La Porta et al. see common law as most favorable to corporate development and economic growth, but Japanese legislators explicitly based their system on German civil law. However, Japan’s commercial code of 1899 omitted the GmbH (private company) form, which Guinnane et al. see as the jewel in the crown of Germany’s organizational menu. Neither apparent “mistake” retarded Japan’s adoption of the corporate form, because its commercial code offered flexible governance and liability options, implemented liberally. It was this liberal flexibility, not choice of legal family or hybrid corporate forms emphasized by previous writers, that drove corporatization forward in Japan and more widely. Surprisingly (given that Germany’s superficially fuller organizational menu predated Japan’s by many decades and the country was wealthier), by the 1930s Japan already had not only more corporations than Germany, but also more commandite partnerships (with some corporate characteristics). After the introduction of the yugen kaisha (private company) in 1940, corporate forms became nearly as widely used in Japan as in the United States, United Kingdom, or Switzerland.

Queues are part of everyday routine and experienced by most shoppers, yet little attention has been given to providing historical accounts of queuing as a consumer task or as a shopper experience. This paper examines grocery shop queues and the changing experience of shoppers in historical perspective, specifically focusing upon the shift from counter-service to self-service grocery formats in Britain from 1945 to 1975. The paper draws upon a wide range of material using evidence from oral histories and witness groups, which is supported by contemporary sources from the Mass Observation Archive, newspapers, shopper surveys, and trade publications and reports. The conceptual framework developed in the paper explores the public and private dimensions of queues to consider the experiences and perceptions of shoppers during a period of rapid change in the retail grocery system. More generally, the paper contributes to our understanding of how management innovations are connected to untraded public values.

This article discusses the relational and rhetorical foundations of more than 300 first letters sent in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by merchant or banking houses based in Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Americas to two prominent French firms: Roux Brothers and Greffulhe Montz & Cie. We used a quantitative analysis of qualitative aspects of first letters to go beyond the standard opposition between premodern personal exchanges and modern impersonal transactions. The expansion of commercial networks during the period under analysis is often believed to have relied on families and ethnic networks and on explicit recommendations worded in the formulas prescribed in merchant manuals. However, most first letters did not use such resources. In many cases, commercial operations began thanks to a mutual acquaintance but without a formal recommendation. This was in fact the norm in the eighteenth century—and an underestimated foundation of the expansion of European commercial networks. In the early nineteenth century, this norm became less prevalent: it was replaced by diverse relational and rhetorical strategies, from recommendations to prospective letters dispensing with any mention of relationships. Whether before or after 1800, the relational and rhetorical resources displayed in letters did not systematically influence the sender’s chances of becoming a correspondent; instead, they depended on the receiving firm’s commercial strategy.

In this article, I seek to expand the relatively narrow focus of most work on commercial credit in eighteenth-century England by incorporating culture into an economic analysis. I argue that the various credit regimes that operated in the regional branches of the English wool textile industry are best understood as having a cultural dimension. A comparative analysis of business strategies in these regions suggests that the different cultures of credit had important implications for the development of the textile industry during the eighteenth century, shaping the character of the entrepreneurship of each region's merchants and producers.

This article analyzes the so-called turn to the market in Sweden, with an emphasis on aspects that are typically absent from large-scale narratives. How did the changes known as neoliberalization and financialization enter everyday life and mundane financial practices? And which analytical tools can historians use to meaningfully connect the experience of changes on the micro level to those on the macro level? Zooming in on the the year 1979 and focusing on two empirical cases—the popularization of stock saving and the domestication of consumer credit—allows us to elaborate and apply a set of analytical entry points about (1) mundane micro-infrastructures, (2) financial knowledge as learning and unlearning, and (3) moral boundary work. This framework offers a way of exploring when and in what ways new financial practices were experienced and eventually embraced by those who had previously been skeptical or even hostile. It also reveals the role played by actors and institutions not typically seen as agents of marketization.

The Zaanstreek—northwest of Amsterdam, The Netherlands—has been a highly industrialized region for nearly four hundred years. For most of this period, it showed a strong sense of community and a high degree of cooperation between firms, which is usually considered to be typical for an “industrial district.” However, between about 1840 and the First World War the character of this industrial district was dramatically transformed. In response to the rapidly growing integration of markets in the national and international economies since the 1840s, the Zaanstreek went through a radical change in energy base, as well as a fundamental shift in industrial structure. This essay addresses the questions of what happened to interfirm cooperation in the Zaanstreek when this fundamental transition in energy base and shift in industrial structure came about and how and to what extent entrepreneurs in the Zaan district between 1840 and 1920 managed to preserve the sense of community and interfirm cooperation that were the hallmarks of this region since the seventeenth century. It shows that the principle of mutuality eventually proved no longer strong enough to keep the actors in these institutions together. Ties between firms within the industrial district were in several respects replaced by, or subordinated to, ties between firms outside the industrial district. What kept interfirm cooperation in the district nevertheless intact for much of the period after 1920 were ties of regional family networks. The essay concludes with a few observations about the relevance to the study of industrial districts in general.

This article examines the trust-producing mechanisms investors and financiers used in São Paulo, Brazil, to determine where to invest their money in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The coffee boom that began in the 1880s spurred bursts of new domestic business development that transformed São Paulo into Brazil's industrial leader. Using shareholder and director data from an array of business sectors, this article demonstrates that early development (1856–1905) of the institutions that provided business finance was accompanied by highly personal relationships between financier and entrepreneur. By the early twentieth century (1906–1920), rapid economic growth and business diversification rendered these personal connections inadequate and hence less important to business finance. Investors and directors concentrated their energies and their money, abandoning the practice of forming broad connections in general—and connections to a bank in particular—and turned to the stock market instead. By providing an alternative to personal forms of trust production, the rise of impersonal intermediation promoted the significantly broadened market for corporate business formation that underwrote São Paulo's economic transformation.

This article investigates a structural ownership model that is used to protect firms from unwelcome capital market intrusion: a multiple-share arrangement. It details the evolution of one of the United Kingdom’s most successful former family firms, Whitbread, in the post-World War II era. In investigating the formation and operation of the so-called Whitbread Umbrella, the study poses the question of whether it was a positive factor in long-term strategic decision making at Whitbread. The emerging popularity of multiple-share ownership structures in the United States, as well as their endurance in other jurisdictions, positions this historic analysis in wider debates on structure, ownership, and corporate governance in the finance, economics, and general management literature.

Conflicting interpretations of the evolution of German business between the two world wars and of Germany's corporate governance during the Third Reich are examined in this article. Alfred Chandler's view that major corporate changes emanated from managerial initiatives is contrasted with Harold James's interpretation that public and government pressures forced innovations on business. In support of James's analysis, I argue that state and political pressures, not management, initiated significant changes in German corporate governance and in the organization of German industry during the interwar period, especially in the 1930s. Using Schering AG, one of Germany's largest companies before World War II, the article traces the influences of National Socialist pressure and changes in corporate law on companies’ organizational adaptation to government social priorities during the Third Reich.

In this paper I discuss a dramatic financial collapse and scandal in Denmark in the interwar period. I analyze the asset price bubble from 1914 to 1920 and the subsequent failure in 1922 of Scandinavia's largest bank, the Danish Landmandsbanken, as well as the downfall of its CEO Emil Glückstadt. I discuss the sense-making process, first during the bubble and then following Landmandsbanken's collapse and Glückstadt's fall from power in 1922, and finally until the introduction of a new bank act in 1930. I further argue that such crises and scandals force contemporaries to make sense of the dramatic fall from the top of society of these icons and of their role in the collapse of their banks. I view the sense-making process as centered on the construction of narratives that explain the crisis and enable or constrain institutional response to the crisis. To conclude, I argue that the process of sense-making in the case of Landmandsbanken can be generalized as the way in which society enforces norms and values in cases of dramatic financial crisis and scandal.

Management in government differs fundamentally from private sector management, the more so in defense, which differs from other US government missions in that very large sums are spent on high-technology systems and equipment to meet the unknowable contingencies of an uncertain future. Because of technological complexity, the difficulties of program selection, contracting, and oversight exceed those in other parts of government. An underappreciated set of problems aggravates these difficulties, notably a lack of metrics for assessing the performance of military systems. In the absence of such metrics, and given the elastic meanings attached to national security, civilian officials have been unable to exercise effective oversight of defense acquisition, leaving discretionary choices by military leaders largely unchecked. For such reasons, common prescriptions for acquisition reform, such as adoption of “proven business practices,” are unrealistic. Meaningful reform would begin by increasing the influence of civilian officials over acquisition decisions and reducing that of the armed forces.

The backwardness of actuarial techniques in Spain and the lack of Spanish mortality tables had a bearing on the development of life insurance in Spain. The actuaries of the domestic and foreign companies operating in this country used other countries’ mortality tables, corrected upwards, to draw up their policies. With actuarial reports from the Gresham Life Assurance Society, established in Spain in the 1890s, the difficulties actuaries had to confront to adjust expectations to Spanish reality can be followed for decades. On the basis of statistical information from 1896 to 1937, a comparison is made between expected and actual death rates. Furthermore, the information from this company enables a comparison with other countries in which it operated (more developed and less developed than Spain) and with the profit and loss results of other domestic and foreign companies operating in the country. Moreover, the problems caused for actuaries by unforeseen events that affected the Spanish population in particular, such as the “Spanish Influenza” or the Civil War, can also be studied. On the basis of this valuable documentation, certain patterns of the difficulties faced by actuaries operating in economically backward countries before World War II can be established.

During the 1930s, the small-scale retailer was regarded by many commentators as being responsible for the apparent inefficiencies of the retail trade in Britain. Using a range of documentary evidence from the period, this article draws attention to debate on the merits of large- and small-scale retailers, highlighting a concern for the latter’s contribution to wider community well-being and to developments in retail trade practices. The relative inefficiency of the small trader was frequently explained in relation to a lack of awareness of sound shop management. Consequently, emphasis was placed by commentators on the need for small traders to enhance their knowledge of retail management practices in order to improve their own competitive position and efficiency in the retail trade more widely. Both the popular and trade press offered small traders a range of advice that was intended to improve their fortunes. This article considers the form and content of such advice.

This article is a response to Patrick Fridenson’s call for more research into the life cycle of enterprises and especially into business failure. Its subject is the textile group established in 1945 by Cyril Lord, which went on to encompass merchanting, manufacturing, retailing, and finance, operating in the United Kingdom, the United States, and South Africa. Using unpublished records as well as the financial and trade press, the article explains the nature of Lord’s financial, mercantile, and manufacturing networks, and his rapid growth, based on product innovation, novel sales techniques, and massive advertising. The article then examines his subsequent insolvency and receivership in 1968. It contributes to our understanding of corporate failure and the role of the receiver, financial institutions, and government in that process.

This address urges a more self-aware business history. It uses autobiographical details and select biographies of literary figures and women professionals to shed light on the subtle and not-so subtle inequalities associated with business and capitalism. The deliberate tease in the title—WOMEN CHANGE EVERYTHING—is intended to convey the power of word placement to change interpretive meaning and significance, and the power of history to modify understanding. Modifiers are key to an appreciation of the constraints and opportunities that have framed the lives and experiences of women in economies and societies. Even footnotes function in this address as modifiers, uncannily revealing sources of authorial intent and inspiration and throwing light on literary and historiographical hierarchies.

This article analyzes how the public relations of multinational companies was affected by the double impact of decolonization and spread of television during the 1960s. It contributes to recent theoretical conceptualizations of corporate social responsibility by adding the dimension of home country stakeholders and the border-crossing character of corporate responsibility. The analysis deals with the changing media representations in Sweden of Swedish-owned firms in Liberia and South Africa before, during, and after what has been called the “postcolonial moment” (1960–1963). In its wake, Swedish industrialists faced a new policy problem: firms in overseas markets were no longer expected to do only what was legal in the host country but also what was considered right in their home country. The analysis follows the debates concerning this issue of corporate international responsibility throughout the 1960s, and how national business organizations and executives in firms such as the Liberian-American-Swedish Mining Company publicly sought to defend the role of Swedish foreign direct investment in Africa. The business community developed various public relations strategies to engage with its critics, professionalized their media relations, and organized international study tours for unions and politicians.

In this article I explore the protean organizational forms used by the Kaiser and Bechtel construction companies between 1930 and 1950. Kaiser and Bechtel prospered during the Depression and World War II because, as members of the Six Companies consortium of construction firms, they refused to adopt a “best practice” model of corporate organization drawn from the diversified manufacturing and distribution sectors. Instead, Kaiser and Bechtel used a variety of organizational forms to win numerous government contracts for public works and defense production, transforming themselves from small regional firms into substantial national and global corporations. I contribute to modern academic debate over the historical forms of business enterprise and the conjunction of state consumption and private production.

The postwar market for films in Italy resembles those found in other developed capitalist economies, in which supply adjusts to demand through a set of institutional arrangements designed to maximize revenue for the film distributor. The outcome is a statistical distribution of revenues that manifests extreme levels of inequality, indicating that the hits of the day were “giants” in relation to the median film and enjoyed throughout the territory. By drawing upon film industry–sourced box-office data for five cities, Milan and Turin in the north, Naples and Bari in the south, and Rome in the center, we can observe the market mechanism operating at the city level, allowing the exploration of differences in preferences between the cities. A relative popularity index (RelPOP) is introduced to measure variation in film popularity across the five cities, and clear evidence is found to support the coexistence of national and local taste. This phenomenon is examined with respect to those films that were exceptionally popular throughout, and those with particular geographically specific audiences. The example of the many films that starred Totò, appealing in particular to southern Italian audiences, is highlighted and contrasted with the Don Camillo series of films that were set in Emilia Romagna and appealed differentially to filmgoers in the north.