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Précis of Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 August 2018

Joshua May
Joshua May*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama, Birmingham, Philosophy Department, Birmingham, AL 35294-1260. [email protected]://www.uab.edu/cas/philosophy/people/faculty-directory/josh-may
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Abstract

Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind argues that a careful examination of the scientific literature reveals a foundational role for reasoning in moral thought and action. Grounding moral psychology in reason then paves the way for a defense of moral knowledge and virtue against a variety of empirical challenges, such as debunking arguments and situationist critiques. The book attempts to provide a corrective to current trends in moral psychology, which celebrate emotion over reason and generate pessimism about the psychological mechanisms underlying commonsense morality. Ultimately, there is rationality in ethics not just despite but in virtue of the neurobiological and evolutionary materials that shape moral cognition and motivation.

Keywords

debunking argumentsmoral judgmentmoral motivationmoral psychologymoral skepticismrationalismrationalizationsentimentalismvirtue
Type
Précis
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 42 , 2019 , e146
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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