We return to the literature on collective villages and reexamine its central arguments. In doing so, we focus on an institution for allocating land that we call the Rule. As claimed by its advocates, the Rule secures land allocations that result in outcomes differing from those that would be achieved by markets. The outcomes are not constrained to be efficient. But the economic costs paid fail to secure the attainment of guarantees of subsistence, greater equality, or a greater sense of community resulting from the elimination of envy. However, in the face of high levels of risk, the form of collective property rights embodied in the Rule may create what we call “communities of (mis)fortune,” in which no one can envy others' gains or losses resulting from the random shocks of nature.

A selective review of the literature on equal educational opportunity supports an argument for explicit use of normative models in research. The argument has two parts. First, we show that confusion over the Coleman Report (1966) was due to a mismatch between the implied reform objective and the statistical approach. The objective was to reduce black/white differences in educational achievement, but the statistics explained individual differences in achievement. Second, we partly develop and apply a normative dynamic model of the objectives of school integration over time. Normative dynamic models could be used in conjunction with behavioral data to operationalize theoretical concepts such as accountability, symbolic politics and non-decisions.

We experimentally investigate the informational theory of legislative committees (Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989). Two committee members provide policy-relevant information to a legislature under alternative legislative rules. Under the open rule, the legislature is free to make any decision; under the closed rule, the legislature chooses between a member’s proposal and a status quo. We find that even in the presence of biases, the committee members improve the legislature’s decision by providing useful information. We obtain evidence for two additional predictions: the outlier principle, according to which more extreme biases reduce the extent of information transmission; and the distributional principle, according to which the open rule is more distributionally efficient than the closed rule. When biases are less extreme, we find that the distributional principle dominates the restrictive-rule principle, according to which the closed rule is more informationally efficient. Overall, our findings provide experimental support for Gilligan and Krehbiel’s informational theory.

Do the processes states use to select judges for peak courts influence gender diversity? Scholars have debated whether concentrating appointment power in a single individual or diffusing appointment power across many individuals best promotes gender diversification. Others have claimed that the precise structure of the process matters less than fundamental changes in the process. We clarify these theoretical mechanisms, derive testable implications concerning the appointment of the first woman to a state’s highest court, and then develop a matched-pair research design within a Rosenbaum permutation approach to observational studies. Using a global sample beginning in 1970, we find that constitutional change to the judicial selection process decreases the time until the appointment of the first woman justice. These results reflect claims that point to institutional disruptions as critical drivers of gender diversity on important political posts.

It would not, I think, be entirely misleading to suggest that doctrines of laissez faire and attacks upon reasoned state intervention in political and social life have tended to emanate from two extremes in social philosophy—ultra individualism and an extreme organicism. In the first case, and we may take Locke as an example, society is made up of a heap of individuals who came together to form the state for the limited purpose of the protection of property. Man is not seen as a part of a larger whole, influenced by the structure of that whole, but as an isolated individual; thus any state interference beyond the protection of property is viewed as a restriction of individual liberty. On the other hand are thinkers who regard society as such a complicated and delicate organism that they can only—and governments should only—sit back and gasp at the complexity of it all. Any attempt to improve one aspect will affect the balance of the whole in ways impossible to predict. It is difficult to point to a pure instance of this opinion, but this is the impression left with the reader after perusing such works as Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Bradley's Ethical Studies and the works of some more modern conservatives. All that governments can be expected to do is to prevent the worst collisions and any attempt to pursue a positive policy is doomed to failure.

Many nondemocracies hold multiparty elections while also adopting institutions of de jure judicial independence; yet there is debate over how nondemocratic courts can affect election integrity. This paper argues that increased de jure independence creates incentives for opposition recourse to the courts, which reduces election fraud due to greater legal exposure for election-manipulating agents and the ruling party. However, this effect occurs only when competition is low and the ruling party has limited incentive to intervene. These predictions are distinct from those of prior work, and they are supported by an analysis of cross-national election-year data from 1945 to 2014. Preprocessing techniques are used to reduce concerns about endogeneity and confounding. The results show that principal-agent dynamics can occur in manipulated elections even when incumbents remain in office, challenge the centrality of protest risk as a deterrent to manipulation, and offer a framework for predicting when de jure reforms translate to behavioral independence.

Participation is one of the crises of political modernization. Along with the political awakening of masses of people has come the necessity of absorbing them meaningfully into the political system. The almost universally low levels of formal education and political competence contribute to the difficulties of mobilization. The most advanced polities are still seeking ways of making democratic participation effective; modernizing polities find the task even more formidable. This article examines the relationships among participation, education, and political competence in a sample of members of the Italian Socialist Party (PSI).

Although Italy is an advanced polity, in average education and industrialization it lags behind the world leaders in Europe and North America; and in some respects patterns of participation likewise reflect a transitional stage. The PSI is probably the only democratic Socialist party of the classic Marxian type left in Western Europe. It is devoted to the democratic mobilization of the industrial and agricultural masses. But it also contains a substantial middle-class element, and thus provides an opportunity to study the relationship between participation and political competence for persons of different levels of formal education.

There can be little doubt that differences in formal education have political consequences. The evidence is compelling that persons of high education participate more, are more knowledgeable, feel more efficacious, and exhibit greater sensitivity to the ideological dimensions of politics. Evidence from a sample of members of the PSI reinforces and refines these findings.

It is no longer the rule among American intellectuals that to describe oneself as a conservative is to confess to intellectual bankruptcy. The new conservatives, on the contrary, make much of their sophistication in matters of philosophy and history, compared with the naiveté of the liberals. That such a reversal of roles has been possible says much about what has passed for liberalism in modern America, for if the liberals had been historically realistic, profoundly humanistic, and uncompromisingly individualistic, the present case for conservatism would lose much of its force. One is tempted to say, if only there had been more liberalism among the liberals, there would be less need for conservatism. To understand this curious situation it is essential to realize that it has been not the liberal but the progressive mentality that has held sway.

This paper contrasts nonguaranteed city debt with taxation and general obligation debt. Drawing upon Bureau of the Census, Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) and Municipal Year Book data, the analysis shows that both per capita tax revenue and outstanding general obligation debt are best explained by background factors such as total population, functional scope, and region, while fiscal strain plays a secondary role. Political structures, in the shape of legal constraints on taxation and debt and of form of government, do not account for patterns of these traditional revenue sources. By contrast, nonguaranteed debt is best explained by a model in which fiscal strain has a paramount role, but with both legal constraints on taxing and regional differentiation contributing significantly to the explanation, at least for data collected prior to 1978. The findings suggest a two-tiered model of the revenue side of fiscal decision making, with historical accommodations to powerful economic and demographic factors dominating taxing and general obligation debt, while nonguaranteed debt serves as a flexible instrument of shorter-term strategy.

Liberal democrats, like all those who elect to paddle in the placid waters of liberalism, show a charming imperviousness to the existence of power. It is the ingenuousness which permitted the ideology of individualism to flourish for well over a century in the Western world. But all chickens—political as well as others—eventually come home to roost; and the failure to imbibe the home truths set down by such ungentlemanly characters as Thrasymachus, Machiavelli, and Pareto now accounts for the dilemmas, reconsiderations, and tortured defenses of liberal democracy which we see abounding on all sides.

Liberal democracy—that uneasy compromise which was never a compromise at all—is, from the moral standpoint, the worthiest of political creeds. It can arouse the enthusiasm of the humane, the heretical, and the responsible: in short, of all men of good will. But the tenets of liberal democracy can only be a guide for governors and governed in a community if there exists a halcyon situation in which the traditional status system is placidly taken for granted by all in the community.

Representative government on a national scale did not originate in the psychology of primitive Teutons, as English historians long contended; nor is it a mere bourgeois institution of passing significance, designed to delude the masses, as Fascists and Bolsheviks have alleged. Its vast historical complications conform to no such simple thesis. On the contrary, representative government began its career as an instrument of political power, in a given complex of social and economic circumstances, to serve the purposes of ruling monarchs; and it has played a bewildering rôle, in form, spirit, and authority, for more than five hundred years. Flexibility has been its prime characteristic. As a means, not an end in itself, it has served an infinite variety of causes, and has displayed both adaptability and survival power. In form, it has not been a political stereotype. Rather, it has been amazingly variable. In spirit, in the ideas associated with its evolution, and in the uses to which it may be put, representative government is subtle and adaptable, offering to statesmen who have imagination and manipulative capacity a tool of inexhaustible utility.

A great deal has been said as to whether Hitler is really representative of the German people. Books have been written to show that he is merely the latest in a long line of German romanticists, racialists, and Pan-Germans. In most of these studies, the German people are lumped together in one mass without much differentiation. In analyzing public attitudes, however, it is desirable to be as particular and specific as possible, and to break up opinion groups into all their component parts. Therefore, without desiring to minimize the emphasis already placed on the evil influences which have had such a strong and continuing effect upon the generality of Germans and the course of their history, it is proposed here to study German political opinions district by district during a critical period. It is the purpose of this investigation to ascertain whether German voters reacted uniformly as a mass when they were presented with a crucial decision. Did the reawakening of German nationalism and Pan-Germanism by Hitler evoke a uniformly strong response throughout the length and breadth of the country, or were the German people genuinely divided in their attitude toward Nazism—the latest version of rampant German nationalism?

The classic definition of American isolation is that it is not a theory but a predicament. In all seriousness, isolation is not a theory of American foreign policy. Isolation is a theory about a theory of American foreign policy. Because this interpretation is a poor theory, misrepresentative even if taken only semi-literally, it has placed the discussion of American foreign policy in a sad predicament of obf uscation, not without its influence upon national decisions.

In relation to the two extremes of isolation and internationalism, America's present course is, in the words of Secretary Hull, a “middle course.” Washington's advice to have “as little political connection as possible,” which is definitive of early policy, is shown by its context to mean merely the avoidance of permanent alliances beyond the existing French treaty.

At its national congress, September 15 to 27, 1956, the Chinese Communist Party, among other items of business, elected a new group of leaders officially known as the Eighth Central Committee. For some time to come this group of men and women will have a highly influential role in the affairs of their party and of the Chinese nation. What they say and do may also affect the course of world events.

What kind of people are they? What are their social and educational backgrounds? How long have they been in the Communist movement? By what roads have they been able to reach the summit of their party hierarchy? What kinds of influence can they exert in the various fields of national affairs? To what extent did their election to the central committee represent a “status mobility” within the party? Answers to these and similar questions should illuminate some broader questions: (1) whether the Chinese Communist Party is really led by the working class as the Communists themselves have claimed; (2) what are the typical features of the Chinese Communist leadership; (3) how the characteristics of that leadership have been conditioned by those of Chinese society; and (4) what are the strengths and weaknesses of the Communist leadership? This paper is addressed to these questions.

This is the first of a number of investigations of the socio-economic basis of politics, with a special focus on voting for the radical left or right. In this case, the voting data are the percentage of votes cast for Allende, the socialist candidate in the 1952 presidential elections in Chile.

Shortly after World War II a Communist guerrilla army, the Hukbong Magpalayang Bayan (HMB), or People's Liberation Army, became a serious threat to the new Philippine Republic. The Huks, as they are commonly known, controlled large parts of the sugar cane and rice growing areas of Central Luzon and carried out military and political operations in other parts of the islands. Like their Communist counterparts in Vietnam and Malaya, the Huks began as an anti-Japanese guerrilla army. In fact, Huk originally referred to Hukbalahap, a contraction of a phrase meaning People's Army Against the Japanese. As the military arm of the Communist Party, however, their ambitions always exceeded mere anti-Japanese activities.

After the Japanese defeat, successive Philippine governments wrestled with the problem of eliminating the Huks. Policies of coercion failed because the Philippine Army and Constabulary were not up to the task. Policies of conciliation failed because the demands of the Huks were regarded as unreasonable. By 1949 it became clear that the issues dividing the Huks and the government would have to be settled by force. Following the allegedly fraudulent election of President Quirino in 1949 the Huks gained steadily. By 1950 large unit raids were common and a full-scale attack on Manila was envisioned for 1951.

Legislatures are widely recognized as institutional embodiments of the concept of representation in contemporary liberal democracies, but how support for legislatures and evaluations of their members's activities influence support for national political regimes and communities is imperfectly understood. This article investigates the question with the use of data from a 1979 national survey of the Canadian public. Analyses of a model of support demonstrate that feelings about parliament and assessments of MPs' performance have significant effects on levels of support for the national political community and regime. Other important variables include cost-benefit evaluations of the personal impact of governmental activity, more general evaluations of governmental performance, and subcultural variations in political socialization.

In the March 1988 issue of this Review, Virginia Gray and David Lowery presented a respecification of Mancur Olson's model of economic growth and tested the revised model with U.S. state data. A special feature of the Gray-Lowery analysis is its more thorough measurement of interest group effects. These investigators found interest group influences quite different from those anticipated by Olson's model. Paul Brace and Youssef Cohen argue that the Gray-Lowery model misspecifies the determinants of state economic growth, overstating the role of interest group size and failing to incorporate crucial exogenous variables. Gray and Lowery join the issue and defend their specification.