S-Modulin is a frog homolog of recoverin. The function and the underlying mechanism of the action of these proteins are now understood in general. However, there remain some unsolved issues including; two distinct effects of S-modulin; Ca2+-dependent binding of S-modulin to membranes and a possible target protein; S-modulin-like proteins in other neurons. These issues are considered in this commentary.

Studies on the snail Melampus reveal that connectivity is crucial to the survival of transplanted ganglia. Transplanted CNS ganglia can innervate targets or induce supernumerary structures. Neuron survival is optimized by the neural incorporation that occurs when a transplanted ganglion is substituted for an excised ganglion. Better provision for the trophic requirements of neurons will improve the success of mammalian fetal transplants.

The cell assembly is an important concept for cognitive psychology. Cognitive processing will to a large extent depend on the relations that can exist between different assemblies. A potential relation between assemblies can already be seen in the occurrence of (classical) conditioning. However, the resulting associations between assemblies only produce behavioristic processing or so-called regular computation. Higher-level cognitive abilities most likely result from nonregular computation. I discuss the possibility of this form of computation in terms of cell assemblies.

A-consciousness may be regarded as the visibility of information that is the output of a process within a community of other processes. The most prominent function of “public” dissemination of information is giving access to it to processes whose relevance is not clear at the moment of dissemination. The function of P-consciousness may be outside the realm of cognition.

Stein & Glasier suggest embryonic neural tissue grafts as a potential treatment strategy for Alzheimer's and Parkinson's disease. As an alternative, we suggest that the family of nerve growth factor-related neurotrophins and their trk (tyrosine kinase) receptors underlie cholinergic basal forebrain (CBF) and dopaminergic substantia nigra neuron degeneration in these diseases, respectively. Therefore, treatment approaches for these disorders could utilize neurotrophins.

Amit's Hebbian model risks being overexplanatory, since it does not depend on specific physiological modelling of cortical ANNs, but concentrates on those phenomena which are modelled by a large class of ANNs. While offering a strong demonstration of the presence of Hebb's “cell assemblies,” it does not offer an equal account of Hebb's “phase sequence” concept.

This commentary discusses the balance of phosphodiesterase and guanylate cyclase activities in vertebrate photoreceptors at moderate light intensities. The rate of cGMP hydrolysis and synthesis seem to equal each other. Ca2+ as regulator of both enzyme activities is also effectively buffered in photoreceptor cells by cytoplasmic buffer components.

I criticize Block's examples of P-consciousness and A-consciousness for being flawed and the notion of A-consciousness for not being a notion of consciousness at all. I argue that an empirically important distinction can be made between behavior that is supported by an underlying conscious experience and behavior that is brought about by nonconscious action-control mechanisms. This distinction is different from that made by Block.

The context of the target article is delimited again, underlining the intended locationof the argument in the bottomup hierarchy of brain study. The central message is that collective delay activity distributions (reverberations) in cortical modules extend the role of a spike (a potentialinformation carrier across long distances) to an active memory of structured, learned information that can be carried across long time intervals. Moreover, the population code of the reverberations makes them readable down the cortical processing stream. Most of the critical comments are then interpreted and addressed in relation to misreading of the proper context. The price for the limitation of the context (in cognitive, behavioral, and computational terms) is compared with the advantages of a clear, direct contact with experiment on the one hand and with a well controlled body of modeling and analysis on the other.

Neural cell transplants have been introduced in clinical practice during the last decade with mixed results, encouraged by success with simple animal models. This commentary is a reminder that although the ideas and techniques of transplantation appear simple, the variables involved in host-transplant integration still require further study. The field may benefit from a concerted, multidisciplinary approach.

Light adaptation is modulated almost exclusively by changes in intracellular Ca2+ concentration, and other Ca2+-independent mechanisms are likely to play only a minor role. Changes in Ca2+i may be not only necessary for light adaptation to take place but sufficient to cause it.

Block's P-/A-consciousness distinction rules out P's involving a specific kind of cognitive access and commits him to a “strong” Pconsciousness. This not only confounds plausible research in the area but betrays an anosognosia about Wittgenstein's diagnosis about our philosophical “introspection” of mysterious inner processes.

Drawing on previous models of anxiety, intermediate memory, the positive symptoms of schizophrenia, and goal-directed behaviour, a neuropsychological hypothesis is proposed for the generation of the contents of consciousness. It is suggested that these correspond to the outputs of a comparator that, on a moment-by-moment basis, compares the current state of the organism's perceptual world with a predicted state. An outline is given of the information-processing functions of the comparator system and of the neural systems which mediate them. The hypothesis appears to be able to account for a number of key features of the contents of consciousness. However, it is argued that neitherthis nor any existing comparable hypothesis is yet able to explain why the brain should generate conscious experience of any kind at all.

If phenomenal consciousness is distinct from the computationally based access-consciousness that controls overt behavior, how can I tell which things (other than myself) enjoy phenomenal consciousness? And if phenomenal consciousness 'plays no role in controlling overt behavior, how do human bodies come to write target articles arguing for the existence of phenomenal consciousness?

Hereditary retinal degeneration due to mutations in visual genes may be amenable to therapeutic interventions that modulate, either positively or negatively, the amount of protein product. Some of the proteins involved in phototransduction are rapidly moved by a lightdependent mechanism between the inner segment and the outer segment in rod photoreceptor cells, and this phenomenon is important in phototransduction.

The spinal cord provides an alternative model for nerve tissue grafting experiments. Anatomo-functional correlations are easier to make here than in any other region of the CNS because of a direct implication of spinal cord neurons in sensorimotor activities. Lesions can be easily performed to isolate spinal cord neurons from descending inputs. The anatomy of descending monoaminergic systems is well defined and these systems offer a favourable paradigm for lesion-graft experiments.

Segmentalized consciousness in schizophrenia reflects a loss of the normal Gestalt organization and contextualization of perception. Grays model explains such segmentalization in terms of septohippocampal dysfunction, which is consistent with known neuropsychological impairment in schizophrenia. However, other considerations suggest that everyday perception and its failure in schizophrenia also involve prefrontal executive mechanisms, which are only minimally elaborated by Gray.

The subunit structure of the cGMP-gated cation channel of rod photoreceptors is rapidly being defined, and in the process the mode of regulation by Ca2+-calmodulin unraveled. Intriguingly, early results suggest that additional subunits of unknown function are associated with the channel and remain to be identified.

It is argued that there is no fallacy in the reasoning in the example of the thirsty blindsight subject, on one reconstruction of that reasoning. Neither the case of orgasm nor the case of a visual versus an auditory experience as of something overheard shows that phenomenal content is not representational.

The work of Sinden et al. suggests that it may be possible to produce improvement in the “highest” areas of brain function by transplanting brain tissue. What appears to be the limiting factor is not the complexity of the mental process under consideration but the discreteness of the lesion which causes the impairment and the appropriateness and accuracy of placement of the grafted tissue.