Stibbard-Hawkes challenges the link between symbolic material evidence and behavioural modernity. Extending this to non-human species, we find that personal adornment, decoration, figurative art, and musical instruments may not uniquely distinguish human cognition. These common criteria may ineffectively distinguish symbolic from non-symbolic cognition or symbolic cognition is not uniquely human. It highlights the need for broader comparative perspectives.

Our species' behavioral and cognitive evolution constitute a key research topic across many scientific disciplines. Based on ethnographic hunter-gatherer data, Stibbard-Hawkes challenges the common link made between past material culture and cognitive capacities. Despite this adequate criticism, archaeology must retain a central role for studying these issues due to its unique access to relevant empirical evidence in deep time.

The target article explores material culture datasets from three African forager groups. After demonstrating that these modern, contemporary human populations would leave scant evidence of symbolic behaviour or material complexity, it cautioned against using material culture as a barometer for human cognition in the deep past. Twenty-one commentaries broadly support or expand these conclusions. A minority offer targeted demurrals, highlighting (1) the soundness of reasoning from absence; and questioning (2) the “cognitively modern” null; (3) the role of hunter-gatherer ethnography; and (4) the pertinence of the inferential issues identified in the target article. In synthesising these discussions, this reply addresses all four points of demurral in turn, and concludes that there is much to be gained from shifting our null assumptions and reconsidering the probabilistic inferential links between past material culture and cognition.

The constructs of motivation (or needs, motives, etc.) to explain higher-order behavior have burgeoned in psychology. In this article, we critically evaluate such high-level motivation constructs that many researchers define as causal determinants of behavior. We identify a fundamental issue with this predominant view of motivation, which we call the black-box problem. Specifically, high-level motivation constructs have been considered as causally instigating a wide range of higher-order behavior, but this does not explain what they actually are or how behavioral tendencies are generated. The black-box problem inevitably makes the construct ill-defined and jeopardizes its theoretical status. To address the problem, we discuss the importance of mental computational processes underlying motivated behavior. Critically, from this perspective, motivation is not a unitary construct that causes a wide range of higher-order behavior – it is an emergent property that people construe through the regularities of subjective experiences and behavior. The proposed perspective opens new avenues for future theoretical development, that is, the examination of how motivated behavior is realized through mental computational processes.

Endogenous reward (intrinsic reward at will) is a fiat currency that is occasioned by steps toward any goals which are challenging and/or uncommon enough to prevent its debasement by inflation. A “theory of mental computational processes” should propose what properties let goals grow from appetites for endogenous rewards. Endogenous reward may be the universal selective factor in all modifiable mental processes.

In their article, Murayama and Jach contend that a mental computational model demonstrates that high-level motivations are emergent properties from underlying cognitive processes rather than instigators of behaviors. Despite points of agreement with the authors' critiques of the motivation literature, I argue that their claim of dismantling the black box of the human mind has been constructed on shaking grounds.

Murayama and Jach point out that we do not sufficiently understand the constructs and mental computations underlying higher-order motivated behaviors. Although this may be generally true, we would like to add and contribute to the discussion by outlining how interdisciplinary research on novelty-evoked exploration has advanced the study of learning and curiosity.

Murayama and Jach offer valuable suggestions for how to integrate computational processes into motivation theory, but these processes cannot do away with motivation altogether. Rewards are only rewarding because people want and like them – that is, because of motivation. Sexual desire is not primarily a quest for rewarding information. Elucidating the interface between motivation and cognition seems a promising way forward.

Murayama and Jach argue that it is not clearly specified how motivation constructs produce behavior and that this black box should be unpacked. We argue that the authors overlook important classic theory and highlight recent research programs that already started unboxing. We feel that without relying on the mechanisms that such programs uncover, the proposed computational approach will be fruitless.

Many motivational constructs are opaque “black boxes,” and should be replaced by an explicit account of the underlying psychological mechanisms. The theory of motivational systems has begun to provide such an account. I recently contributed to this tradition with a general architecture of motivation, which connects “energization” and “direction” through the goal-setting activity of emotions, and serves as an evolutionary grounded map of motivational processes.

Murayama and Jach raise a key problem in behavioral sciences, to which we suggest evolutionary science can provide a solution. We emphasize the role of adaptive mechanisms in shaping behavior and argue for the integration of hierarchical theories of goal-directed cognition and behavioral flexibility, in order to unravel the motivations behind actions that, in themselves, seem disconnected from adaptive goals.

Although in basic agreement with Murayama and Jach's call for greater attention to the black boxes underlying motivated behavior, we provide examples of our published suggestions regarding how subjective task value (and ability self-concepts) “gets into people's knowledge structures.” We suggest additional mental computational processes to investigate and call for a developmental and situated individual differences approach to this work.

Murayama and Jach offer a thoughtful and timely critique of motivation constructs. We largely concur with their basic premises, but offer additional input and clarification regarding the importance of carefully considering the energization and direction components of motivation, and fully attending to the hierarchical aspect of motivation rather than prioritizing particular levels of analysis.

Murayama and Jach rightfully aim to conceptualize motivation as an emergent property of a dynamic system of interacting elements. However, they do not embrace the ontological and paradigmatic constraints of the dynamic systems approach. They therefore miss the very process of emergence and how it can be formally modeled and tested by specific types of computer simulation.

Murayama and Jach claim that current motivational constructs do not specify causal processes (black-box problem) and that mental computational processes solve this problem. We argue, process-focused research requires theoretical frameworks addressing situational variations, individual differences, and their interaction. Classic achievement motivation theory provides comprehensive models with empirically measurable process-related constructs and predictions. Recent developments build on this, addressing motivation, action, and their socio-cultural and lifespan context. Theory-free mental computational processes cannot do any of that.

I argue that Murayama and Jach's claim that higher-order motivational constructs face the “black-box” problem is misconceived because it doesn't clearly distinguish between personal and subpersonal explanations. To solve it they propose interpreting motivations as causal effects of mental computational processes. I suggest that their solution might be more compellingly presented as providing a fictionalist perspective on some personal-level constructs.

In their proposal for unpacking the black box of motivation, Murayama and Jach (M&J) propose three types of reductions: From high-level to low-level motivational constructs, from motivation to cognition, and from contentful to contentless explanations. Although these reductions come with the promise of parsimony, they carry the risk of losing vital explanatory power.

The proposed “black-box” problem and its solution are drawn from the same substance-oriented framework. This framework's assumptions have consequences that re-create the black-box problem at a foundational level. Specifically, Murayama and Jach's solution fails to explain novel behavior that emerges through an organism's development. A process-oriented theoretical shift provides an ontological explanation for emergent behavior and eliminates the black-box problem altogether.

Whole Trait Theory (and other dynamic theories of personality) can illuminate the process by which motivational states become traits. Mental computational processes constitute part of the explanatory mechanisms that drive trait manifestations. Empirical work on Whole Trait Theory may inform future research directions on mental computational processes.

Metacognitive feelings are an integral part of mental computational processes and influence the outcome of computations. We review supporting evidence on affect inherent in perceptual processes, fluency in study decisions, metacognitive feelings in aha-experiences and intuition, and affect in early phases of interest development. These findings connect to recent theories that combine metacognitive feelings with computational models.