During the two decades before World War II, as this article demonstrates, the relationship between the Big Three American automakers and their parts suppliers was remarkably similar to the celebrated cooperation of Japanese auto assemblers and their trading partners after 1980. Unlike the arms-length multisourcing that characterized American firms after 1960, the prewar Detroit production culture featured collaborative development, cost sharing, and long-term innovative relationships. This system nurtured the rise of Chrysler, which not only grew from a standing start in 1920 to convert the General Motors-Ford duopoly into the “Big Three” by 1930, but also established itself as the industry's leader in innovation and profitability.

This article contributes to a line of research in Business History that aims to determine the factors of family business longevity in the long term with the study of individual cases. The literature has identified family cohesion as one of the essential factors for survival. Cohesion may be reinforced or broken at the time of the intergenerational transfer. This study finds that a critical response on the part of the business family to the difficulties associated with intergenerational transfer of control, including modifications to the original plan, is usually based on trust between generations. Within the business family cohesion facilitates intergenerational transfers and, consequently, allows the family to evolve and transform itself into a business dynasty.

Home heating and lighting markets have played crucial and underappreciated roles in driving energy transitions. When historians have studied the adoption of fossil fuels, they have often privileged industrial actors, markets, and technologies. My analysis of the factors that stimulated the adoption of anthracite coal and petroleum during the nineteenth century reveals that homes shaped how, when, and why Americans began to use fossil fuel energy. Moreover, a brief survey of other fossil fuel transitions shows that heating and lighting markets have been critical drivers in other times and places. Reassessing the historical patterns of energy transitions offers a revised understanding of the past for historians and suggests a new set of options for policymakers seeking to encourage the use of renewable energy in the future.

This article analyzes the transfer of tacit knowledge between countries and continents, based on a case from the shipbuilding industry. The South Korean shipbuilder Hyundai Heavy Industries (HHI) was established in the early 1970s and had by the late 1980s become the world’s leading shipbuilder. Aided by foreign loan capital, HHI acquired technology through foreign licenses and imported equipment. However, shipbuilding is about more than hardware. This article presents and analyzes another important means of knowledge transfer: the acquisition of tacit knowledge in the form of shipbuilding skills, including shipyard processes and operations. This transfer was mainly accomplished through the “import” of foreign managers and the dispatch abroad of South Korean employees. One important element, which we investigate in detail, was the Korean personnel that HHI sent in 1972 to the Scott Lithgow shipyards in Scotland to observe and learn. Based on archival sources and interviews, we detail the manner in which tacit knowledge could be transferred across language and cultural barriers.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, transatlantic trade and finance networks were complex webs of transactions often consisting of lengthy chains of connections linking distant firms to distant markets. As a number of scholars have shown, merchant bankers of the nineteenth century were at the center of many of these networks, acting as an interconnected and often impenetrable group that dictated the flow of capital and investment across many borders. Most recently, scholars such as Manuel Llorca-Jaña, Manuel López-Morell, and Juliette Levy (to name a few) have produced a number of especially significant publications on the role of financial intermediaries in Latin America. Llorca-Jaña’s and López-Morrell’s work has been essential for illuminating the role of London bankers Huth & Co. and Rothschilds (respectively) in creating a global network that included Latin American markets and trades, while Levy’s work has highlighted the role of special financial players in inland markets, namely in the Yucatan. This paper aims to build on this previous work through an analysis of crucial network actors in Anglo-American merchant bank networks in the first half of the nineteenth century. To conduct a varied and general analysis, this paper will draw on the correspondence records of the Baring Bros. and N. M. Rothschild, two of the most well-known and profitable London merchant banks of the period. Through this material, this study will present an analysis of British merchant bank connectivity and the role of intermediaries in connecting merchant banks to distant markets and clients, such as the mining districts of interior Mexico and the sugar merchants of Cuba.

Philips Australia, the Australian subsidiary of Dutch MNE Philips Electronics, experienced difficulties during 1942–1943, when it came close to being nationalized as enemy property. In response, the company set out to improve its reputation in the local radio parts and electronics industry and in Australian markets. Its strategy of embedding itself in Australian society served the purpose of improving company performance and influencing the government policies that guided the rapid development of Australia’s postwar electronics industry. With this strategy, Philips Australia minimized the risks and maximized the commercial opportunities it faced. The firm localized senior management, maximized local procurement and local manufacturing, took a leading role in industry associations, engaged politically influential board members, and used marketing tools to build a strong brand and a positive public profile in Australia. However, the company became aware of the limitations of this strategy in 1973, when a new Labor government reduced trade protection. Increasing competition from Japanese electronics firms forced Philips Australia to restructure and downsize its production operations. Despite increasing reliance on imports from the parent company’s regional supply centers and efforts to specialize production on high-value added products, the firm saw its profitability and market share in Australia decrease.

My dissertation is a study of standardization in four communications networks: AT&T's monopoly telephone network, the Internet, digital cellular telephone networks, and the World Wide Web. A history of these networks that highlights standardization shows how engineers in industry committees replaced managers in monopoly hierarchies as the stewards of standards for communication networks. By the end of the twentieth century, the new networks—and the new institutions devised to sustain the standardization process—formed the technological and ideological infrastructure of the Third Industrial Revolution.

Foreign markets largely shaped the business strategy of Les Films Albatros, a medium-sized, internationally networked specialty producer of films in interwar France. Depending more on foreign revenues than did the Hollywood studios, Albatros also realized higher gross returns. Because films were capital goods providing a perishable product (seats at a specific time), their price depended on both expected performance and the threshold ticket-selling capacity necessary to recoup cinema fixed costs; some films could not be sold at any price. Given the small potential market for its films, Albatros had to find an intricate balance between producing at low cost and delivering films with at least threshold ticket-selling capacity. It did so by differentiating its films, entering film distribution in France, coproducing internationally, and cooperating with Pathé and Gaumont, the two largest French film companies. While its larger European rivals were obsessed with operational effectiveness vis-à-vis Hollywood, Albatros, by adopting a distinct strategic position, hardly had to pay attention to operational effectiveness at all. It was making a differentiated product for needs unserved by Hollywood.

This article examines the Reynolds Metals Company’s political networking activities in Washington, D.C., and the state capitals of the U.S. South in the 1940s and 1950s. It argues that Reynolds’ astute recruitment of senior staff from federal and state governments, its adept building of elite networks in the legislative and executive branches, its judicious espousing of key political rhetoric (antitrust, regional development, national security), as well as its nurturing of Democratic circles in the South were crucial to their attainment of competitive advantage. This saw the company rise from being a new entrant in the U.S. primary aluminum production during World War II to the second-largest national producer by 1946 and a major global player by the mid-1950s. This same political networking was critical in maintaining that advantage after World War II in the face of competition from the Aluminum Company of America and the Canadian multinational Aluminium Company of Canada. Both “wartime” (covering the period from World War II and into the Cold War) and the legacy of government intervention (from the early twentieth century until the 1960s, including the New Deal) provided a fertile context for RMC’s business strategy. The company’s success owed much to founder Richard S. Reynolds Sr.’s acumen in hiring the right people, creating or joining the right networks, having the right social capital, as well as his experiences and connections accrued from working with his uncle, the noted tobacco magnate R. J. Reynolds. The article offers insights into the nature of U.S. business–government relations.

This article traces the history of the first Chinese life insurance company: the China United Assurance Society. China United was founded in Shanghai in 1912 as a purely Chinese-owned enterprise and became the first Chinese life insurer to survive past its eighth year. By 1935, it boasted insurance in force of over 20 million yuan. In adapting life insurance to Republican China, China United had to contend with a number of extraordinary challenges. It had to train a corps of Chinese technical experts in a country without a single accredited actuary. It had to cultivate demand for a product that was poorly understood and often distrusted. At the same time, the Society was forced to find a way to manage a nationwide sales network that could market insurance products to a country that hitherto had little knowledge of life insurance. In doing so, it was threatened by interethnic strife sparked by racist practices of the foreign manager. Finally, China United had to overcome increasingly fierce competition, high lapse rates, and excess mortality that combined to drive underwriting profits negative. The Society was able to survive as a going concern only through its investing prowess in Chinese capital markets. Using previously unmined sources from the Shanghai Municipal Archives, this article charts China United’s turbulent process of indigenization, and explores its lasting legacies in the contemporary Chinese life insurance industry.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the largest U.S. chemical firm, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company, established an international presence in synthetic fibers by building plants to make nylon, polyester, and acrylic in Latin America and Europe. DuPont managers also looked to the Middle East, specifically to Iran, which was fast industrializing under Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The Shah's pro-Western stance and his country's rich oil fields made Iran appealing to a petrochemical giant like DuPont, which used petroleum feed stocks to make fibers and other products. In the 1970s, DuPont partnered with the Behshahr Industrial Group, a conglomerate run by the Ledjavardi clan, one of Iran's leading families, to build a high-tech fiber facility that would help modernize the Iranian textile industry. The story of this short-lived joint venture, a victim of the Islamic Revolution, demonstrates the challenges to multinationals operating in imperial Iran, and shows how the daily experience of dealing with cultural differences often masked larger political and economic troubles.

The commercial traveler, or traveling salesman, was an agent of commercialism and modernization as well as a stock character in British popular culture. To C. Wright Mills, salesmen faced particularly challenging demands to conform to managerial direction. This article examines how British salesmen negotiated their occupational identity during the twentieth century. Developments in marketing, corporate growth, and periods of war and recession all challenged salesmen’s status and autonomy. These influences prompted a lengthy and recurring debate about how best to present, defend, and justify their work and identity. New marketing techniques and management systems evolved steadily, rather than producing sudden or uniform changes in the ways in which salesmen worked. Their culture of enterprise and individualism persisted, in part as it was shared by employers and managers. The impact of new marketing methods proved greatest in confectionery, tobacco, and other consumer goods trades as sales of branded, packaged goods expanded. Even then, salesmen contributed to shaping their work and occupational identity, proving unable to establish professional credentials and dividing over whether adopting trade union methods could improve their position.

Cooperative corporate behavior has often been explained through the social anatomy of business leaders and structural ties among firms. Our alternative approach investigates how quotidian interactions built trust and routines among a group of major firms in the Australian wool trade—a sector that required regular interaction to be effective. Deploying extensive archives of their meetings, we use social network analysis to examine interactions among the key group of firms and individuals. Through content analysis we infer the behavior and atmosphere of meetings. Finally, an evaluation of meeting agendas and outcomes demonstrates cooperation and a shared commitment to improving the operation of the wool trade in the 1920s.

This article studies the strategy developed by the Benedictine Community at the Monastery of Montserrat to conceal their patrimony through the constitution of a public limited company. The singularity of this case lies in the opacity that the Benedictines created regarding their properties in the eyes of the government and in the fact that the public limited company was, rather than just a simple mechanism to conceal the Community's assets, a real tool for business management. This instrumental character included a strategy for the enlargement of the patrimony, a line of improvement in the use of rented estates and services, and the execution of the Community's decisions concerning its assets. The business analysis of Larsa is focused on the development of the firm compared to that of its geographical environment, Catalonia, so as to show the similarities and differences between the Benedictine public limited company, managed by members of a religious order, and those run by laymen. Larsa's strategy was based, as that of similar firms, on organic growth and a low level of indebtedness, although a break occurred in that strategy as the result of an exogenous shock (the October 1934 Revolution) that forced the company to modify its objectives from longevity and solvency to profit maximization, dividend distribution, and even business decapitalization.

Jardine Matheson & Company, a Hong Kong conglomerate founded in 1832, has survived political upheaval and global and regional economic crises, transforming itself several times. From their beginnings in the commission business, William Jardine and James Matheson developed a reputation for sound financial management that furthered their trading relationships and supported their firm's expansion from agency house to managing agent to investment house between 1832 and 1885. Fundamental to Jardine Matheson's success was the strategic decision to eschew speculation and to concentrate on building a pattern of relationships within and outside the business that would foster the flow of information, the knowledge with which to interpret it, the ability to influence others, and a reputation for probity that would attract and retain trading partners.

This paper discusses the origins of rating in the second half of the nineteenth century. We review and criticize existing narratives, which—echoing a story told by lawyers favorable to (or employed by) the agencies—have alleged that a cultural shift in normative views, evidenced in an evolution of court decisions, provided legal protection (against libel) to agencies, and permitted the development of printed credit reports. Such a view is inconsistent with evidence from actual judicial decisions and from our exploration of archival material. Looking at both litigated and settled cases, we show that the rise of mercantile agencies in the late nineteenth century was the product of a farsighted corporate strategy applied ruthlessly to a legal system that was still very reluctant to permit the agencies to “commoditize” credit.

In many countries governments and labor unions have contested the post-war rise of temporary agency work, arguing that this innovation infringed on workers' rights and security. We investigate the rhetorical strategies used by Dutch temporary work agencies (TWAs) to gain legitimacy for their business between 1961 and 1996. Our conclusion is that the TWAs' trade association ABU developed a sophisticated rhetoric of “self-restraint” to legitimize the deployment of a non-standard labor arrangement. The core message was that – if applied properly - agency work did not threaten permanent employment. The complexity of the inclusive nature of this rhetorical approach, aiming to acknowledge the concerns of multiple stakeholders, was reflected in ABU's difficulty in aligning its claims of socially responsible behavior with an effective defense of the sector's economic interests. Still, the consistent focus on restraint lent credibility to the claimed function of “allocating” workers to their jobs that eventually gained the TWA industry fundamental acceptance as a responsible labor market actor.