Sijilmassi et al. argue that myths around shared ancestry and history exploit an evolved psychology of interdependence. In contrast, we argue that psychological exploitation is not required. Rather, such myths may be one method, among many, to create a shared understanding of group boundaries, which can be “self-enforcing.” We summarize the game-theoretic basis for this account and some supportive evidence.

The social identity approach offers a more parsimonious and more comprehensive explanation for historical myths’ assumed coalition-building function than the target article's proposed mechanism based on fitness interdependence. Target article's assertion that social identity theory cannot explain certain characteristics of historical myths is based on a narrow interpretation of the social identity approach.

Historical narratives can satisfy basic individual psychological needs. However, an over-reliance on a group's past can marginalize those who think differently – thus, homogenizing the culture and stifling creativity. By revising narratives to balance the power of collective narratives with the richness of individuality, we foster groups that encourage varied identities.

This commentary adds elements of analysis from the new evolutionary sociology that might help to support the mythologic hypothesis. It discusses the likelihood of a more generalized processer rather than exactly evolved psychological mechanisms, the consequences of bottlenecks, and the importance of utilizing molecular, fossil, and primate data in the authors' research program.

I argue that while recruitment might explain some of the design features of historical myths, origin myths in general more importantly provide shared narrative frameworks for aligning and coordinating members of a group. Furthermore, by providing in-group members with shared frameworks for interfacing with the world, the contents of myths likely facilitate the selection of belief systems at the group-level.

Sijilmassi et al. argue that myths serve to gain coalitional support by detailing shared histories of ancestry and cooperation. They overlook the emotional influences of stories, which include myths of human origin. We suggest that influential myths do not promote cooperation principally by signaling common ancestry, but by prompting human emotions of interdependence and connection.

Sijilmassi et al. offer a cognitive account of historical myths, which they present as a cognitive technology designed to recruit coalitional support. We argue this account is incomplete, and that a comprehensive explanation of historical myths must include a central role for human emotions. In particular, emotion-driven narratives have the capacity to recruit coalitional support, which is critical to large-scale human cooperation and social cohesion.

Historical myths are indeed a mystery in need of explanation, and we elaborate on the present adaptationist account. However, the same analysis can also be applied to motivations to produce and consume history in general: That humans produce and consume history is also a mystery in need of psychological explanation. An adaptationist psychological science of history is needed.

Historical myths are appealing primarily because they provide people with views of life and their role in it as significant and enduring. These worldviews help people manage death anxiety by enabling them to view themselves as part of something great that stretches far into the past and endures indefinitely into the future. We review empirical evidence supporting this analysis.

Sijilmassi et al. offer a myth-based framework that is particularly useful in understanding the rising tide of Hindu nationalism in contemporary India. We propose that the success of these myths lies partly in drawing upon the evolved human capacity for prestige-based status to induce a sense of belonging and identification with high-prestige Hindu social groups.

Do people believe in historical myths because they are manipulated by coalitional recruiters, or because it is in their interests to do so? The target article gives somewhat conflicting explanations. We propose that the audiences of historical myths are socially rather than epistemically motivated – they believe and propagate historical myths as a way of signaling their coalitional commitments.

Behavioural ecologies in themselves can create variation in fitness interdependencies among individuals, and hence modulate the functionality of invoking historical myths. We develop this possibility for the case where coalitions form to attack and exploit enemies, or to defend and protect against hostile out-groups. We propose that invoking historical myths are functional and observed especially when groups aggressively expand.

Although we agree that historical myths function to increase cooperation in the groups that share them, we propose that the mechanisms at work may include affective states. We suggest that sharing historical myths can create a felt sense of intimacy, similarity, and security among group members, which increases trust and motivates cooperation, even without particular beliefs about population structure.

This commentary points out some theoretical lacuna in the argument and then evaluates, in a preliminary way, its main comparative empirical hypotheses. It finds very limited support for the observable implications of the evolutionary theory. By contrast, the historical remoteness of foundational myths is closely associated with how long a society has been ruled by a centralized state, pointing at the important role of political history.

To understand why humans put much effort into celebrating cultural myths, it is crucial to approach this phenomenon as part of humans' broader social cognitive evolution. Specifically, humans' unique capacity to bond with others through shared/collective representations of shared experiences has likely caused individuals to use myths to assess not only coalitions' fitness interdependence, but also their cooperative prowess.

The authors' proposal for the evolutionary origins of historical myths does not hold up to scrutiny, as illustrated by a simple mathematical model. Group-level explanations, such as defining the conditions for in-group membership, are dismissed by the authors but are far more plausible, as illustrated by the ongoing war in Ukraine.

The commentaries addressed various aspects of our account of historical myths. We respond by clarifying the evolutionary theory of coalitional psychology that underlies our claims (R1). This addresses concerns about the role of fitness interdependence in large groups (R2), cultural transmission processes (R3), alternative routes to nation-building (R4) and the role of proximal mechanisms (R5). Finally, we evaluate alternative theories (R6) and discuss directions for future research (R7).