There is at present considerable discussion regarding questions with respect to “the freedom of the seas.” These questions, so often vaguely referred to, should presumably be understood to relate to the exercise of belligerent rights on the sea and to embrace such matters as a possible codification of international law touching this subject, proper compliance with rules heretofore generally accepted if not always strictly observed, the desirability of amendments to such rules, and the formulation of principles to meet new problems that have grown out of the recent conflict. In the light of events in connection with the war the present situation with regard to the disposition of such questions through international agreement unhappily appears more difficult than that which confronted the delegates who assembled in conference at London in 1908 on the invitation of the British Government to reach an understanding among the nations represented relative to the rules of international law concerning the laws of naval warfare, and formulated the so-called London Declaration signed February 26, 1909.

In this essay, I take up two concerns raised by Harold Koh and Todd Buchwald in their critique of the Kampala amendments on aggression: what they term “proxy prosecution” and the notion of aggression as a uniquely political question. I also take issue with the argument in Alain Pellet’s response on attacks by nonstate actors.

These areas of contention notwithstanding, there are important issues on which I think that Koh and Buchwald get it right. In forthcoming work, I argue that the object and purpose of the criminalization of aggression precludes an interpretation of Article 8bis of the Rome Statute that would include humanitarian interventions not authorized by the Security Council. Nonetheless, the failure to make this textually explicit at Kampala was a mistake that the authors are correct to lament. Similarly, they accurately identify the ambiguities in the provisions on the amendments’ entry into force as an entirely avoidable defect that creates unnecessary confusion. These important points notwithstanding, the article takes some misleading positions on the politics of the crime.

On the surface, the two books under review seem to have little in common. The Bonnitcha/Poulsen/Waibel (BPW) book, written by two legal academics and a political scientist, provides a balanced, fact-grounded account of international investment agreements (IIAs) and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). This is the “international treaty regime” in that book's title which the authors argue needs to be distinguished from the broader “international regime complex” that their book explicitly does not address, namely the number of other international instruments that at least incidentally also protect foreign investments (including, for example, political risk insurance, tax treaties, certain World Trade Organization agreements, and certain human rights treaties like the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) (p. 7 and Figure 1.2). As one of the encomiums on its back cover page suggests, the BPW book seeks to answer the fraught competing contentions of defenders and critics of the regime that all too frequently generate “more heat than light.” Their book dispassionately synthesizes the available legal, economic, and political literature relevant to understanding the investment treaty regime's oft-proclaimed “legitimacy crisis.” It seeks to supply lawyers needing political context and political scientists needing legal knowledge with the unfiltered facts required to assess whether such a “crisis” exists and, if so, what the ways forward might be.

This new treaty edition is to be entitled Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America. The title requires some explanation as to its extent and limits. Agreements or acts which have gone into force are, with certain exceptions noted hereafter, included in the volumes of this edition now to be considered. Unperfected treaties, to use the current expression— agreements which have not gone into force—are in general, therefore, and subject to the exception mentioned below, excluded. It is to be observed that in a broad sense “unperfected treaties” include those which have been definitely rejected as well as those which are to be deemed pending; and there are also a few instances where an agreement was not formally acted on but is so ancient as to be obsolete. All those unperfected treaties, however, of whatever classification, are here omitted, with the exception of such of them as may be within one group of documents now to be mentioned.

The outbreak of the European War found hundreds of merchant vessels of belligerent nationality in enemy ports or on the high seas bound to or from such ports in ignorance of the existence of hostilities, having left their last port of departure before the outbreak of war. The short period antedating the outbreak of the war, during which hostilities may be said to have been imminent, and the suddenness with which the war burst out afforded little opportunity to such vessels to escape, and consequently large numbers were caught either in enemy ports or on the high seas proceeding innocently thereto or therefrom.