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Mutualism is only a part of human morality

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2013

Herbert Gintis
Herbert Gintis*
Affiliation:
Santa Fe Institute, Santa Fe, NM 87501, and Department of Economics, Central European University, 1051 Budapest, Hungary. [email protected]://people.umass.edu/gintis
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Abstract

Baumard et al. mischaracterize our model of individual and social choice behavior. We model individuals who maximize preferences given their beliefs, and subject to their informational and material constraints (Fehr & Gintis 2007). Individuals thus must make trade-offs among self-regarding, other-regarding, and character virtue goals. Two genetic predispositions are particularly crucial. The first is strong reciprocity. The second is the capacity to internalize norms through the socialization process. Our model includes the authors' model as a subset.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , February 2013 , pp. 91
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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