I ask your attention for a few minutes to some observations upon the Monroe Doctrine. If I am justified in taking your time it will be not because I say anything novel, but because there is occasion for restating well settled matters which seem to have been overlooked in some recent writings on the subject.

We are all familiar with President Monroe’s famous message of December 2, 1823.

On December 15, 2012, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Tribunal or ITLOS) ordered Ghana to resupply and, upon payment of security, to refuel and release the Argentine naval frigate ARA Libertad, which was being held by authorities in the Ghanaian port of Tema. The Tribunal ordered release of the vessel in response to Argentina’s request for provisional measures under Article 290(5) of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Convention or UNCLOS). The Tribunal accepted Argentina’s prima facie showing that the Libertad, a tall, three-masted sailing ship commissioned in the Argentine Navy being used as a training vessel for officer cadets, qualifies as a “warship” under Article 29 of UNCLOS, and was therefore entitled to immunity and release to avoid irreparable harm to Argentina pending the final outcome of the case (paras. 93–95).

It can be said today that a unilateral most-favored-nation (MFN) clause is only of historical significance. The first unilateral MFN clauses appeared in the seventeenth century in the capitulation treaties with the Ottoman Empire and in the agreements between the French East India Company and the Mogul Empire. However, it was in the latter half of the nineteenth century that unilateral MFN clauses were most extensively concluded between the European Powers and Asian countries. These unilateral clauses served as an instrument for securing “equality in exploitation” in the economically backward regions of Asia where several of the capital exporting countries were in competition and conflict with each other.

The differences between the United States and Mexico which have been occasioned by Article XXVI I of the Mexican Constitution of 1917 and the regulatory laws designed to give it effect are concerned with such important questions of international law as to warrant a rather extended examination of the principles involved and the contentions of the two parties. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the question has been said to be one upon which there can be no difference of rational opinion, and further that it is not a justiciable one.

The establishment of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNBF) during the Middle Eastern crisis in November, 1957, has been generally accepted as being a proper exercise of the powers of the United Nations. Proposals have been made, however, to establish a more permanent force, either on a full-time or stand-by basis, for use in future emergencies.

The purpose of this article is to examine the work of the First Main Committee of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea at Caracas, with particular attention to the question of the system of exploration and exploitation of the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. This is the area which the United Nations General Assembly in 1970 had characterized as constituting, together with its natural resources, the “common heritage of mankind” in the Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.

The strained U.S.-China trade relationship poses a frontal challenge to the multilateral trading system and has broad repercussions for international law. This Article addresses three dimensions of this relationship: (1) the economic dimension; (2) the geopolitical/national security dimension; and (3) the normative/social policy dimension. The Article advances a middle ground between those seeking to reinforce the World Trade Organization (WTO) system with new rules that limit the state's role in the economy, and those who reject WTO constraints in favor of a power-based system. It proposes pragmatic reforms to govern the interface of the two states’ respective systems across these three dimensions to facilitate ongoing exchange while giving each country latitude to protect itself from the externalities of the other's policies. The result would be greater room for bilateral and plurilateral bargaining, but conducted within the umbrella of the multilateral system.

Enforcement by way of unilateral economic sanctions has been described as “one of the least developed areas of international law.” The term “sanctions” is notoriously difficult to define and does not itself appear in the key international instruments. With economic sanctions regularly referred to as President Trump's “weapon of choice,” and with opposition to such measures growing, greater certainty is needed in this area of law if the legitimacy and effectiveness of sanctions are to be preserved. This essay distinguishes UN-authorized sanctions from three types of “autonomous” sanctions (collective corrective sanctions, unilateral corrective sanctions, and unilateral coercive sanctions) and argues that many uses of unilateral sanctions are either unregulated or based on questionable legality.

The constitutional rules that govern how states engage with international law have profound implications for foreign affairs, yet we lack comprehensive data on the choices countries make and their motivations. We draw on an original dataset that covers 108 countries over a nearly two-hundred-year period to map countries’ foreign relations law choices and trace their evolution. We find that legal origins and colonial legacies continue to account for most foreign relations law choices. A small number of models emerged in the nineteenth and early twentieth century in Western Europe, subsequently spread through colonial channels, and usually survived decolonization. Departures from received models are rare and usually associated with major political shifts. Prominent political science accounts that emphasize how states design their foreign relations law strategically to enhance their international credibility or entrench democracy or human rights appear to have limited explanatory power over the bulk of foreign relations law today.

“Drugs” have been regulated at the international level since 1912, while cannabis has been specifically regulated since 1925. Contemporary local, national, and international cannabis regulations are now diverging, with some jurisdictions legalising its recreational production, sale and consumption. This essay explores the legal and historical complexity and contingencies around the development of international cannabis regulations and prohibitions. It highlights that the global drug control system was not solely focused on prohibition and instead was a complex mix of regulations underpinned by frequently ill-defined and unclear prohibitions. It argues that the international drug control system should not serve as a bar to national-level reforms and that the two can continue to coexist. The essay favors a flexible, functional and pragmatic interpretation and implementation of the system as the most likely and indeed preferred outcome of international cannabis policy reforms.

This work forms a companion volume to Legal Advisers and Foreign Affairs published three years ago in a similar format, under the same editorship and auspices, and reviewed by the present writer in this Journal for January, 1965. Like its predecessor it is the outcome of a symposium sponsored by the American Society of International Law under the Chairmanship of its President, Professor Brunson MacChesney, which took place at Bellagio in August, 1965, the participants being members not of government legal services but of the analogous services of representative international organizations. In sponsoring the Bellagio Conference the Society was following up and extending its exploration of the rôle played by the “service” legal adviser in the international field—a rôle which, as the present reviewer previously had occasion to point out in connection with the functions of legal advisers to governments and government departments, has certainly been neglected and, because neglected, to some extent misunderstood.

AIDS is truly an international phenomenon, with cases now reported on every continent. To combat the AIDS epidemic, the nations of the world may be reverting to a pattern of quarantine and restrictions on international travel. For example, on April 23, 1986, the Federal Register gave notice of a rule proposed by the Centers for Disease Control of the United States Public Health Service that, if enacted, will add AIDS to the list of seven diseases that provide grounds for exclusion of aliens. This action would allow the U.S. Department of State to deny visas and the Immigration and Naturalization Service to deny admission to aliens subject to medical examination (generally immigrants and refugees) who are found to have AIDS. Although seemingly innocuous, the proposed regulation was initially seen by gay rights groups as an instrument that could potentially be used to harass homosexuals and other high-risk groups seeking entry to the United States. The proposed regulation also contrasts with the U.S. Public Health Service’s domestic strategy for coping with AIDS, which emphasizes education rather than quarantine as the principal means of controlling the disease.

One year ago, the U.S. Supreme Court refused a request by the Obama administration to stay the lethal injection by Texas of a convicted prisoner even though that execution would violate a U.S. treaty obligation. Instead, the Supreme Court deferred to contravening Texas state law and policy that denied the prisoner, Humberto Leal García, a hearing on the merits as to whether the government of Texas’s failure to advise Leal of his right to meet with a consular representative prejudiced his criminal convictions in Texas courts. The State of Texas, which opposed the stay, carried out the execution hours after the Supreme Court stood down.