The time has come to prepare in advance everything that can legitimately be prepared for the revival of international activities after the present catastrophe. Since there are too many unknown factors, it is impossible to envisage the international machinery of the future in all of its details. We cannot as yet foresee the shape that the agency or agencies eventually superseding the League of Nations will assume. The international organization-to-be will certainly assume a striking difference in character, dependent on whether the League is reconstructed or a different type of international agency is created. From an administrative point of view, however, the problems will not be so different from what they were before; it will therefore be fruitful to discuss some of these problems in the light of the Geneva experience.

Domination, understood as the abusive or capricious employment of power over others for the sake of one's own ends, is among the gravest threats to human freedom. Solving the problem of domination is a crucial normative challenge, and this article identifies in the work of Jean-Jacques Rousseau a promising and overlooked avenue for addressing it. I propose an interpretation of Rousseau's Emile in which preventing domination requires moral education in the practice and value of care. This interpretation gives Rousseau new relevance as a theorist of domination. In connecting non-dominative to educative care, Rousseau's approach has the potential to forge new connections between neo-republican theories of domination and feminist care ethics, even suggesting new routes by which public policy might foster a non-dominative society.

By the standards of the ancient Chinese curse (“May you live in interesting times”), my transition into the position of Editor of the APSR was cursed. Only a few days into these new duties, I looked up one morning from the stack of manuscripts on my desk, glanced out of the window at the beautiful blue sky, and beheld smoke billowing from the Pentagon.

Public reason liberals appeal to public deliberation to ensure that a legal order can be publicly justified to its citizens. I argue that this voice mechanism should be supplemented by exit mechanisms. By allowing citizens to exit legal orders they believe cannot be publicly justified, citizens can pressure states to change their laws. This exit pressure is sometimes more effective than deliberation. I explore federalism as an exit mechanism that can help public deliberation establish a publicly justified polity.

Many scholars blame partisan polarization for collapsing politics into social life. But these diagnoses lack any sophisticated theoretical basis for distinguishing “social” from “political” forms of identity. This article offers such a framework, providing better grounding for evaluating polarization. Drawing on work on the politics of difference, I first argue that the harms of polarized partisanship mirror long-standing criticisms of essentialist social identities, including the constriction of agency and reduction of compromise. I then show how a more political form of partisan identity could not only mitigate these concerns but also positively contribute to democracy through the promotion of civic republican ideals of active citizenship. I conceptualize partisan identity between the view of the social-identity literature (partisanship as cultural identity) and an idealizing tendency within some recent normative views (partisanship without identity), offering a novel evaluation of polarization and a conceptual map useful for both empirical and normative scholars.

Scholars usually portray institutions as stable, inviting a status quo bias in their theories. Change, when it is theorized, is frequently attributed to exogenous factors. This paper, by contrast, proposes that institutional change can occur endogenously through population loss, as institutional losers become demotivated and leave, whereas institutional winners remain. This paper provides a detailed demonstration of how this form of endogenous change occurred on the English Wikipedia. A qualitative content analysis shows that Wikipedia transformed from a dubious source of information in its early years to an increasingly reliable one over time. Process tracing shows that early outcomes of disputes over rule interpretations in different corners of the encyclopedia demobilized certain types of editors (while mobilizing others) and strengthened certain understandings of Wikipedia’s ambiguous rules (while weakening others). Over time, Wikipedians who supported fringe content departed or were ousted. Thus, population loss led to highly consequential institutional change.

Recent work on counter-insurgency, client states, foreign aid, and proxy wars uses a principal–agent framework to study the principal’s ability to induce an agent to exert effort on the principal’s behalf. This work broadly emphasizes the moral hazard problem and the actors’ limited commitment power. The latter is usually addressed through the logic of repeated games in which reneging on an agreement triggers future punishment. This study analyzes a related incentive problem that undermines the principal’s ability to induce an agent to exert effort on its behalf. The repeated-game’s enforcement mechanism tends to break down if the principal is trying to get the agent to resolve a problem that, if resolved, (i) creates an ongoing problem for the agent and (ii) simultaneously significantly reduces the agent’s ability to impose future costs on the principal. The principal cannot induce the agent to exert much effort in these circumstances, and the problem persists.

The power to incur public debts is one which may have a vital influence on all governmental services. Since borrowing is often the easy way out of a difficult financial situation, the state's credit must be jealously guarded against abuse by the unscrupulous, the inefficient, and the over-ambitious. As a result of their experiences during the nineteenth century, most of the states in this country placed constitutional restrictions upon the use of the state's credit. But despite limitations many states have contracted large debts during the past twenty years, and several of them have been embarrassed by debt problems.

This article explores the extent to which Shanghai City, and its subordinate units, have been politically independent of higher authorities in the Chinese government. Evidence from the ‘fifties and early’ sixties suggests increasing managerial and cultural independence at the city level. Evidence from the early Cultural Revolution however suggests conceptual problems in the connection of usual notions of “autonomy” with substantive issue areas, and in their connection with local and central patterns of factions. The slow reconstruction of a local Party hierarchy in Shanghai was paralleled by a decentralization of some commercial and industrial decisions. Shanghai's role as a model in Party rebuilding increased the fully national role of the city's top leadership. Analysis of autonomy, power, or dependence in administrative units is affected when strong local leaders acquire national ambitions. Suggestions are made about the characteristics of an organization these words might describe.

Substantive due process is the classic, if temporary, achievement of judicial activism. The Roosevelt Court destroyed it out of respect for the democratic processes. Mr. Justice Black's “incorporation” ploy was calculated to forestall backsliding by equating the Fourteenth Amendment with the Bill of Rights. But the Bill of Rights, after all, is quite old fashioned. It does not cover many matters deemed crucial in our day, e.g., poverty. To fill this “gap” the Warren Court used “equal protection” as “actively” as the pre-Roosevelt Court had used “due process.” Obviously inspired by the Black incorporation principle, the early Burger Court is doing to substantive equal protection what the Roosevelt Court did to substantive due process. A generation ago we called it a “return to the Constitution,” now it is called strict construction. If in time the full Nixon Court succumbs to the magic of power and imposes its ideals upon the nation, some of us may find embarrassment in our quondam efforts to convince ourselves that judicial activism (it used to be called judicial supremacy) is a proper handmaiden of democracy.

While significant progress has been made in establishing a legal barrier to the further spread of nuclear weapons, some important nations are withholding approval of this Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Political factors are very significant, but agreement is made even more difficult by persistent ambiguities in technological forecasts of “how far we or they are from the bomb.” The time-lag for any crash weapon programs will not remain as extended as one might hope, because civilian technology itself is drawing states ever closer to de facto military capabilities. Yet the length of this time-lag may be crucial to the maintenance of peace if political crises emerge. Since scientists offer widely varying estimates on such time-lags, a graphical formulation is offered to reduce ambiguity. In the end, the effectiveness of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards under the NPT may depend more on their symbolic and political impact than on their technology.

Communist China entered the “constitutional stage” of its experience on September 20, 1954, when the Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic (CPR), adopted by the first National People's Congress (NPC) on that date, was promulgated. The ordinary Chinese citizen could detect no immediate effect of this event upon the conditions of his daily life, and he had no reason to believe that things affecting him would be done very much differently in the future than in the recent past. He could understand from the incessant propaganda of the preceding months that the “transition to Socialism” was moving toward its climax. The new Constitution promised him no surcease from the incitements and pressures of the interminable “mass movements”—for “land reform,” “suppression of counter-revolutionaries,” “Resist America, Aid Korea,” “3-Anti,” “5-Anti,” “democratic reform,” “national elections,” “On to Taiwan,” and the others. Instead, he would be told that the past was merely the prologue: the pre-constitutional measures of September, 1949—the Common Program, the Organic Law of the Central People's Government (CPG), and the Organic Law of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)—had only enabled the “people's democratic dictatorship” to lay the foundations for the superstructure of Socialism.

The British Commonwealth of Nations is the oldest international organization of states in existence. Its uniqueness lies in its unbroken historical continuity, the loyalty of its members to each other, their solidarity on vital matters of common concern, the fluidity of their machinery for dealing with such matters, and their abhorrence of constitutional contracts within the family of the Commonwealth. These are its features so far as we can see them yet in the perspective of history. This article will discuss some of these features and advance an hypothesis for research on the nature of Commonwealth.

Continuity, with change but without revolution, has been the British political formula for the Commonwealth. The evolution of the Commonwealth was one of the long-range consequences of the American Revolution. In a broad historical sense the Commonwealth is the lesson that Britain drew from that revolution. There have been other examples in history, such as Rome and Spain, of the expansion overseas of a people and of its concepts, language, traditions, and institutions. But only in the case of the Commonwealth has historical continuity been maintained without catastrophic change or revolution. It is true that revolution severed the main branch of the first British Empire. The cause of that revolution was the still unresolved deadlock between executive and legislature which had caused the revolt under Cromwell in the preceding century.

For students of government the annually recurring debates over foreign aid are a stethoscope held to the heart of the United States foreign policy process. They reveal in classic form the political strains and stresses that have come to afflict this country's postwar external relations. Foreign aid has required new concepts, skills, personnel, institutions, legislation, and funds. This modern brand of “dollar diplomacy” has not only jostled traditional structures and processes within the executive branch but has called upon the legislator and the man in the street to adjust to a new vision of the American mission and to what it involves in material terms as well. Herewith is a case study of that reappraisal.

The foreign aid debate of 1957, centering around the preparation and approval of the authorization and appropriation acts for fiscal 1958, was especially instructive because it was the occasion for a resounding collision between a greatly intensified crusade to redirect and reinvigorate the program, particularly in support of long-range economic development, and an equally determined campaign to bear down on the brakes. The present commentary focuses primarily on the roles of the official executive and legislative participants, as well as of influential non-governmental interests, during the course of this debate. The story sheds some light on both the foreign policy process in general and on some of the major substantive and administrative issues at stake in this particular case.

No reference was made in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals to colonial questions, and this, the most important omission among the subjects covered in the Covenant of the League of Nations, brought forth immediate comment. There was, first of all, the problem of those territories held under mandate as part of the League of Nations system. They were all under the administration of members of the United Nations, except for the former German islands in the North Pacific, which were under mandate to Japan. If the new organization was to supplant the League, some formal changes would, in any case, be required.

A second problem was the disposition of such territories as had been taken from Italy and would be taken from Japan. If the self-denying ordinances of the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration were to be taken literally, there would be territories to dispose of which could hardly be turned into colonies.

Finally, the unfortunate experiences of many European states during the earlier years of the war in the Asiatic and Pacific territories under their control had caused a large amount of discussion of colonial questions. The belief had been voiced in various quarters that colonial administration needed modernizing, that self-government of the natives was not always their goal, and that colonial problems should be considered as international problems and not merely problems of individual colonial powers. Some of these powers looked upon the United States as the center of anti-colonial feeling, and even went so far as to suspect the United States Government of a desire to force changes on them. It was held by some groups in the United States that, as these colonies would be freed largely by American arms, the United States thereby would acquire some responsibility for their future. As the war situation improved and the colonial powers began to think about a peacetime future, they started to make tentative schemes for colonial reform which might avert any sort of outside intervention or internationalization. The British Colonial Development and Welfare Bill, the French proposal to unite all colonies in a “union” with the metropole, the Dutch proposal for a federalized state, all seemed related to the anti-imperial trend of the early days of the war.