The present essay is intended to supply amplification, and where necessary correction, to my previous article on Anaxagoras' philosophy. Since its publication important essays on the same subject have been written by Mr. Cyril Bailey and by Mr. F. M. Cornford, and the present essay is also an attempt to examine some of the theories put forward in them.

There are one or two points which may be stated at the outset. The conclusions which I put forward five years ago I still believe to be valid. Some of the presentation of the evidence, however, I now see to be misleading and inadequate, notably the treatment of Aristotle's evidence, which I now hope to deal with more fully, and to show that it lends even stronger support to my thesis. I should also say that my former use of ‘Elements’ as a convenient collective term to refer to the four Empedoclean Elements has proved confusing, since it was never intended to suggest that these substances were elements in Anaxagoras' system. I now refer to them by their names in full.

Ovid in writing Amores 3.11.38–9 showed awareness of Metellus Macedonicus’ speech of 131, which proposed compulsory marriage in order to stimulate the birth rate and which was read to the senate and published at large by Augustus (Suet. Aug. 89.2). I wish to suggest that when he wrote Book 1 of the Metamorphoses Ovid was evoking another political debate in which Augustus was involved. Jupiter announces to the gods that in the end radical surgery is needed when the wickedness of mankind becomes incurable (Met. 1.187–91).

This note argues that two passages are worthier of the dramatist if the audience has seen the furies than if it has not. Orestes sees the furies (Choe. 1048–50, 1053–4, 1057–8); the chorus (1051–2, 1055–6,1059–60) does not see them. Does the audience see them? K. O. Müller, on philosophical and antiquarian grounds, thought so. Nearly all scholars today believe not. I agree with Miiller from what Orestes now says to the chorus: ὑμεῖς μν οὐφ ρτε τσδ', γὼ δ' ρ (1061). If the chorus does not see the furies and the audience does not see them either, the ὑμεῖς μν οὐχ ρτε τά7sigma;δ' lacks moment; the chorus cannot find those words of any use and the audience (from what it has heard in the ten lines preceding) cannot find them of interest. There is value in the words only if the audience, seeing what Orestes sees, is being reassured that the chorus does not. Line 1058, κξ μμτων στζουσιν αἷμα δυσφιλς, may be regarded as saying something the audience did not know from its own senses, and the same is true for ὑμεῖ μν οὐχ ρτε τσδ' in 1061 if it says once more that the furies, though real to Orestes, and to the audience as well, are not real to everyone. The opposite reasoning—that if the audience has seen the furies the γὼ δ' ρ (at the close of the line) is unneeded after Orestes has already said three times that he sees them—is not countervailing. For those words are in the less emphatic position, are fewer, and are of less doubtful usefulness, since they lead to λαὑνομαι δ κοὐκτ' ἄν μεναιμ' γώ.

Social dialect, which can be defined negatively as dialect associated with variables other than geographic region, was hardly recognized as a linguistic category until the twentieth century. Although it has been recognized since antiquity that groups at the bottom of the socio-economic ladder speak differently from the elite, non-elite idioms did not merit serious investigation since they were regarded merely as corrupt or decadent approximations to the prestige variety. There is evidence that the Greeks also recognized gender as a variable in linguistic production. Age occasionally figures in discourse about language, but the association is vaguer since it was tangled up with the idea that earlier generations spoke a better or more authentic form of Greek.

The so-called Latin Iliad, the main source for the knowledge of the Greek epic poem in the Latin West during the Middle Ages, is a hexametric poetic summary (epitome) of Homer's Iliad likely dating from the Age of Nero, which reduces the 15,693 lines of the original to a mere 1,070 lines (6.8%).

This article takes as its starting point the frequency with which Ovid refers to his earlier works in his Tristia and Epistulae ex Ponto. Alongside his treatment of the Metamorphoses in the exile poetry, it is suggested that Ovid refers, on a number of occasions, to his Fasti and the progress he is making on it. He does so by using the incipit of his calendar poem, Tempora; this term is sometimes combined with signa (‘stars’), which are also mentioned in the opening couplet of the Fasti. It is proposed that Ovid's attitude toward his Fasti changes over the course of his exile, during which time he is, at various junctures, editing his calendar, and that some of these changes are discernible in the exile poetry; they result in part from his entertaining the possibility of using his Fasti as leverage in securing a mitigation of his punishment. Poems discussed in detail are Tristia 1.1, 1.7, 2.547–52, 5.3; Epistulae ex Ponto 2.1, 4.8.

This article argues for an allusion in Virgil's Eclogue 4 to one of Pindar's victory odes (Olympian 6). It will be suggested that this Pindaric pretext is viewed by the Latin poet through a Callimachean perspective which adds to it further layers of significance. Consequently, the evidence will be discussed for reading the allusion in terms of royal ideology which places Virgil's poem in the tradition of Hellenistic ruler-encomia.

Menander Gallograecvs, as one may call the text constructed by the joint labours of Messrs Gustave Lefebvre and Maurice Croiset, did not come into my hands till three months after its publication, and I am not surprised to find that over sixty of the corrections which I made on a first reading were proposed by Mr Leo in November last, five-and-twenty more by Mr Wilamowitz in December, and another five-and-twenty by other scholars at other dates. The remainder, and the fruits of a second perusal, are the following:

Since the date of my last report upon this subject there has been little to chronicle in regard to the excavations in the Forum. The work of clearing the superficial strata which cover the remainder of the site of the Basilica Aemilia is proceeding somewhat slowly, and the level at which interesting discoveries may be expected has not yet been reached. Nor is the Forum Museum as yet ready. New discoveries have been confined to small excavations on the S.E. and the S.W. sides of the Arch of Titus, where large blocks of travertine, which originally belonged to some other building, and floors in concrete and opus spicatum, with foundations and drains below them, have been found, orientated more or less in correspondence with the older Sacra Via. Two parallel walls at a lower level, however, of large blocks of tufa may well be connected with the earlier temple of Jupiter Stator, which preceded the massive concrete foundation of the temple as we have it, which is orientated with the temple of Venus and Rome and the Arch of Titus.

In Book 9 of Plato's Republic we find three proofs for the claim that the just person is happier than the unjust person. Curiously, Socrates does not seem to consider these arguments to be coequal when he announces the third and final proof as ‘the greatest and most decisive of the overthrows’ (μέγιστόν τε καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν πτωμάτων) (583b7). This remark raises a couple of related questions for the interpreter. Whatever precise sense we give to μέγιστον and κυριώτατον in this passage, Socrates is clearly appealing to an argumentative standard of some kind, and claiming that his final argument alone meets (or comes closest to meeting) this standard. But what precise standard is Socrates invoking here? And given that the first two arguments of Book 9 fall short of this (as yet undetermined) standard, why does he not simply leap directly to the third, most decisive proof?

In the fourth book of the Aeneid Virgil presents the epic's titular hero as fated to found Rome, initially neglecting and ultimately reassuming his mission, all the while being accorded praise or blame for his progress. In this article I shall re-examine Virgil's use of the specifically Chrysippan Stoic doctrine of Fate and human responsibility in Aeneid 4, with a focus on three key points: the role of assent in creating a compatibility of Fate and human responsibility; the ‘Lazy Argument’, the position that Chrysippus combatted, that if things are fated they will happen without any effort on my part; and the Stoic conception of Fate as a chain of causes that includes human assents. I shall argue that Virgil's impeccable, almost obsessive, scholarship results in a detailed homage to Chrysippan Stoic doctrine that actually alludes to its finer points. I restrict my comments to Book Four on the grounds that the Dido-episode tests to the limit Aeneas’ resolve to ‘follow … Italy’ (361), even if non sponte, and that the juxtaposition with Dido sheds added light on the picture. I hope thereby to contribute to a topic of research that deserves renewed investigation using the discoveries in Hellenistic philosophy over the last two generations.

This paper identifies a neglected manuscript, Viterbo, Centro Diocesano di Documentazione (CeDiDo), Capitolare 51 (R), as the extant archetype of the Libri Romani version of the glossary of Placidus. It first demonstrates that R is the parent of the three witnesses to the Libri Romani text used by editors, and it considers the implications of the neglected manuscript for future editions of the text. It then corroborates the importance of R by tracing its travels in humanistic and antiquarian circles in Italy in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. This history provides a framework for future research on the textual transmission of the Libri Romani text of Placidus.

There is a striking resemblance between the physical theory of Plato's Timaeus and that of the Stoics; striking enough, indeed, to warrant the supposition that the latter was substantially influenced by the former. In attempting to trace the main lines of this influence, scholars have tended to focus attention almost exclusively on the Stoics' choice and characterization of the world's ultimate constituents: a rational principle (strongly reminiscent of Plato's World Soul) that pervades and controls a material principle (reminiscent of Plato's Receptacle). In this paper, I offer some suggestions about how the early Stoics may have reacted as readers to Plato's literary presentation of the dialogue's cosmogonic myth. On this basis I consider the proposal that the crucial philosophical appeal of the Timaeus for the Stoics – and perhaps the reason it attracted their interest in the first place – lay not in its claims about the Receptacle and World Soul, but rather in its portrayal of the Demiurge who designed the cosmos.