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Humean replies to Regard for Reason

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 September 2019

Neil Sinhababu Open the ORCID record for Neil Sinhababu [Opens in a new window]
Neil Sinhababu*
Affiliation:
NUS Philosophy, National University of Singapore, Singapore117570. [email protected]://www.neilsinhababu.com
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Abstract

First, I argue that the Humean theory is compatible with the commonsense psychological explanations May invokes against it. Second, I explain why desire provides better-integrated explanations than the mental states May describes as sharing its effects. Third, I defend individuating processes by relata, which May rejects in arguing that anti-Humean views are as parsimonious as the Humean theory.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e166
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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References

May, J. (2018) Regard for reason in the moral mind. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Sinhababu, N. (2017) Humean nature: How desire explains action, thought, and feeling. Oxford University Press.Google Scholar