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Liberal Democracy and Social Control*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 September 2013

Andrew Hacker
Andrew Hacker
Affiliation:
Cornell University
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Extract

Liberal democrats, like all those who elect to paddle in the placid waters of liberalism, show a charming imperviousness to the existence of power. It is the ingenuousness which permitted the ideology of individualism to flourish for well over a century in the Western world. But all chickens—political as well as others—eventually come home to roost; and the failure to imbibe the home truths set down by such ungentlemanly characters as Thrasymachus, Machiavelli, and Pareto now accounts for the dilemmas, reconsiderations, and tortured defenses of liberal democracy which we see abounding on all sides.

Liberal democracy—that uneasy compromise which was never a compromise at all—is, from the moral standpoint, the worthiest of political creeds. It can arouse the enthusiasm of the humane, the heretical, and the responsible: in short, of all men of good will. But the tenets of liberal democracy can only be a guide for governors and governed in a community if there exists a halcyon situation in which the traditional status system is placidly taken for granted by all in the community.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Political Science Review , Volume 51 , Issue 4 , December 1957 , pp. 1009 - 1026
Copyright
Copyright © American Political Science Association 1957

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References

1 “Liberal democracy,” for present purposes, must be denned briefly and arbitrarily. It describes both an ideology and an institutional system; and its appeal is to those who claim to be fearful alike of the consequences of elite rule and of direct democracy. Both ideology and institutions, therefore, postulate a dynamic equilibrium between two values: (1) majority rule and human equality, i.e., that each shall count for one in political arrangements and that self-government, with the majority decision prevailing, is the best government; and (2) individual rights and constitutional guarantees, i.e., that there shall be an optimum area in which neither government nor society shall interfere with the individual in his pursuit of activities he thinks good. Both these values, Liberal Democrats postulate, are crucial: neither must be allowed to overwhelm the other. The means by which a majority is to be brought to respect minorities, and the areas in which individuals are to be left unhindered, as well as the methods for ensuring that in “proper” cases a majority shall have its way—these questions are open to constant discussion, compromise, and accommodation. This creed seems to be the received doctrine among academic political scientists; and the juxtaposition of majority rule and individual liberty is the alpha and omega of most introductory courses and textbooks. For the definitive exposition, see Pennock, J. Roland, Liberal Democracy: Its Merits and Prospects (New York, 1950)Google Scholar.

2 “Social Strains in America,” in Bell, Daniel, ed., The New American Right (New York, 1955), p. 125Google Scholar.

3 The American mythology, of course, is that most nineteenth-century businessmen were shrewd, ill-tutored freewheelers like Jay Gould and Daniel Drew. In fact, studies in entrepreneurial history show that, for the most part, the men who headed the great enterprises were from a privileged background. See Newcomer, Mabel, The Big Business Executive (New York, 1955)Google Scholar, and Warner, W. Lloyd and Abegglen, James C., Big Business Leaders in America (New York, 1955)Google Scholar. For an evaluation and comparison of these studies, see Berger, Morroe, “The Business Elite: Then and Now,” Commentary, Vol. 22 (October, 1956), pp. 367–74Google Scholar.

4 See Fairlie, Henry, “Political Commentary,” Spectator, Vol. 195 (September 23, 1955), pp. 379–81Google Scholar; and (October 21, 1955), pp. 516–17.

5 This point has been well made by Roche, John in hia “Communication” in this Review, Vol. 51 (June, 1957), pp. 484–88Google Scholar. Roche also discusses the lack of a libertarian strand in the American tradition in his excellent articles, “We've Never Had More Freedom,” New Republic Vol. 134 (January 23, 1956), pp. 12–15Google Scholar; (January 30, 1956), pp. 13–16; and (February 6, 1956), pp. 13–15. If it seems outrageous to suggest that a ruling class was only concerned with keeping its own children out of trouble, a recent example may bring this unwelcome truth home. Contrast, for a moment, the reaction of the upper-middle-class liberal to the indictment, trial, and conviction of Alger Hiss, on the one hand, and of the Rosenbergs, on the other. In terms of the overall record, there may be equal reason to wonder at the justice of both convictions. Yet the good people who were (and still are) much aroused about the treatment of Hiss seem to find it difficult to worry about the Rosenbergs, or Morton Sobell. Would it be too much to suggest that this ia because Hiss was one of the “right people”—in terms of stock, education, manner, etc.,—whereas the Rosenbergs were not? There are, of course, all sorts of complicating factors which bedevil a comparison of the two cases. Yet in light of the contemporary liberal reaction—or lack of it—to the plight of the Rosenbergs, perhaps the limited civil liberties vistas of the old ruling class become more plausible.

6 For a good statement of the tone and propriety which developed under the aegis of gentlemanly politics, see Shils', Edward chapter entitled, significantly, “The Deformation of Civility,” in his The Torment of Secrecy (Glencoe, Illinois, 1956), pp. 153–175Google Scholar: “As long as the political ruling classes were recruited from the aristocracy or from the classes whose conduct was guided by an aristocratic ideal of life, there was an inevitable diffuseness in their range of interest and in their attitude towards their major tasks. The aristocrat was expected to act like a gentleman, to be interested in the administration of his estate, to be interested in sports and proficient in military skills, and he was naturally expected to take his place in the government of the country, locally and nationally” (p. 156).

7 There has been surprisingly little written by political scientists on the political implications of the Americanization process. The task appears to have been left to journalists and members of other academic disciplines. Lubell's, SamuelThe Future of American Politics (New York, 1952)Google Scholar and The Revolt of the Moderates (New York, 1956)Google Scholar are good essays in casual empiricism. White's, William S. “‘Consensus American’: A Portrait” in The New York Times Magazine (November 25, 1956)Google Scholar is an interesting attempt at a theory. Perhaps the best analyses (brilliant when read individually and chaotic when read at one sitting) are the papers by Peter Viereck, David Riesman, Richard Hofstadter, Seymour Lipset, Nathan Glazer, Talcott Parsons, and Daniel Bell in The New American Right, op. cit. While this book is a discussion of the McCarthyite-nativist fringe, much of the analysis can be applied to a far larger segment of the American population.

8 Hartz, Louis, The Liberal Tradition in America (New York, 1955)Google Scholar.

9 Even the assimilation pattern of Jews—long thought a special case—is going according to form. See Handlin, Oscar, “What Will U.S. Jewry Be Like in 2000?”, The National Jewish Monthly, Vol. 71, No. 9 (May, 1957), pp. 5, 32–33Google Scholar. And for a glimpse of the way middle-class Negroes are preparing themselves for the immersion, see Frazier, E. Franklin, Black Bourgeoisie (Glencoe, Illinois, 1957)Google Scholar.

10 “Arrogance” is certainly the word which comes immediately to mind when one reads, say, Viereck's, PeterThe Unadjusted Man (Boston, 1956)Google Scholar, or Lippman's, WalterThe Public Philosophy (Boston, 1955)Google Scholar. It is the view of both “conservative” and “liberal” liberal democrats that humility ought to be the most noticeable characteristic of the man in the street. However, Viereck's flaming indictment of direct democracy ends up being not so much clarion as pathetic. Down deep, Viereck must know that the ruling class he so respects will never again command the deference of the American public.

11 To be sure, there were free-wheeling entrepreneurs, who lived on the frontiers of our economy in the nineteenth century, and who had no sense of responsibility to society or to posterity in the prescriptive sense. And no one expected them to. But we must not over-estimate their numbers (see the references above, note 3); and we must also recall that many of them, like Rockefeller and Harriman, founded family dynasties. Thus a John D. Rockefeller, Jr. was put in a position where he could serve his fellow men in conservationist and philanthropic endeavors. And the five grandsons have carried on the “tradition” from Latin America to Winrock, Arkansas. The family character of nineteenth century and early twentieth century enterprise made it possible for these families to develop responsible second and third generations. Today's men of power have little opportunity to do this for their sons. This means that each successive industrial ruler is, in a real sense, a self-made man. Each one has made the climb himself and in doing this has not had the leisure or security to develop a sense of noblesse oblige which, some might wish, would inform his exercise of power. See Bell, Daniel, “The Break-Up of Family Capitalism,” Partisan Review, Vol. 24 (Spring, 1957), pp. 317–20Google Scholar.

12 Op. cit., p. 79. A number of recent novels juxtapose the new and the old men quite neatly. Auchincloss's, LouisThe Great World and Timothy Colt (Boston, 1956)Google Scholar shows how a Wall Street law firm undergoes this transition in its leading personnel. The senior partner, a venerable figure on the style of Oliver Wendell Holmes, is forced to admit to partnership a Fordham Law School graduate. The latter has not one iota of feeling for the legal profession's prescriptive responsibilities (we can just imagine what his response would be if he were asked to defend a Communist under a Smith Act indictment); but he is highly skilled in bringing in the kind of business a large firm needs to survive. When the patrician dies, it is inevitable that the new man will take over complete charge. The firm will be successful; but success will be judged by an entirely different standard. The legal ethic of the old regime will be looked on as a curiosity; perhaps a worthy relic, but hardly attuned to modern needs. On the other side of the street, Hawley's, CameronCash McCall (Boston, 1955)Google Scholar shows just how the new manipulator is capable of meeting problems which are totally incomprehensible to the old-style businessman. It is significant that when the editors of Business Week gave this book to several top executives to read and asked them to discuss the “moral problem” raised by the existence of Cash, most of them saw nothing unusual in his activities—but if there was, it could be remedied by changing the current tax laws! No. 1372 (December 17, 1955), pp. 104–114.

13 That traditional American class relationships have little meaning not only to the man-in-the-street, but also to his wife in the split-level house, is brought out by Elizabeth Janeway in her review of Barrymore's, DianaToo Much, Too Soon in The New York Times Book Review, April 7, 1957Google Scholar. Miss Janeway was commenting on what is wanted in novel-reading today: “Today's mass audience finds fiction hard going. Very few people, I think, really read for escape; most readers are anxious to learn about the world and their place in it. But the old mythology of class and social relationship on which the novel has relied for the last two hundred years is neither interesting nor pertinent to the mass audience, for the mass audience stands outside that crumbling structure …. The ordinary members of ‘the lonely crowd’ need stories which will help them understand and control their lives, they need signposts to behavior and meaning as much as men always have. And a new mythology is consequently being created for them. Like all mythologies in the beginning, it is based on particular events. When the reader asks, ‘Did this really happen?’ it is able to reply, ‘Oh yes, it did. I really knew this Unforgettable Character. This is a direct quote from Marilyn Monroe.’”

14 See, for example, Kelley, Stanley, Professional Public Relations and Political Power (Baltimore, 1956)Google Scholar and Packard, Vance, The Hidden Persuaders (New York, 1957)Google Scholar. Both of these studies show that when expert technicians work from a basis of power, persuasion can be effectively engineered on a mass scale. The elements of manufactured obedience are well outlined in Bernays, Edward, ed., The Engineering of Consent (Norman, Oklahoma, 1955)Google Scholar. However, it is a big mistake to overestimate the extent to which people can be influenced from a long distance. Penetration can be deeper, and hence more lasting and effective, if it is conducted on the individual or small-group level. For there the processes of persuasion can be especially tailored to the needs of the individual person who is the object of attack. Certainly, the small-group approach is the basis of the “human relations” techniques in industry and the effectiveness of psychotherapy rests on its person-to-person relationship. For a discussion of the latter, see my “A Political Scientist Looks at Psychotherapy,” The International Journal of Social Psychiatry, Vol. 2 (Summer, 1956), pp. 23–33CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

15 The changing character of democracy in our century has been the chief concern of such writers as E. H. Carr and C. Wright Mills. Carr is concerned with the shift in ideological underpinning which has accompanied the transition from “individualism” to “mass democracy,” The New Society (London, 1951), ch. 4Google Scholar; and Mills, in what is certainl the most important chapter of his much misunderstood The Power Elite (New York, 1956)Google Scholar, discusses the differences between a “public” and a “mass” as the human raw materials for a democratic society. For liberal democracy required, as a citizenry, a “public.” But as mass characteristics infuse this public, so a liberal democracy is transformed into a mass democracy. The citizen of the latter society must be managed by his rulers rather than be led by his leaders. Hence there arises the need for a “power elite” which comes into being not because of the lust for power on the part of its individual members, but because such a group is ready to perform certain functions which society requires (ch. 13). Neither Mills nor Carr goes into the dynamics which transform a public into a mass. A good analysis of this process, in economic and psychological terms, is to be found in Fromm's, ErichThe Sane Society (New York, 1955)Google Scholar. See, in particular, his discussion of alienation, at pp. 120–52.

16 The starkest fact—for students of politics—in the spate of sociological essays now appearing, is the acquiescent powerlessness of the people who inhabit the emerging middleclass. For the members of the lonely crowd, politics is a spectator sport; for the organization men, patterns of life and work are determined by an amoral institution; for the exurbanite, participation is social or civic, rather than partisan; and for all, the fruits of a surfeit of honey are sufficient exchange for removal from the decision-making process. See Riesman, David, The Lonely Crowd (New Haven, 1950)Google Scholar; Whyte, William H. Jr., The Organization Man (New York, 1956)Google Scholar; Spectorsky, A. C., The Exurbanites (Philadelphia, 1955)Google Scholar; Lynes, Russell, A Surfeit of Honey (New York, 1957)Google Scholar. To be sure, these people have power in the very special sense that they compel decision-makers to frame policies in such a way that they will be acceptable to the “market” (be it economic, political, or social). But the consequence is that decision-makers strive to anticipate reactions rather than waiting for the political-economic “customer” to make his wishes known.

17 If we claim that the average man of our time is content with the amenities of his placid, middle-class existence, we must also go on to insist that he is, in point of fact, soft. He has little in the way of internal strength and he possesses few resources—either material or psychic—of his own. The fact that these people are willing to allow themselves to be carried is made clear in an episode in Wilson's, SloanThe Man in the Grey Flannel Suit (New York, 1955)Google Scholar. Hopkins, the ulcerous network president, finally states an unpleasant fact of life to Tom Rath, the nice young man who wants to take it easy: “‘Somebody has to do the big jobs! This world was built by men like me! To really do a job, you have to live it body and soul! You people who just give half your mind to your work are riding on our backs!’”

18 Standing out like a sore thumb in The Organization Man is the chapter called “The Executive: Non-Well-Rounded Man.” (ch. 11) Here we are allowed a glimpse of the top three men in the nation's 300 largest corporations. Their lives and personalities present a sharp contrast to those of the middle-management men depicted in the remainder of the book. One wonders if, in fact, the well-adjusted organization men will be recruited into the highest echelon at all.

19 The classic statement is Russell Davenport, “The Greatest Opportunity on Earth,” Fortune, Vol. 40 (October, 1949), pp. 65ffGoogle Scholar. See also Mason's, Alpheus T. analysis of this trend, “Business Organized as Power,” this Review, Vol. 44 (June, 1950), pp. 323–42Google Scholar.

20 For an elaboration, see my “Utopia, Inc.,” The Commonweal, Vol. 65 (February 8, 1957), pp. 479–81Google Scholar.

21 This is the title of an essay in Individualism Reconsidered (Glencoe, Illinois, 1954), pp. 99–120Google Scholar. Riesman tells the would-be autonomous or self-directed man to find his satisfactions in highly personalized activities. Indeed, it is rather difficult to discover the difference between “autonomy,” which Riesman thinks good, and “marginal differentiation,” which Riesman implies is rather hollow. The solution-via-abdication is illustrated in Pawel's, Ernst novel, The Dark Tower (New York, 1957)Google Scholar, where the hero concludes that he cannot meet the standard of success in his corporation or the standard of good citizenship in his suburb, and hence packs up his family and finds a country-editor job for himself in the Rockies. The point about the new men is that, unlike Pawel's hero, they find their brand of autonomy by attaining the heights where they can exercise power within the framework of the organization. The climb may, in one sense, appear to be morally and intellectually debilitating. But in another it can be viewed as the only road to freedom in today's society.

22 A fascinating attempt to evolve a new set of prescriptions for a new society and a new citizenry is to be found in the work of B. F. Skinner. The whole of his philosophy is in his Utopian novel, Walden Two, (New York, 1948)Google Scholar. A briefer statement is his “Freedom and Control of Man” in The American Scholar, Vol. 25 (Winter, 1955–1956), pp. 47–65Google Scholar. Also of value is a two-man symposium between Skinner and Carl R. Rogers, in which Skinner defends his ideas against a variety of criticisms: “Some Issues Concerning the Control of Human Behavior,” Science, Vol. 124 (November 30, 1956), pp. 1057–66CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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