IN the heroic Latin hexameter, after the essential alternation of long and short syllables, by far the most important feature is unquestionably the caesura. Nevertheless, ancient writers on metre dismiss it with the most cursory notice; all we get from them is that the chief caesura is the penthemimeral, the trochaic and hephthemimeral coming next; the fourth trochaic and the bucolic are usually rejected, and the trihemimeral is mentioned only by Ausonius, Modern writers, among whom are Müller and Winbolt, deal with the question at greater length, but do not agree even on fundamental points, and often base their statements on an insufficient analysis of the extant remains of Latin hexameter verse. The purpose of the following paper is to attempt a more complete analysis, at least in the case of Virgil, the acknowledged master of the Latin hexameter. But before we proceed further there are two preliminaries which must be settled—what are the main types of caesura, and how many caesurae are admissible in one verse?

Munro adopts the emendations veris for Veneris (1. 737) and Zephyrus for Zephyri (1. 708), making Zephyrus the ‘winged harbinger of Spring.’ As to the order of the procession, Munro takes one view in his translation and another in his notes: according to the latter it is ‘Zephyrus, Spring, Venus, Flora,’ the flowers springing up where Spring, Venus, and Zephyrus have trodden: according to the translation it is ‘Flora, Zephyrus, Spring, Venus.’ Duff, in his edition, adheres to the MSS. reading as printed above: Veneris praenuntius pennatus is Cupid, and the order of the procession is ‘Zephyrus, Flora (his wife), Cupid, Spring and Venus (or Venus and Spring).’ With this reading and interpretation, which are probably right, quibus goes in construction with praespargens: Munro, reading Zephyrus, takes quibus with uestigia propter, ‘in whose tracks’ (perhaps with praespargens as well), so that with his reading his note is right and his translation—‘along the path they tread mother Flora straws all the way before them’—is wrong, or at least not so probable, as quibus propter uestigia would be more naturally said of one following behind.

Philosophical influences in the personality and public life of Publius Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, consul in 147 and 134 b.c., were once emphasized in scholarship. In 1892, Schmekel demonstrated the reception of Stoic philosophy in the second half of the second century b.c. among the philhellenic members of the governing elite in general, and statesmen like Scipio Aemilianus in particular, in what he called the ‘Roman Enlightenment’. In the 1920s and 1930s, Kaerst showed influences of Stoic philosophy on Scipio, contemporary politics and the Principate to come, while Capelle and Pohlenz identified Stoic ideas in Scipio's foreign and domestic policies. Together they formed a body of scholarship which held that Scipio possessed a serious interest in philosophy which defined his character and informed his public life. In the 1960s, the challenge to this scholarship was led by Strasburger in two articles, and by Astin in his 1967 biography. Both scholars downplayed and devalued philosophical influences on Scipio and denied him the pursuit of the Greek virtuous life. They placed him within the traditions of the Roman elite, ambitious for glory and results-driven, and they have successfully formed influential views to this end, despite the critique made by Erskine. Astin remained the authoritative study of Scipio and there was much in his Realpolitik that scholarship found compelling, even when it allowed Scipio an attachment to Greek culture. For example, Gruen, Elvers and Badian acknowledged Scipio's interest in Greek culture and philosophy, in combination with the practices and goals of a traditional Roman aristocrat, but they placed their accent on the latter by affirming that Greek learning did not change the current of a traditional aristocratic life. The contention of this article is that the pre-Strasburger/Astin interpretation of Scipio, despite its shortcomings, was indeed correct to detect a deep current of philosophical influences on Scipio. The article argues that the evidence demonstrates that in education, character and public life Scipio was informed by the Greek moral and political tradition; that Scipio had claimed to possess the cardinal virtues, derived ultimately from Plato; and that he had acted under a moral imperative of power formulated by the Stoic philosopher Panaetius; the conclusion will address the ethical intention of Scipio.

Recent excavations in Macedonia have provided an analogy to the pillaging of the Palace at Persepolis. In plundered tombs at Aiani the excavators found a number of small gold discs with impressed rosettes and of gilded silver ivy leaves; at Katerini some thirty-five gold discs with impressed rosettes, a gold double pin, a gold ring from a sword-hilt, a bit of a gilded pectoral, gilded silver fittings once attached to a leather cuirass, many buttons and other fragments; and at Palatitsia (near Vergina) bits of a gilded bronze wreath and of a gold necklace, and an ivory fitting. It was suggested that some of these objects had been dropped when ornamental facings were being torn away from a wooden funerary couch and from clothing by the robbers, who were probably working at speed and dared not return. In the antechamber of the tomb at Katerini many of the objects I have mentioned were found inside a burnt layer, and M. Andronikos has provided the explanation that they had been burnt on the pyre outside the tomb and then brought inside with the debris of the pyre itself. Nothing else was associated with burnt material.

In A.J.P. XXXIII., pp. 426–435, Mr. A. C. Pearson attempted to prove that ὅТαѵ ‘not infrequently bears a causal signification … and that in such cases the temporal meaning is more or less evanescent, and sometimes entirely disappears.’ The use of ὅТαѵ where the verb refers to future time is not discussed, the purpose being ‘to establish that the classification which sums up the other occurrences of the construction as necessarily expressing “indefinite frequency” is incomplete; and that a rigorous insistence on its universal applicability has vitiated the interpretation of numerous passages.’ In the question of ‘causal implication’ I am not particularly interested. It is useless to attempt to deny that our English since is a satisfactory translation of ὅТαѵ in many instances, though it is not, perhaps, an easy matter to state what is the exact force of since in such cases. As to ‘causal implication’ I shall merely point out that a cause, strictly speaking, precedes in time that of which it is the cause, whereas a ὅТε-clause properly defines a situation that is of the same time as the principal clause. The question I wish to raise is whether the implication of ‘indefinite frequency’ has disappeared so completely in certain passages as Mr. Pearson thinks it has. Some of his examples are very interesting. It is not easy to see repeated action in them, and we may admit that critics have not ‘seriously pondered the results which flow from their adherence to established convention.’ But has Mr. Pearson seriously pondered the results which flow from his own conclusions ?' So far as I can see, he makes no distinction at all between cases of ὅТαѵ with the subjunctive, ‘where no other relation than that of causality appears to exist between the subordinate and principal clauses’ and cases of ‘causal’ ὅТε with the indicative.

Except Goldbacher and Dee, most critics have held the latter part of the last book of the Metamorphoses of Apuleius to be almost entirely autobiographical; and many have taken the same view of the first chapter of the first book. Rohde, in particular, has championed this theory, and incidents of the last book are freely included in biographies of Apuleius.

In 394 Agesilaus, treading in the footsteps of Xerxes, came from Asia by way of Thrace and Macedon into Thessaly, threw off the attacks of the Thessalian cavalry, proceeded without further trouble into Boeotia, and met the enemy at Coronea, where a great battle was fought. The question ought to have been asked before now, why was he not held up at Thermopylae?

The last volume of Cicero's Orations, as published in the Oxford Bibliotheca Scriptorum Classicorum, was lately entrusted to me, and will be published in the course of the present year. Meanwhile I desire to record in this paper some of the more important results of my study of the MSS., and, following on this, to indicate several places where our current texts seem to be susceptible of correction and improvement.

At the beginning of ch. xxv (3516) Socrates starts once more to prove his contention that courage is a form of wisdom. He begins by asking Protagoras whether pleasure is not always in itself good, pain in itself evil. Protagoras is not prepared to admit this, but he is willing to accept the position as a basis for discussion. Socrates then asks a second question (352a 8): does Protagoras, like most people, think that knowledge has no power or authority in the soul? does he think that knowledge may be present and yet not operative, being knocked about like a slave by the superior force of anger, pleasure, or passion? Must we not rather believe that knowledge can be conquered by nothing and is alone sufficient to salvation?

Over the last fifty years the world of the palaeographer has been revolutionized by the widespread use of photography. Today a scholar can study a microfilm of almost any codex in the western world in the comfort of his home and compare it with any number of other codices within a matter of minutes. It is no longer necessary to travel long distances, set aside large blocks of time, and spend substantial sums of money in the collation of manuscripts. This fact should encourage modern palaeographers to review the work of their predecessors who were denied these blessings to see if the work of the past lives up to today's standards.

Among the late fifth-century regulations governing the wine-trade in Thasos is a ban on κοτυλιζεῖν (‘selling wine in half-pint measures’, or more generally ‘breaking bulk’). It is normally characterized as a law of rather narrow relevance, something to do with maintaining the quality of Thasian wines and guarding against false measures. Here I want to examine the possibility that it is in fact a highly political measure on the part of a government hostile to the demos, an attempt to ban an institution identified with democracy–the public bar.

As far as I am aware, it has generally been taken for granted that ‘Kato’ in the pentameter must be vocative. The double vocative ‘Visce’—‘Kato’ does not seem objectionable if ‘non’ were repeated as first word of the pentameter (e.g., as Professor Nisbet suggests, ‘non ego, Visce, / non quadrupla, Kato, …). None the less this is unexpected, and it seems at least worth considering the possibility that 'Kato’ might be nominative. The most plausible (if not the only) way of accounting for a nominative would be as subject of a relative clause. Further consequences would follow almost inevitably: the word-ending doubtfully read

The text of Quintus Curtius benefited greatly from Conrad Müller's edition of 1954 (Munich, with translation by H. Schönfeld). In particular, his thorough investigation of Curtius' rhythms enabled him to settle many hitherto doubtful points. Problems remain, unsolved or undetected. In Curtius, as in other prose texts, scribal omissions are a prolific source of corruption, sometimes productive of interpolation. Most of the following notes postulate corruptions of this type.

So the modern editions print the opening words of the work more popularly known as the Caesares. The Symposium begins with what I consider to be a playful encounter between the narrator and his interlocutor, in which the latter's expectations of seriousness in the myth which is to follow are frustrated. This playfulness has not been appreciated by Julian's commentators. I suggest that we have here a concealed trimeter which figures largely in the dynamics of this dialogue (the word δ⋯ is to be retained in Julian's text as necessary connective tissue):

γελο⋯ον οὐδ⋯ν σὐδ⋯ τερπν⋯ν οἶδ' ⋯γώ.