American scholars generally take a dim view of the 1946 Constitution of Japan. Because it carries the imprint of a foreign political philosophy and, more particularly, because it was allegedly imposed through the willful and covert action of an American field commander, that instrument, they feel, is off key and should be rewritten. Their case was well stated some years ago by Harold S. Quigley, in these words:

… the SCAP draft Constitution … has been regarded widely in Japan as a foreign imposition not wholly suited to a people of very different legal and social traditions…. [It was] written hastily by men without adequate knowledge of Japanese civilization and with little regard … for the national right of self-determination…. The decision to prepare a constitution was made by General MacArthur, who interpreted directives from Washington liberally. These directives … did not require SCAP to write a new constitution…. they specifically laid down … that the new government should be established “in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.”

Among the experiments in government which have taken place in post-war Germany, one of the most varied in form is to be found in the theory and practice of direct legislation. The referendum, initiative, and a type of recall exist in national, state, and local governments. The experience of the German people with these constitutional practices has been treated occasionally in studies of the national and municipal governments, and this note is designed to perform a similar service with regard to the German states.

Studies of the constitutional convention at Weimar seem to indicate that direct legislation was adopted for the national constitution without a great deal of study. The Germans had, however, been acquainted with the idea of direct legislation for some time, and a proposal for its use had found expression in the Erfurter Program of the Social Democratic party. The provisional arrangements for the national government during the revolutionary period included machinery for an appeal to the electorate in cases of disagreement between the ordinary organs of government. But the widest use of the various forms of direct legislation is first to be found in the provisional constitutions of the states.

Although Dante and Machiavelli are generally considered exemplars of opposed medieval and modern ways of thinking, there are various points of resemblance in their political arguments. In Dante's Banquet, there is a presentimento machiavellico that illuminates the ideas that form the basis for Machiavellianism. These ideas, in turn, may be seen as extensions of scriptural positions and as Christian modifications of classical attitudes toward hope, certainty, and philosophy.

The Panel on Public Law is one of a number of such organizations which came into being under the auspices of the Committee on Research of the American Political Science Association. Its purpose is to survey research in public law as now conducted and to give such guidance to methods and areas of future research as is possible and as the members think desirable. Since the date of its organization in the summer of 1942, the Panel, with a somewhat fluctuating membership, has exchanged ideas through extensive correspondence. On September 9–10, 1944, it met in Washington for more detailed discussion and sharing of opinions. It met again in Philadelphia on March 29, 1946, pursuant to the program of the annual meeting of the Association. The range of opinions and attitudes has proved very wide. It reflects a high degree of individualism in the field—the result, no doubt, of differences of initial training and experience and habit of mind, and also, perhaps, of the comparative isolation one from another which characterizes the working conditions of the representatives of the field. The correspondence and the oral discussions already held have dealt with too many problems to make possible a report of widespread agreement.

The most significant development of recent years in the field of public personnel administration in the United States is the rapid spread of the merit system. After receiving lip service for decades, the merit system has made more gains in the last three years than at any previous time since the passage of the Pendleton Act by Congress in 1883. Tangible proofs of this progress are to be found in the state and municipal civil service systems which have been established and in the personnel developments of 1938 and 1939 in the federal government.

In this article I offer an historically situated model of the self as an alternative to liberal, communitarian, and Foucauldian conceptions. Through the example of John Milton, I show that the conscience gave rise to a self that was jointly individual and ethical. By participating in public debates at the behest of his conscience, Milton recognized himself as an individual possessor of moral authority. Conscience thus liberated Milton from traditional identifications and beliefs as it bound him to act for his society. The self founded on conscience therefore differs from both communitarian and liberal variants. Moreover, whereas conscience in the Foucauldian account renders the self docile, it empowers the self in my account. I conclude that the self predicated on conscience challenges the divisions between private and public realms, self-regarding and prosocial actions, and self-creating and culturally determined persons.