The German Basic Law is a resilient constitution. It has proved able to cope with both the new beginning of the constitutional tradition in Germany after the cataclysm of 1945 and German reunification after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. To be sure, there is reason for some critical reflection concerning concrete questions and even fundamental issues—not the least of which is the question whether German reunification should have been marked by a process of constitutional self-reflection and renewal beyond what has been done. All in all, however, the Basic Law is, in historical perspective, a remarkable success. Therefore, it is not surprising that it has gained much international attention. Some aspects of the Basic Law have even become a kind of attractive export article not accounted for in Germany's foreign trade balance, but nevertheless of considerable importance.

The limitations of the management board's directive powers in German Stock Corporations are an important issue in German Corporate law. The German Stock Corporation or Aktiengesellschaft (“AG”) is the corporate organizational form most directly comparable to the publicly held corporation in the U.S. It is regulated by the German Stock Corporation Act (AktG). The defining feature of the AG is a two-tier board structure containing both a management board (Vorstand), which is in charge of managing the corporation, and a supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), which is elected by the shareholders' meeting (Hauptversammlung) and which appoints and supervises the management board. The two boards are completely separate from each other, no overlap in membership is permitted.

In the 2009 judgment dealing with the Treaty of Lisbon, the German Federal Constitutional Court urges to modify a domestic statute in order to guarantee the rights of the internal rule-making power and also provides a reasoning on the role of the European Union (EU) as an international organization, the principle of sovereignty and the relations between European Institutions and Bodies and the EU Member States. According to the German Court the Treaty of Lisbon does not transform the European Union into a Federal State (Staatsverband), but into a Confederation of States (Staatenverbund). In spite of the 1993 landmark judgment, the so-called “Maastricht Urteil”, the Court steps forward and focuses also the subject-matters that necessarily have to pertain to the Member States jurisdiction, the so-called “domain reserve”. The German Federal Constitutional Court decision on the Lisbon Treaty arouses the reflection on the core of State sovereignty and on the boundaries of the EU legal system and focuses on the force of the right to vote of every citizen, the basis of democracy.

Furthermore, the decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court highlights the well-known issue of the EU's identity and the balancing between EU democracy and Member State sovereignty. In the light of the German Constitutional Court statements, the present work aims to understand which could be actually the EU's identity and how could be approached “democratic deficit” of the EU.

The enforcement and bankruptcy system in Turkey is principally regulated by the Code of Enforcement and Bankruptcy (CEB), Act Number 2004, which came into force on 4 September 1932. This Code mainly originates from the Swiss Federal Law on Debt Collection and Bankruptcy. During 2003 and 2004, several amendments were made to the CEB by Law Number 4949 and by Law Number 5092.

In Viking and Laval, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) adjudicated the rights of labor and capital mobility under E.U. law. Both cases strengthen the single European market through economic liberalization to generate greater prosperity for all Europeans as part of the process of European economic and political integration. Labor and capital mobility create greater prosperity for all through more rational market exchanges. Free trade is good for goods and is even better for labor. A liberalized and fully mobilized labor market results in more productivity and greater wealth in the European polity, as well as interdependence, and thereby deeper integration resulting in greater understanding and less conflict. The decisions, wrongly criticized by some as “bad for workers” are justified by the fact that they will benefit workers in Eastern Europe, consumers in Western Europe, and the Community as a whole by deepening integration. A key challenge for the European Union is to economically anchor and deepen the political restructuring of Eastern Europe by enabling the natural labor and capital movements which an open marketplace generates. Europe does this not with the failed neo-liberal model which has ravaged the wealth of the United States and squandered it in illusory booms based on consumer borrowing and deficit spending to fund war for oil. Rather, Europe is developing a neo-corporatist social model. This article uses the Viking and Laval cases as examples of this development.

The present paper concerns procedural guarantees in immigration proceedings, thus addressing the broader question of the role of the general principles of EU law in respect of administrative decision-making. The main assertion is that certain requirements of procedural due process are recognized in EU law as fundamental rights. They must therefore be observed by Member State authorities when decisions significantly affecting the legal position of a person are taken, provided that the decision is at least partly determined by EU law. The relevant immigration proceedings involve measures related to the termination of residence as well as decisions related to denial or loss of a particular legal status. In effect, the actual scope of application of the EU's administrative fundamental rights is determined by the actual scope of activity of the European legislator. The author concludes that even a relatively ‘shallow’ harmonization of laws can lead to a ‘deep’ reshaping of the domestic legal order, by becoming a Trojan Horse for fundamental rights heretofore alien to some national immigration regimes.

Lawyers, economists and social scientists alike have for a number of years agreed that foreign investment has the potential to act as a catalyst for the enjoyment of an individual's fundamental human rights, particularly in developing countries. This article discusses and critically analyses corporate human rights obligations and the lack thereof under stabilization clauses in foreign investment contracts. The balance of this article is devoted to exploring three main issues relating to corporate human rights obligations and stabilization clauses. First, stabilization clauses in foreign investment agreements are examined in relation to corporate obligations and responsibility for fundamental human rights. In doing so the substantive and procedural dimension of stabilization clauses is analysed. Second, using the concrete examples of the Mineral Development Agreement between Mittal Steel and the Government of Liberia Mittal Steel Agreement and of the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Project as case studies, this article considers an application of stabilization clauses in foreign investment contracts in relation to the fundamental human rights obligation of states and of corporations. Third, a proposal for reform in the form of a fundamental human rights clause is introduced. To be clear, the argument here is that the fundamental human rights obligations of investors, particularly of corporations, must be included in foreign investment agreements.

The relationship between human rights law and business has emerged in recent years as one of the most topical to be discussed and put on the agenda almost worldwide. The activities of corporations in this globalized environment have often served as the catalyst for human rights violations; due to the lack of institutional protection, some corporations are able to exploit regulatory lacunae and the lack of human rights protection. On 9 April 2010 Professor John Ruggie, the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General on human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, submitted his fifth Report under the title “Business and Human Rights: Further steps toward the operationalization of the ‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework.” The objective of this short article is to examine his 2010 report and to establish whether this Report has contributed to clarifying standards in the field of human rights and business.

The article describes the original Stem Cell Act, the reform discussion following its enactment and the reform of the Act adopted by the German Bundestag on 11 April 2008.

The Basic Law, whose 60th anniversary we celebrate today, is not identical with the Constitution that was enacted on 23 May 1949. In the sixty years of its existence, it has been amended fifty-four times. Further amendments are under way. Many amendments concerned more than just one article. A little more than half of the 146 articles of the original text still read as they were framed in 1949. However, twenty-six of these unchanged articles are part of the “Transitional and Concluding Provisions.” A number of them were limited to one singular act of application, such as Art. 136 I (“The Bundesrat [Federal Council] shall convene for the first time on the day the Bundestag [national parliament] first convenes.”), and lost their normative value with the completion of the given act. A little less than half of the original articles, and the Preamble, have been subject to amendments; some of them several times. The forerunner is Art. 106 (apportionment of tax revenue), with six amendments. In addition, forty-seven articles have been added to the original text, some of which were repealed later.

The Federal Republic of Germany counts among the earliest States parties to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It ratified the ECHR on 5 December 1952, three years ahead of Italy, and hence found itself among the original members of the treaty system when the ECHR entered into force on 3 September 1953. For the new democratic Government, it was a decision of principle to affirm its willingness to cooperate peacefully within the group of European States, submitting to an international review mechanism with regard to all of its activities. Therefore, very shortly afterwards, it accepted also the individual application under Article 25 ECHR, which at that time was not yet compulsory for all States parties. For many years under the Nazi dictatorship, Germany had brought death and destruction to its neighbours. Now, organized under a democratic and liberal constitution, the Basic Law (BL), it wanted to manifest its newfound identity as a civilized State abiding by the rule of law.

The German General Act on Equal Treatment (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, AGG) has been in force for four years now. Academic discussion has so far mainly focused on the scope of anti-discrimination provisions for non-state actors, i.e. on whether there should be private anti-discrimination legislation, what conduct the statute should prohibit, and what exceptions it should allow. In order to fully understand the effects and relevance of anti-discrimination provisions in a legal system, their remedies and sanctions have to be taken into account as well. This article focuses on the remedies provided for in the AGG and, more specifically, on obligations to contract. The issue of whether there is and whether there should be an obligation to contract has – as regards remedies – been the most controversial issue in the academic discussion so far.

The principle of the rule of law is a well-established notion at the core of modern constitutionalism and the undisputed building block of democratic governments. This principle is characterized by the breadth of its scope, the difficulty to strictly define its content, and the increasing possibility of a more or less broad interpretation. This explains the wide-ranging debate on the rule of law which has been developed over time with significant contributions from several disciplines, including philosophy, constitutional law, and international law.

In Germany, as in the U.S., the relationship between protection of privacy and freedom of expression has been subject of many decisions. In the U.S. a right of privacy was famously conjured out of common law precedents by Warren and Brandeis. Over the course of a century, it developed into a right of publicity, which gave celebrities the power to prevent the commercial use of their names, endorsements, images, voices, and other attributes of personality by unauthorized third parties. In defining such a right, much attention has been focused on separating what is commercially unacceptable from what is desirable free speech under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. It has also been important to settle the duration of such rights. Publicity rights as a commercial value of a person's identity are therefore well established in the U.S., although state laws vary widely as to the extent of protection. In Germany, due to the constitutional background of the personality right, the balance between public and private interests still operates differently. After the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in 2004 convicted the German Federal Republic of violating the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights Fundamental Freedoms, the German Federal Court (Bundesgerichtshof—BGH) took the opportunity to think over its previous position about image rights. Three judgments were examined by the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht—BVerfG) and one of them was reversed.

Modern western societies are aging—according to statistical analyses, in 2060, every seventh German citizen will be over 80 years old. The challenges of an aging society occupy jurisprudence and the legal practice. Issues specific to aging offenders and aging victims are more relevant than ever and must be analyzed. The question of old age is one of many problematic aspects of two criminal cases recently decided by the German Federal Constitutional Court. In the following, age's relevance to criminal prosecution and material criminal law will be discussed and related to an analysis of the proceedings of John Demjanjuk and Heinrich Boere, two alleged Nazi criminals, tried in their old age. Demjanjuk's case especially has raised questions well beyond the relevance of his age (89 years). The cases open up many interesting facets of German criminal procedural law and material law connected to the crimes of the Nazi era.

The example of the German Law Journal has been very important for the creation of a new legal journal, the Italian Journal of Public Law. First, that example was very persuasive due to the importance of the traditional ties between the German and Italian legal cultures. Second, following that example, unlike most e-journals in the legal field in Italy, the Italian Journal of Public Law devotes considerable attention to theoretical issues. Its goal is essentially to serve as a bridge between legal cultures and this explains the choice of English as the working language. This does not imply, however, a demise of the national tradition, in particular as far as the distinctiveness of public law is concerned. Openness towards other legal cultures implies, rather, an even stronger awareness of the existence of a variety of approaches or methods, in contrast with the faith in “the” legal method, conceived in a unitary way, which characterized part of the last century.

While the European Union (EU) has been finding itself increasingly involved in providing security in its “near abroad,” the proposal of a “Stabilisation and Association Process for Countries of South-Eastern Europe” has marked the commencement of a nearly all-encompassing commitment to progress in the countries of the Western Balkans. In this context, Kosovo—for which the European perspective of the Western Balkans has been declared open—provides a text book example covering all aspects of external assistance as well as security and defense policies. Among the latter, the European Union Rule of Law Mission in the territory of Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) is indeed characterized by a number of extraordinary factors and circumstances. It is not only EULEX Kosovo's unparalleled European and local staff size or its partly executive mandate that set this EU mission apart from other civilian missions of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) which have thus far been deployed to the Western Balkans. Unsurprisingly, the complexity of the mission has generated difficulty in comprehending its deployment, mandate and implementation. Yet, against the backdrop of the 2003 Security Strategy which makes the credibility of the EU's foreign policy dependent on its achievements in the Balkans, a clear understanding of EULEX Kosovo appears paramount.

Written in a transitional period between the two World Wars and taking place during the Austro-Hungarian monarchy's last days before World War I, Austrian author Robert Musil's novel, “The Man Without Qualities” considers the societal need of preserving order in times of political disorder by tracing the story of Ulrich, the “man without qualities”. Claiming that “if all that high-speed business doesn't suit us, let's do something else!”, the novel's main character emphasizes the emerging challenge of social cohesion in times of political transformation: between the collisions of public power and private autonomy; a nation-state past and an international future; and collective action and individual capacity.

Sociology of law usually applies three basic distinctions that also can be applied to the analysis of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law or constitution).

In Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA in Liquidation v. Italian Republic, the European Court of Justice (EG) ruled that Community law precludes the existence of two types of national rules that limit State liability: (1) rules that exclude liability for damages due to an infringement of Community law that arises out of an interpretation of legal provisions or an assessment of facts or evidence carried out by a court adjudicating at last instance, or (2) those limiting liability solely to cases of intentional fault and serious misconduct on the part of the court, if such a limitation were to lead to exclusion of the liability of the Member State in other cases where a manifest infringement of the applicable law was committed. This article, while recognizing that the ruling in Traghetti del Mediterraneo is in line with previous case-law on Member States' liability for breach of EU law, casts some doubts as to whether such an invasion of an area traditionally regulated by national law is in fact desirable. It questions what the foundations are of the procedural rights conferred by European law, and, in doing so, the extent to which European law can tamper with the constitutional balance of a state. Finally, it provides some tentative solutions to the dilemma faced by Italian law following the delivery of the Traghetti del Mediterraneo judgement.