the same time, it is highly susceptible to being used to legitimize authoritarian outcomes. The scholarly literature that attempts to reimagine or expand the theory is scant and unable to overcome its problems. In response, this article develops an alternative standard: the theory of equitable elite bargaining. This theory provides that a constitution is normatively legitimate if it is the product of an equitable bargain between elites from most major political groups in society at the moment of constitution-making. The theory of equitable elite bargaining is applicable to the realities of modern constitution-making and makes it more difficult to legitimize authoritarian constitutions. Further, both representation-based and consequentialist arguments can justify a constitution drafted in accordance with the theory as normatively legitimate. The theory imposes a standard that can result in arduous constitution-making processes and moderated constitutional content. Additionally, its focus on elites poses challenging questions. However, this article will argue that the net benefits of this theory warrant its consideration as a new standard to assess normative constitutional legitimacy.

The recent fortieth anniversary of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) has sparked a good deal of reflection and retrospection. Looking back, it is clear that the Convention’s architects carefully navigated, and selectively absorbed, a number of competing visions of oceanic governance, from freedom to enclosure to visions of Global North–South equality. This made the Convention’s construction period a very drawn-out and painful one – longer than for any other international treaty in history – and while some hopes were realized, others were dashed. Forty years on, it is important not to let its current canonical status blind us to the fact that the Convention came close to being a failure, and that things could have gone differently at a number of critical junctures. Nor should it stop us asking whether UNCLOS is really fit for purpose today. In this article, I situate the Convention within wider developments in the global economy and the global environment, and consider the role it has played in promoting goals of global justice and environmental protection.

Chile’s experience with its Constitutional Convention from 2021 to 2022 sheds light on an important issue for comparative reflection: the role of procedures in constitution-making processes. The Constitutional Convention was bound by procedures that were both externally imposed and internally created. Our assessment is that, while some procedures improved representation and deliberation, the most important decision-making procedures were pernicious to the process. We argue that looking at procedures is fundamental when analysing constitutional processes, as the rules that bind rule-making processes can significantly impact not only their functioning, but also their outcomes.

This article shows how failed constitutional proposals may contribute to future constitution-making processes by exploring the relationship between the recently failed Chilean constitution-making process (2019–22) and the previous unsuccessful one led by former President Michelle Bachelet (2015–17). Comparative constitutional scholars are yet to fully understand how constitutional failures of this kind can take place, and Bachelet’s process has not received the attention it should. This article fills that gap by showing how both processes were driven by shared principles initially set by Bachelet. It also shows how those principles may serve as a blueprint for future constitutional changes in Chile. Bachelet had campaigned on the basis that any constitutional replacement attempt should be participatory, institutional and democratic – all ideas that have remained popular in Chile’s political landscape. Those ideas have served the purpose of both reducing transaction costs among constitutional negotiators and securing large compromises in polarized political scenarios.