No CrossRef data available.
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 September 2019
We offer a friendly criticism of May's fantastic book on moral reasoning: It is overly charitable to the argument that moral disagreement undermines moral knowledge. To highlight the role that reasoning quality plays in moral judgments, we review literature that he did not mention showing that individual differences in intelligence and cognitive reflection explain much of moral disagreement. The burden is on skeptics of moral knowledge to show that moral disagreement arises from non-rational origins.
Target article
Précis of Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind
Related commentaries (21)
Analyzing debunking arguments in moral psychology: Beyond the counterfactual analysis of influence by irrelevant factors
Baselines for human morality should include species typicality, inheritances, culture, practice, and ecological attachment
Cautiously optimistic rationalism may not be cautious enough
Do framing effects debunk moral beliefs?
Emotions in the development of moral norms within cooperative relationships
Humean replies to Regard for Reason
Kantian indifference about moral reason
Moral foundations are not moral propositions
Moral judgment as reasoning by constraint satisfaction
Moral principles in May's Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind
Moral reasoning is the process of asking moral questions and answering them
Moral reasoning performance determines epistemic peerdom
Optimism in unconscious, intuitive morality
Rationalism, optimism, and the moral mind
Rationalization, controversy, and the entanglement of moral-social cognition: A “critical pessimist” take
The faces of pessimism
The social character of moral reasoning
The space between rationalism and sentimentalism: A perspective from moral development
Valuation mechanisms in moral cognition
What is sentimentalism? What is rationalism?
What sentimentalists should say about emotion
Author response
Defending optimistic rationalism: A reply to commentators