This article will give an overview of the idea and history of origins of preventive detention and the legal changes in the German Criminal Code that underlie the decision of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (17 December 2009). It will attempt an outlook by considering the prospective outcome of future law suits against German legal statutes relating to preventive detention, and will also describe the present situation and current legal recommendations, including the much-discussed alternative of detention in psychiatric wards. The article will close with a brief comparative look at the related legal problems arising in countries with a criminal law which is based on the establishment of personal guilt of the offender while facing public pressure to detain persons for protective reasons.

I don't usually open my commentary by citing great words spoken by old men. But in this case I will make an exception. Ferdinand Lassalle is not only the grandfather of German social democracy; he is also the author of these words: “Constitutional issues are power issues.”

This is a book review of Fuyuki Kurasawa's, The Work of Global Justice: Human Rights as Practices. Fuyuki Kurasawa is an associate professor of sociology, political science and social and political thought at York University in Toronto. Professor Kurasawa has a particular interest in human rights and global justice through the exploration of the theoretical underpinnings of global justice projects. Kurasawa proposes a theoretical model that strikes a balance between normative universalism and empiricism. This leads to a vision of an alternative globalization marked by radical redistribution of economic and political power. The work of global justice is largely the emancipation of those who are systemically barred from justice, through five modes of ethico-political practice: bearing witness, forgiveness, foresight, aid and solidarity. This book review is a critical look at this theoretical model and his vision of an alternative globalization.

One could be forgiven for thinking that constitutional review by the judiciary is invariably part of modern constitutionalism. Gone are the days that constitutions contained provisions that prevented the courts from testing the constitutionality of legislation, such as section 59 of South Africa's now repealed Constitution of 1961 that forbade the courts from inquiring into or pronouncing on the validity of legislation. It has come to be accepted in many quarters that a constitution presupposes judicial review in some form or another in gauging the integrity of legislation, instead of only relying on legislative wisdom as before. An attitude that echoes the views expressed in Marbury v. Madison by Chief Justice Marshall of the United States Supreme Court, that by its very nature a written constitution implies judicial control. However, the Constitution of the Netherlands proves to be an exception in this regard, as section 120 states emphatically that:

Sixty years after the entry into force of the Basic Law the world is much more interdependent. The concepts of statehood and sovereignty have changed. The following contribution examines how the Basic Law, as amended and interpreted by the Federal Constitutional Court, deals with this development. As a foundational matter, the Basic Law contains a commitment towards integration, although sixty years ago integration largely was seen as a promise. Now, 60 years later, the Federal Constitutional Court is developing limits to integration and recently ruled out Germany's participation in a European Federal State and sees itself as the guardian of German sovereignty. A change of paradigms seems to have taken place. For the founding fathers and mothers, a united—possibly even federal—Europe was considered to be the solution to protect against war and relapse towards an undemocratic, terroristic regime. But now the Federal Constitutional Court feels compelled to protect democracy and the core values of the Basic Law against “too much” European integration.

Whitney R. Harris was the last surviving prosecutor who appeared before the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg during the trial of the principal surviving Nazi war criminals. He died on 21 April 2010 in his 98th year.

The most immediately striking aspect of the ICJ's recent ruling on Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence is the divergence between what the Court actually said and how its decision is being read in the media and by political actors. Typically the Court is said to have found secession by Kosovo to be “legal” or “lawful” under international law. According to Kosovo President Fatmir Sejdiu, “The decision finally removes all doubts that countries which still do not recognize the Republic of Kosovo could have.” The angry reaction to the decision by Serbian nationalists likewise supposed that the Court had endorsed a right to secession. In fact, what the Court did was to read literally—and some would say narrowly or pedantically—the question it was asked, and thus to avoid opining on the major legal (and related policy) issues raised by the act of secession, including whether there is a right to proceed with a unilateral act of secession, and to whom such a right may or may not belong. On the literal reading, the Court was not asked, and thus it did not rule on, whether international law requires that the final status of Kosovo protect the group and individual rights of minorities, whether Kosovar Serbs or Roma. Likewise, the Court did not rule on whether Serbia or, indeed, any other State in the world community is required to recognize Kosovo as an independent State. Nor did the Court's decision address the borders of an independent Kosovo, or whether and under what circumstances force could legally be used either to impose independence or to resist it.

Irish legal education is under increasing pressure to reform and reinvent itself in the face of various challenges, especially those implied by the Bologna process. In line with two of the main priorities of the process, namely employability and student-centred learning, a growing number of Irish law faculties have incorporated, or are planning to incorporate, more practice-related components into the law curriculum and, in some cases, a fully fledged Clinical Legal Education programme. This is an important shift in the paradigm of legal education in Ireland which should be welcomed and encouraged by all stakeholders – students, academics, practitioners, judges and those involved in myriad capacities in the administration of justice.

In the first part, a comprehensive presentation is given about the general structure of legal education in Ireland dealing with the main legal education providers, academic and professional requirements for legal training, as well as figures on the legal population and the approximate cost of legal education. The second part goes on to consider three views about the role of practice in Irish legal education, namely the ‘traditional’ view, the ‘holistic’ view and the ‘clinical’ view. These schematically presented views reflect different perspectives on the nature and purpose of legal education. They do not necessarily compete with each other, especially the last two which could arguably complement one another in the general renewal that Irish legal education is facing at the moment. The traditional view is that the status quo, i.e., in which practical elements are not a big feature of legal education at third level, has worked well and should, more or less, be preserved. The holistic view encourages the teaching of some element of practical preparation, but that this can best be provided to students by third level institutions through interdisciplinary courses that put law in context. The view which favours clinical legal education is that more can, and indeed should, be done to enhance the preparation of students for law practice, although it has to be pondered in light of economic realities, competing views about pedagogy and the Bologna context.

Very seldom has a judgment or advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) received so much media coverage as the recent Advisory Opinion on the Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo rendered on 22 July 2010 in response to a question posed by the General Assembly. The question had been forwarded on behalf of a request by Serbia and was phrased in the following way: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”

On 22 July 2010, the International Court of Justice (hereinafter the “ICJ”) delivered its advisory opinion on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo. The ICJ concluded that the declaration of independence dated 17 February 2008 did not violate any applicable rule of international law consisting of general international law, UNSC resolution 1244 (1999) (hereinafter the “Resolution 1244”) and the Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government in Kosovo (hereinafter the “Constitutional Framework”). The ICJ delivered the advisory opinion in response to a question set out in resolution 63/3 dated 8 October 2008 of the General Assembly of the United Nations Organization (hereinafter the “General Assembly”), which asked if “the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo is in accordance with international law.”

With the request for an advisory opinion on Kosovo opportunity knocked on the doors of the International Court of Justice. The opportunity was unique for several reasons. First, the case of Kosovo was momentous. It had involved war. International armed forces had intervened to stop ethnic cleansing. Since then, the situation of Kosovo has been politically loaded. It has polarized the entire international community. Second, it is a rare occurrence that such a situation comes to the Court. The regular case, if there is such a thing, before the Court has tended to be a relatively low-profile interstate dispute. The Kosovo incidence had only come to the Court in the first place—like the case of the Wall on the West Bank, the other recent high-profile exception—because the detour via the United Nations General Assembly had been open.

The International Court of Justice's advisory opinion favoring the legal status of the Kosovar declaration of independence came as an exhilarating surprise to many in Kosovo. The spirit of suspicion and negative perception of most internationals (US citizens being a notable but not exclusive exception) meant that a favorable ruling from an international court was unexpected.