The United States at the dawn of the twentieth century was just beginning to comprehend the influence it could have on the international scene. It had no desire to become involved in the European power politics that had produced, in the lifetimes of many Americans then living, the Crimean War, the Franco-Prussian War and the essentially European Boer War in South Africa. Nevertheless, a distinct strain of expansionism could be found in American foreign policy. The belief was stirring in those concerned to establish a nonviolent world order that the interaction of nation-states would benefit from exposure to American values, American economic dynamism and the lessons to be drawn from the American federal experience. This belief, combined with a deep aversion to what was seen as essentially a European proclivity for settling disputes by resort to war, motivated some of the more influential participants in the American peace movement. That movement, in turn, gave birth to the American Society of International Law.

I realize that any subject which has to do with the Peace Conference possesses at this time a peculiar interest not only to members of the legal profession but in fact to men of every avocation and every nationality.

In this essay I discuss the rise in industry's participation in transnational standard setting, which implicates transnational legal ordering, and address the risks such participation generates: Economic globalization has led to increased demand for transnational standards. Yet regulators lack the expertise needed to write increasingly complex and rapidly changing standards, and turn to those that hold the expertise: industry. Thus, industry engagement in standard setting has clear benefits. Such engagement introduces, however, a problem well known from the national context: the risk of capture. In the context of standard setting, two kinds of capture are of particular importance: (i) information and (ii) representational capture. The consequence of such capture, in the transnational context, is that it may (i) undermine the global public interest, (ii) lead to unfair competitive advantages, and (iii) undermine the public interest in developing countries. I illustrate these risks with examples from health law and policy. While states have national laws to manage capture (albeit not effectively at times), at the transnational level, organizations are largely free of such legal constraints. As the “new frontier” of standard setting, transnational bodies should introduce reforms for balancing the benefits and risks of industry engagement, otherwise, they risk impairing the public interest and undermining trust in their integrity.

The withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union has prompted a global recalibration of treaty relations. Due to the Withdrawal Agreement and its transition period, the UK is expanding its international treaty-making powers as it is gradually released from the constraints of EU law. Practice to date shows the creation of many new international legal instruments through which governments have sought to address the novel questions that Brexit raises for the international law of treaties.

The protection of unhampered and free exercise of the diplomatic function was recognized as one of the fundamental purposes of the law of diplomatic immunity in the Havana Convention of 1928, and in the Draft Convention of the Harvard Research Committee, 1932. The idea is not a new one—it has long been considered necessary that the channels of intercourse between States be made secure. Even before the political institutions of man began to play an important role in the life of peoples, nations or tribes recognized that it was necessary to treat with each other and guarantee security to messengers in order to advance their mutual interests. The history of the juristic philosophy of diplomatic immunity indicates that there are three periods of development in which the protection of the diplomatic function was deemed to be the purpose of the law, viz., (a) in antiquity, particularly in the universal law of Greece and Rome; (b) in the philosophy of the law-of-nature school, from the twelfth century to the seventeenth; (c) in the precedents of the modern Statessystem and the views of positivist writers, especially since the seventeenth century

New scholarship has identified trends, constraints, and opportunities for climate litigation in the Global South. While countries in the Global South tend to experience a lack of capacity within government agencies, civil society, and the judiciary, the Global South is not a homogenous group. Where climate litigation has been identified, the judiciary is often implementing government policy prescriptions in the absence of detailed climate legislation or filling enforcement gaps. But there are also a number of countries where climate litigation is not taking place or where gaps exist between ongoing litigation and traditional definitions of climate litigation. The scholarship is yet to further explore the relationship between climate legislation and litigation in the Global South, in particular in circumstances where ripe policy and legislative conditions for climate litigation exist. Taking into account different regional and national experiences, this essay explores that relationship.

The relationship between the principle of equitable and reasonable utilization and the obligation against causing significant harm has been the most challenging issue in the long history of the evolution of international water law. The purpose of this essay is to discuss the genesis of the debate on the relationship between the two concepts, present the opposing positions of the different riparians thereon, and clarify how the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses has resolved this matter and rendered the two concepts reconcilable.

With the rise of corruption as a subject of international instruments and the convergence of obligations around its prevention, detection, and remediation in both the public and private sectors, corruption has increasingly figured as an issue in international arbitration. Indeed, its acceptance as a public policy issue at both the international and transnational levels has resulted in the need for tribunals, in both commercial and investor-state disputes, to grapple with questions of jurisdiction, admissibility, and consequences, as well as standards of proof. As this essay demonstrates, the challenges presented by the issue of corruption pose special difficulties for arbitration. Time will tell if tribunals will move from their current largely binary, all-or-nothing approach to a more nuanced one based on proportionality.

Immediately after the first signs of COVID-19 in West Africa in March-April 2020, twelve countries officially closed their borders. Other countries, such as Benin, Ivory Coast and Senegal, adopted a more pragmatic approach by merely limiting to essential crossings any arrivals or departures over land, and by adopting humanitarian corridors. Many of these measures are based on Article 4 of the 1979 Dakar Protocol of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Article 91 of the amended Treaty of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (known under its French acronym UEMOA), which authorize states to limit the freedom of movement and residence for reasons of public order, public security, or public health. The measures, however, have heavily impacted the legal regime of free movement of persons throughout the ECOWAS area. In the following analysis, I will show that the measures have (1) contributed to the disintegration of the legal regime of free movement of persons in ECOWAS and (2) instrumentalized COVID-19 for political ends in ways that are counterproductive for the region.

Litigation of contentious cases before the International Court of Justice has in some instances been a lengthy and comparatively expensive procedure. However, it is not necessarily the Court or its procedure that produces this situation, because governments parties to litigation sometimes feel it is important to retain a number of advocates to plead, and they agree on comparatively long periods for the preparation of written pleadings. Comparing this procedure with ad hoc arbitration before a referee and two arbitrators, the latter looks comparatively swift and inexpensive. However, there are as yet unused possibilities for the International Court to adjudicate cases on a basis comparable in time and expense to ad hoc arbitration. The use of the Court for what might be less important cases would also contribute to its institutional development.

Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor presents a very clear and concise description of the main contours of the conventionality control theory articulated by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“Court,” “Tribunal,” or “Inter-American Court”). So, I will not repeat his masterful explanation, which states, in brief, that the conventionality control requires all State authorities, particularly judges, to apply the American Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) as interpreted by the Court.