The increasing frequency of arbitration and the pressure for a regular court of international justice composed of permanent judges, have given new emphasis to the demand for what is called the codification of international law.

The process and the result intended to be described when the term codification is applied to international law involves something very different from the codification of municipal law. The codifier of any part of the law of a nation finds the law with which he is to deal already in existence and authenticated. It may be confused in form and apparently unrelated in its parts: it may be scattered through the statutory enactments of many years and the declarations of a multitude of judicial decisions; the codifier may have to struggle with difficult questions of apparent inconsistency, of doubtful repeal, of obscurities in expression calling for interpretation and construction, and with conflicts of judicial opinion; but the expressions which he considers all come from the same law-making power. Somewhere in the mass of material is to be found the final expression of legislative will, the controlling decision of the courts, and when these are found everything inconsistent with them may be rejected as repealed or overruled. The codifier's task is to find what the rules really are; to put them in due relations to each other under appropriate heads in accordance with some systematic scheme of arrangement; to bring order out of confusion; to furnish a methodical statement of the results of his researches which may make the law plain to the people who live under it and may relieve countless lawyers from the necessity of going through the same wearisome process of inquiry in each separate case. When the work is complete, if it is acceptable, the legislative power of the state puts its stamp of approval upon it and resolves any doubts or uncertainties by its acceptance of the codifier’s conclusions. It may indeed be that the research of the codifier and the clearer view presented by a systematic arrangement will have revealed inadequacies of expression, incongruities, and omissions in the existing law, but, as to these, the suggestions of the codifier for remedying the defects discovered will be accepted or rejected by the single fiat of the legislative body which enacts the code.

It has been remarked that the Government of the United States “seldom loses an opportunity to profess its loyalty to international arbitration in the abstract. … The expression of this sentiment has become so conventional that a popular impression prevails that it accords with the actual policy of the United States.” This ambivalent attitude is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in a memorandum addressed by Mr. John Foster Dulles on July 10, 1946, to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. “The United States, since its formation,” Mr. Dulles states, “has led in promoting a reign of law and justice as between nations. In order to continue that leadership, we should now accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. If the United States, which has the material power to impose its will widely in the world, agrees instead to submit to the impartial adjudication of its legal controversies, that will inaugurate a new and profoundly significant international advance.” Although the initial step of accepting the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court would in itself be “of profound moral significance,” it would, Mr. Dulles continues, “assume greatly increased practical significance” only when “limiting factors” have been removed, for the “path is as yet so untried that it would be reckless to proceed precipitately,” the Court “has yet to win the confidence of the world community,” and “international law has not yet developed the scope and definiteness necessary to permit international disputes generally to be resolved by judicial rather than political tests.”

In opening this meeting of the American Society of International Law, which I hope will be the first of many meetings in unbroken succession to continue long after we personally have ceased to take part in affairs, let me welcome you to the beginning of your labors for a more thorough understanding of this important and fascinating subject. It is impossible that the human mind should be addressed to questions better worth its noblest efforts, offering a greater opportunity for usefulness in the exercise of its powers, or more full of historical and contemporary interest, than in the field of international rights and duties. The change in the theory and practice of government which has marked the century since the establishment of the American Union has shifted the determination of great questions of domestic national policy from a few rulers in each country to the great body of the people, who render the ultimate decision under all modern constitutional governments. Coincident with that change the practice of diplomacy has ceased to be a mystery confined to a few learned men who strive to give effect to the wishes of personal rulers, and has become a representative function answering to the opinions and the will of the multitude of citizens, who themselves create the relations between states and determine the issues of friendship and estrangement, of peace and war. Under the new system there are many dangers from which the old system was free. The rules and customs which the experience of centuries had shown to be essential to the maintenance of peace and good understanding between nations have little weight with the new popular masters of diplomacy; the precedents and agreements of opinion which have carried so great a part of the rights and duties of nations toward each other beyond the pale of discussion are but little understood. The education of public opinion, which should lead the sovereign people in each country to understand the definite limitations upon national rights and the full scope and responsibility of national duties, has only just begun. Information, understanding, leadership of opinion in these matters, so vital to wise judgment and right action in international affairs, are much needed. This society may serve as a collegium, in the true sense of the word, in which all who choose to seek a broader knowledge of the law that governs the affairs of nations may give each to the other the incitement of earnest and faithful study and may give to the great body of our countrymen a clearer view of their international rights and responsibilities.

The Viet-Nam hostilities arose and have escalated because of the radically different perceptions of the situation by the principal parties. A settlement might be possible if each side understood the image perceived by the other. An analysis of the interpretation of the situation which would result from an impartial application of international law, presumably reflecting the consensus of world opinion, might also be helpful.

On August 6, 1924, nearly six years after the Armistice of Mudros, the state of war which had existed in the Near East since 1914 was terminated as between Turkey, on the one hand, and the British Empire, Italy and Japan, on the other hand, by the drawing up of the first procès-verbal of the deposit at Paris of the ratifications of the settlement concluded at Lausanne on July 24,1923. The state of war between Greece and Turkey had already been terminated a year ago, pursuant to the settlement of Lausanne, and under the terms of the same settlement the Allied forces of occupation had been withdrawn from Turkish territory; the prisoners of war and interned civilians detained by Greece and Turkey, respectively, had been mutually restored; the compulsory exchange of certain portions of the Greek and Turkish populations had been effected; and a general amnesty for political offenders had been declared. The portions of the settlement brought into force by the recent ratifications are the Treaty of Peace, the Straits Convention,the Commercial Convention and the Convention respecting Jurisdiction and the Conditions of Residence and Business. Certain instruments which did not require ratification, including the Declarations relating to Sanitary Matters and to the Administration of Justice and the Protocol and Declaration relating to Concessions, may now also be expected to be given practical effect.

In 1976 the United States Congress established the Coastal Energy Impact Program (CEIP) for the purpose of giving financial assistance to those coastal states of the United States off whose shores resource development was being conducted on the outer continental shelf. The program was designed to alleviate the burden that offshore development was said to have placed on those coastal states. The enacting legislation stipulated that the states must comply with certain requirements of the Act in exchange for the distribution of federal funds. Although these funds were to be provided partly in the form of grants distributed on the basis of various statutory formulas, the largest amount of the grants was to be divided on the basis of adjacency. Thus, a coastal state would receive additional funds if the activity on the outer continental shelf took place in the area determined to be “adjacent” to that state. As a result, the geographical description of the areas “adjacent” to each coastal state had a direct impact on the amount of funds each state would realize from the program. Statutory provisions and the regulations required that adjacency be determined on the basis of lateral boundaries drawn in the ocean seaward from the coastal state. Those boundaries might already have been established on the basis of interstate agreements or court decisions. In the absence of such delimitations, the Assistant Administrator for Coastal Zone Management of the Department of Commerce National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration was called upon to establish the “lateral seaward boundaries” on the basis of the international law applicable to lateral boundary delimitations. The “lateral seaward boundaries” so established by the Assistant Administrator would have no legal significance other than for CEIP purposes.

Soviet positions on international law and organizations are changing sharply under the influence of the policy of perestroika (restructuring) introduced by General Secretary M. S. Gorbachev. This development was brought to the attention of the American Society of International Law at its Annual Meeting in April 1988 by the noted Soviet international lawyer, G. I. Tunkin.

On the agenda of the Security Council, and regularly listed by the Secretary General among the “matters of which the Security Council is seized” is the item “Question of Hyderabad.” No action has yet been taken by the Security Council on this item, further than keeping it on the agenda; the case has been presented but not discussed. Various interesting questions of international law and of the constitutional law of the United Nations are raised by this situation, which is thus far the worst failure of the United Nations. Equally as interesting political factors are involved, which have in fact had more weight than the legal factors. Only the latter will be considered in this discussion.

As this discourse is devoted to the sources of international law in Soviet doctrine and the diplomatic practice of the USSR, I think that it is necessary to begin by characterizing my understanding of the contemporary Soviet doctrine of international law.

In Western countries, the Soviet doctrine of international law is often regarded as monolithic, without internal contradictions and discussions. It is not so, though I would agree that there are some grains of truth in those allegations. On certain questions we have had too much unanimity in our social sciences at large, and in the doctrine of international law in particular. One could feel this unanimity particularly in the domain of the most sensitive political and legal problems.

In an era of expanding interest in international environmental problems,1 it is essential to examine the rapidly developing state practice concerning man's startling capability, through the use of technology without any hostile intent, adversely to alter not just the immediate environment of his neighbor but common resources shared by all. The present discussion does not attempt to deal with the practice of all states, but rather considers the extent to which legally relevant expectations of restraint, are being shaped by United States practice concerning the use of novel technology in the res communis? The focus on United States practice reflects the belief that, within the confines of a law journal article, considerable light may be shed on world community expectations by an examination of the practice of a state which has a major interest in the field and which is a significant participant in the international law-creating process.

The status under international law of the Gulf of Aqaba has come to be a matter of concern not only to the several littoral states, but also to the international community. The basic issue, that of freedom of navigation in this arm of the Red Sea, has been brought into focus as a result of restrictive efforts of several of the coastal states with respect to Israeli shipping, for Arab-Israeli hostility has given political, strategic, commercial and even religious significance to a water area which, until recently, had attracted little attention.

The reconvened sixth session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-6bis) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) took place in Bonn from July 16 to 27, 2001, under the presidency of Jan Pronk, Netherlands minister of housing, spatial planning, and the environment. The meeting was noteworthy as the occasion for adopting the Bonn Agreements on the Kyoto Protocol rules, a crucial juncture for entry into force of the principal international instrument for reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. The rules were adopted in final form as the Marrakesh Accords at the seventh session of the Conference of the Parties (COP-7), held in Marrakesh, Morocco, from October 29 to November 9, 2001.

Ever since the Supreme Court’s 1829 decision in Foster v. Neilson, it has been settled that some treaties ratified by the United States are “non-self-executing” and thus are not enforceable in U.S. courts unless implemented by Congress. Despite its pedigree, both the theory behind the self-execution doctrine and its mechanics have long befuddled courts and commentators. There is significant uncertainty, for example, concerning the materials that are relevant to the self-execution analysis, whose intent should count in determining self-executing status, the proper presumption that should be applied with respect to self-execution, and the domestic legal status of a non-self-executing treaty.

It is not necessary to make a profound study of the work of the League of Nations in the sphere of minorities protection to realize the importance of the I Minorities Section of the Secretariat, of the minorities petition and of the Minorities Committees (usually called “the Committees of Three”). Indeed it is difficult to imagine how the guarantee of the League could have been given substantial reality without these three institutions. At first sight it would appear remarkable that the treaty articles upon which the present procedure is based should make not the slightest mention of any provision concerning these institutions. This is nevertheless the fact. All the rules (with only one exception) concerning the functions of the Minorities Section and of the Minorities Committees and the nature of the minorities petition have been established unilaterally by resolution of the Council.