World War II has called forth greater organizational and administrative efforts than ever before on the part of the armed forces, private industry, and government. The sheer size of the new organizations that were formed to fight battles, manufacture matériel, and administer government programs has intensified the problems of top management and executive control, as well as the technical problems of military operations, supply, and industrial production. Great dynamic changes in society always afford occasion for reappraising basic philosophies, and these significant changes in the scope and scale of our great enterprises are no exception. The field of management is perhaps less spectacular, less open to popular discussion than are the issues of foreign policy and of government participation in the national economy. But effective management of our enterprise is of fundamental importance to a successful conclusion of the war and subsequent maintenance of peace. The demands of the war on the home front have stimulated much re-thinking of the theories of government and business administration. This article is concerned with the relation between the basic theories of two of the greatest contributors to the field of management—Frederick Taylor and Henri Fayol.

We all know what the task of organizing for war has been during the past four years. Arms production of undreamed of magnitude had to be developed in a matter of months. To produce the vast number of planes, tanks, and ships, new enterprises sprang up over night and existing ones expanded to many times their original size. Similarly, the federal government, in addition to creating tremendous staffs in the War and Navy Departments, had to develop quickly “administrative leviathans” to control prices and ration goods, allocate industrial production, and direct the production and distribution of foods. War-time control had to be exercised to an unprecedented degree, frequently for hitherto unregulated matters, in connection with oil, censorship, transportation, manpower, and the like. Besides a need for more technical personnel in industrial production, there developed a need for people able to organize and direct large new enterprises.

That there is a general and well-grounded dissatisfaction with the administration of punitive justice in America, I shall take for granted. It is, if I may say so, a condition, not a theory. The criminologist complains that whereas the fear of punishment does not restrain crime, it is none the less the chief reliance of law for protecting society; that whereas his science has shown the necessity of special institutions with expert management for many classes of delinquents, the legal theory of ideal equality before the law leads criminal law to consign all offenders to a common prison; that whereas he has “demonstrated positively that crime is a disease,” the law persistently deals with the criminal as a normal person. The sociologist complains that whereas the true purpose of punishment is protection of society, the basis of judicial punishment is revenge; that whereas the rights of society ought to be borne in mind continually, the law looks chiefly at individual rights; that whereas sociology has shown the necessity of study of the actual criminal, the law deals with him in the abstract and speculates over responsibility; that whereas the certainty, not the severity of punishment operates as a deterrent and protects society, the law provides for the latter and takes scant account of the former. The plain citizen who, without scientific investigation, knows only that he pays taxes to maintain prisons, courts, sheriffs, constables, police, and public prosecutors, complains that notwithstanding the enormous cost—said to amount the world over to $400,000,000 annually—society is not protected, crimes are not punished, and lawlessness is general.

In 1890, Mr. Edward C. Mason published in his monograph, The Veto Power, the results of his investigation of presidential vetoes down to 1889. In the present note, it is proposed to supplement the earlier study by presenting a short analysis of vetoes between 1889 and 1934.

By 1889, the direct veto had been applied to 435 measures. Of this number, however, over 200 were pension bills vetoed during Cleveland's first administration. Of pocket vetoes, there had been only 16. From 1889 to the close of the Seventy-third Congress in June, 1934, the direct veto was exercised 235 times, and 292 pocket vetoes were recorded. In the hundred-year period from 1789 to 1889, 29 vetoes were overridden by Congress; in the 45 years from 1889 to 1934, 22 met reversal. This increase in the number and proportion of vetoes is attributable to the increased amount and broadened scope of legislation resulting from the complexity of our social and political life.

Since the English Revolution of 1688, it has been a part of the Anglo-American tradition that elected representative assemblies control the policies and acts of the executive branch of the government. This doctrine was firmly embedded in the American state and federal constitutions. With some wartime reservations, it has been universally accepted throughout our country. At the present time, however, there is an uneasy feeling that practice does not square with theory. There is even a suspicion that practice contradicts theory—that a vast body of officials has in fact escaped the possibility of control by the people's representatives.

The trends of the last half-century have certainly complicated the problem of congressional authority over administration. This has occurred in part because administration has made impressive gains in effective organization and operation, while relatively Congress has stood still. Within the administrative system there has developed a capacity for self-direction which might well challenge the dominance of Congress, if Congress continues to be the laggard partner in the governmental team.

In Chapter 13 of the Leviathan on “The Natural Condition, of Mankind” is found Hobbes' doctrine of the state of nature as it is generally known. This may be briefly summed up as follows: In faculties of mind and body, men are, on the whole, so nearly equal that one cannot claim for himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. From this equality of ability arises equality of hope in attaining ends desired. “And therefore if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies.” There are three principal causes of quarrel among men; first, the desire for gain; second, for safety, and third, for glory. Hence where there is no common power to keep men in awe, “they are in that condition called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man.” This war need not be constant conflict, since “the nature of war consists not in actual fighting, but in the known disposition thereto during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary.” In such a state of war, actual or potential, the condition of man is most unfortunate and deplorable. “The life of man in such a state,” says Hobbes, “is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

In spite of later claims that it had been the leader of the anti-fascist camp and of the Slav world from the beginning of the second World War, the Soviet Union followed a strictly Russian policy, neither anti-fascist nor Pan-Slav, from August, 1939, to June, 1941. This policy clearly foreshadowed a nationalist revival of the language and aspirations that had been most characteristic of Old Russia but were assumed to have been definitely buried in the ten November days of 1917 which shook the world. During these two years not the slightest sympathy for the Czechs and Poles suffering under German occupation was expressed. Indeed, although Leninist communism during World War I had conducted a violent defeatist propaganda compaign in both warring camps, the subversive communist propaganda that was resumed in 1939 was directed only against the democratic nations. “Moreover, officially, even ostentatiously, help was granted to the camp of fascism so that, from 1939 to 1941, the Soviet Union could be considered a non-belligerent partner of the Axis. From the policy of benevolent neutrality towards the Axis the Soviet Union was removed against its will. Circumstances made it an ally of the democracies. This change was performed reluctantly, only because no other choice was left.”

The organized interest group does not make the laws of the land. It must devise means for gaining access to and influencing those who are constitutionally empowered to make, administer, or otherwise define the law. This study deals with the efforts of one organized group, the Associated Industries of Vermont, to secure its objectives in the 1951 session of the Vermont legislature. The study is correlatively concerned with the legislator's view of the AIV activities and, more broadly, of the legislative process.

The Associated Industries of Vermont is a “peak” association; an organized business group which acts as spokesman for many diverse business interests in the state. The membership, which ranges from small manufacturers to the National Life Insurance Company, totaled some 450 concerns in 1951, the year in which the events to be described took place. Membership is by individuals, firms, and a few trade associations. Included were almost all the textile, the granite and marble, and the machine-tool companies in the state—representing three of the state's important industries. A rough estimate of the total payroll of the member concerns was about half of the total payroll of the state. A few retailing and other non-manufacturing members had recently been added.

“The problem of the ‘dying away’ of the state,” observed A. Y. Vyshinsky rather sarcastically in a recent monograph, “is a purely theoretical problem.” Within the context of contemporary Soviet political theory, the accuracy of this observation is beyond question, although Vyshinsky would have been the first to admit that a “theoretical problem,” no matter how pristine, always reflects a practical quandary within the methodological precepts of Marxist-Leninist ideology. This particular theoretical problem conceals an important chapter in the profound transmutation of Marxist political theory and its philosophical substructure in the Soviet Union, for it was the failure to cope adequately with this utopian legacy which led to the abandonment of the eschatological categories of the Marxist doctrine and the erection of a totally new theoretical edifice supported by new philosophical foundations.

Contrary to widespread impression, the theoretical problem of the Soviet state was not satisfactorily resolved at the 18th Party Congress in 1939, although the view is prevalent that Stalin was able to provide an adequate rationalization for the existence of the state in Soviet society. It was on this occasion that the late Soviet leader explained that the state was a necessary institution because of “capitalist encirclement” and that it would persist in socialist and communist society until this encirclement was finally liquidated.

The rôle played by public opinion in a democracy, particularly as it affects the legislative process, has long been a subject for speculation by political scientists. The advent of controlled quota sampling permits of the study of this important relationship in measurable terms. The object of the present discussion is to trace the interaction of public opinion and the executive and legislative branches of government as they have dealt with a single public question—reorganization of the Supreme Court, as presented to Congress for consideration by President Roosevelt on February 5, 1937. Enlargement of the Supreme Court from nine to fifteen members was the most controversial feature of the general reorganization of the federal judiciary proposed by the President, aimed at speeding up the process of clearing cases through the federal court system, and making the system more “representative” of the wishes of the people.

The debate on enlargement of the Supreme Court provides a useful and interesting case study for several reasons. The case as a public issue has a definite beginning and end, ranging from the proposal of the judiciary reform bill by the President on February 5 to the death of Senator Joseph T. Robinson on July 14, 1937. As it was debated by public and legislators, the issue was a relatively clear-cut one, uncomplicated by side issues or utterly foreign events that might have influenced the course of either legislators or the public. Finally, and of decided importance, the American Institute of Public Opinion made weekly measurements of opinion toward the proposal during the entire period that reorganization of the Court was a public question. This permits the correlation of reliable opinion samplings with events in the debate and the observation of their relationship.

How the city, the political community, may ask its citizens to sacrifice their lives for the sake of its preservation has plagued us since the birth of political philosophy. This article examines Thucydides' presentation of Pericles' attempt to solve this problem by reconciling the highest good of the individual and the good of the city by means of the love of glory. I contrast the central themes of Pericles' speeches in Thucydides, especially his renowned funeral oration, with other parts of Thucydides' presentation of Periclean Athens, in particular his famous account of the plague, to demonstrate his doubts about the efficacy of the Periclean solution to the political problem.