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Does market competition explain fairness?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2013

Peter DeScioli
Peter DeScioli*
Affiliation:
Departments of Psychology and Economics, Brandeis University, Waltham, MA 02453. [email protected]
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Abstract

The target article by Baumard et al. uses their previous model of bargaining with outside options to explain fairness and other features of human sociality. This theory implies that fairness judgments are determined by supply and demand but humans often perceive prices (divisions of surplus) in competitive markets to be unfair.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 36 , Issue 1 , February 2013 , pp. 87 - 88
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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