Ackermann et al. outline a model for elaboration of subcortical motor outputs as a driving force for the development of the apparently unique behaviour of language in humans. They emphasize circuits in the striatum and midbrain, and acknowledge, but do not explore, the importance of the auditory perceptual pathway for evolution of verbal communication. We suggest that understanding the evolution of language will also require understanding of vocalization perception, especially in the auditory cortex.

Group-level traits (GLTs) clarify the necessity of cultural multilevel selection theory. We propose a revised definition of the GLT concept. We also highlight the need to better understand the interplay between the dimensions of cooperation and coordination in the ontogeny of GLTs.

Whenever selection operates at a given level of a multitier hierarchy, units at that level should become the object of functional analysis, and units at lower levels should be studied as proximate mechanisms. This intuition already exists for the study of genes in individuals, when individuals are the unit of selection. It is only beginning to be applied for the study of individuals in groups, when groups are the unit of selection. Smaldino's target article is an important step in this direction with an emphasis on human cultural evolution, but the same algorithm applies to all multilevel evolutionary processes.

As astutely noted by the authors of this provocative article, it is time for evolutionary psychology (EP) to be incorporated into clinical and educational interventions. However, two issues from this article are raised in the current commentary: some historical misconceptions of the evolutionary label and a lack of clear and specific guidelines for developing or improving interventions based on EP.

In our response, we address commentators' feedback regarding the contributions and limitations of the Selfish Goal model. We first clarify potential misunderstandings regarding the model's contributions and the role of consciousness. Second, we situate evaluations of the selfish metaphor within the similarities and differences inherent to the goal-gene comparison. We then respond to commentators' insights regarding future directions and implications of our model, particularly with respect to the broader organizational systems in which goals may operate. Finally, we reiterate important considerations for goal research moving forward.

Newell & Shanks' (N&S's) critical review considers only a very limited sense in which mental processes can be thought of as either conscious or unconscious and consequently gives a misleading analysis of the role of consciousness in human information processing. This commentary provides an expanded analysis of conscious processing that also reveals the various ways in which mental processes are unconscious.

Speech is an exquisitely coordinated interaction among effectors both within and between individuals. No account of human communication evolution that ignores its foundational multisensory characteristics and cooperative nature will be satisfactory. Here, we describe two additional capacities – rhythmic audiovisual speech and cooperative communication – and suggest that they may utilize the very same or similar circuits as those proposed for vocal learning.

Recent experimental evidence indicates that intuitions about inherence and system justification are distinct psychological processes, and that the inherence heuristic supplies important explanatory frameworks that are accepted or rejected based on their consistency with one's motivation to justify the system.

We heartily agree with the target article and focus on how positive sociocultural change can be accelerated through the systematic use of scenario planning – what we call sociotecture. Scenario planning is a design process for the creation and selection of symbotypes that make a positive difference. It cuts through complexity by integrating cognitive and affective processes across multiple scales.

Smaldino makes a solid contribution to the literature on the evolution of human social organization by pointing out that group-level-traits (GLTs) often emerge from the interactions of group members in such a way that their effects are not easily partitioned into individual selection. However, we argue that he too readily dismisses institutional analysis as a tool for understanding these traits.

This article argues that mirror neurons originate in sensorimotor associative learning and therefore a new approach is needed to investigate their functions. Mirror neurons were discovered about 20 years ago in the monkey brain, and there is now evidence that they are also present in the human brain. The intriguing feature of many mirror neurons is that they fire not only when the animal is performing an action, such as grasping an object using a power grip, but also when the animal passively observes a similar action performed by another agent. It is widely believed that mirror neurons are a genetic adaptation for action understanding; that they were designed by evolution to fulfill a specific socio-cognitive function. In contrast, we argue that mirror neurons are forged by domain-general processes of associative learning in the course of individual development, and, although they may have psychological functions, they do not necessarily have a specific evolutionary purpose or adaptive function. The evidence supporting this view shows that (1) mirror neurons do not consistently encode action “goals”; (2) the contingency- and context-sensitive nature of associative learning explains the full range of mirror neuron properties; (3) human infants receive enough sensorimotor experience to support associative learning of mirror neurons (“wealth of the stimulus”); and (4) mirror neurons can be changed in radical ways by sensorimotor training. The associative account implies that reliable information about the function of mirror neurons can be obtained only by research based on developmental history, system-level theory, and careful experimentation.

The unconscious-thought effect occurs when distraction improves complex decision making. Recent studies suggest that this effect is more likely to occur with low- than high-demanding distraction tasks. We discuss implications of these findings for Newell & Shanks' (N&S's) claim that evidence is lacking for the intervention of unconscious processes in complex decision making.

Speech prosody is essential for verbal communication. In this commentary I provide an integrative overview, arguing that speech prosody is subserved by the same anatomical and neurochemical mechanisms involved in the processing of reward/affective outcomes.

The inherence heuristic is characterized as part of an instantiation of a more general model that describes the interaction between undeveloped intuitions, produced by System 1 heuristics, and developed beliefs, constructed by System 2 reasoning. The general model is described and illustrated by examining another instantiation of the process that constructs belief in objective moral value.

The target article sought to question the common belief that our decisions are often biased by unconscious influences. While many commentators offer additional support for this perspective, others question our theoretical assumptions, empirical evaluations, and methodological criteria. We rebut in particular the starting assumption that all decision making is unconscious, and that the onus should be on researchers to prove conscious influences. Further evidence is evaluated in relation to the core topics we reviewed (multiple-cue judgment, deliberation without attention, and decisions under uncertainty), as well as priming effects. We reiterate a key conclusion from the target article, namely, that it now seems to be generally accepted that awareness should be operationally defined as reportable knowledge, and that such knowledge can only be evaluated by careful and thorough probing. We call for future research to pay heed to the different ways in which awareness can intervene in decision making (as identified in our lens model analysis) and to employ suitable methodology in the assessment of awareness, including the requirements that awareness assessment must be reliable, relevant, immediate, and sensitive.

Despite its considerable length, this article proposes a theory of human behavioral science that eschews half the evidence. There is irony in the title “Evolving the Future” when the featured examples of intentional change represent procedures that build slowly on the past. Has an opportunity been missed, or is an evolutionary perspective simply incompatible with learning from the future?

Most commentators supported the thesis of the target article, though there were also those who were less fully persuaded. I will begin with a response to the most critical commentaries. First, I will justify an evolutionary perspective that includes group organization and nongenetic inheritance. Next, I will discuss the concept of emergence. Following that, I will transition to an exploration of ideas and concerns brought up by some of the more supportive commentators. This will include a discussion of different types of groups; the psychology of group-level traits; the uses and limitations of an institutional perspective; the link between transmission, adaptation, and selection; current and future methodologies; and the variety of fields that may benefit from a group-level traits perspective.

I argue that Cook et al.'s attack of the genetic hypothesis of mirror neurons misses its target because the authors miss the point that genetics may specify how neurons may learn, not what they learn. Paying more attention to recent work linking mirror neurons to language acquisition and evolution would strengthen Cook et al.'s arguments against a rigid genetic hypothesis.

We argue (1) that the empirical evidence offered by the authors is insufficient to sustain their claim; (2) that, beyond methodological problems, the proposed underlying cognitive mechanism is largely speculative and that a reverse, more motivational, path is equally plausible; and (3) that the distinction and antecedence of inherence intuitions with respect to essentialist beliefs remain to be demonstrated.

Ackermann et al. discuss the lack of evidence for vocal control in nonhuman primates. We suggest that nonhuman primates may be capable of achieving greater vocal control than previously supposed. In support of this assertion, we discuss new evidence that nonhuman primates are capable of modifying spectral features in their vocalizations.