Case Nos.2 BvR 2115/01, 2 BvR 2132/01, & 2 BvR 348/03.60 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 499 (2007). At <http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de>.

Bundesverfassungsgericht (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany), September 19, 2006.

On September 19, 2006, the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht) held in jointly decided Case Nos. 2 BvR 2115/01, 2 BvR 2132/01, & 2 BvR 348/03 that a failure to provide consular information to foreign nationals pursuant to Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) violates the guarantee of a fair trial as provided by the German Constitution (Grundgesetz). The result is in contrast to a recent U. S. Supreme Court decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, a strikingly similar case.

The defendants, two nationals of Turkey and two of Serbia-Montenegro, were arrested in the course of different criminal investigations. They were informed of their rights as defendants as guaranteed by Germany's law of criminal procedure. The prosecuting authorities failed, however, to provide information on the defendants’ right to contact the consular staffs of their own countries in compliance with the VCCR. Three defendants were found guilty of murder and sentenced to lifetime imprisonment by the district court (Landgericht) of Braunschweig. The district court of Hamburg found the fourth defendant guilty of a robbery that resulted in the death of a victim, and sentenced him to eleven years’ imprisonment. Since the defendants refused to make statements, the criminal courts relied, inter alia, on the testimony of the police officers questioning the defendants after their various arrests. During the subsequent criminal proceedings, the defendants, presumably out of ignorance, made no attempt to invoke their consular rights, and the district courts seemed to be equally unaware of those rights.

The treatment of civilian alien enemies, either in the national jurisdiction of a belligerent or in occupied territory, presents questions of public international law as well as of municipal law and administration. It appears that in some of the United Nations in the present war the problem of internment of such persons has become less acute as the tide of battle has turned against the Axis. In Great Britain, for example, the number of aliens of enemy nationality interned under the Royal Prerogative, and whose release had not been authorized, was only 6,123 at the beginning of 1944 as compared with 17,940 at the beginning of 1941.

There is at present considerable discussion regarding questions with respect to “the freedom of the seas.” These questions, so often vaguely referred to, should presumably be understood to relate to the exercise of belligerent rights on the sea and to embrace such matters as a possible codification of international law touching this subject, proper compliance with rules heretofore generally accepted if not always strictly observed, the desirability of amendments to such rules, and the formulation of principles to meet new problems that have grown out of the recent conflict. In the light of events in connection with the war the present situation with regard to the disposition of such questions through international agreement unhappily appears more difficult than that which confronted the delegates who assembled in conference at London in 1908 on the invitation of the British Government to reach an understanding among the nations represented relative to the rules of international law concerning the laws of naval warfare, and formulated the so-called London Declaration signed February 26, 1909.

A Subject of warm debate in the convention which framed the Constitution of the United States was where the power of making or declaring war should be vested.

The committee of detail reported in favor of giving Congress power “to make war.” Pinkney opposed this on the floor, preferring to bestow it on the Senate. That this was also the view of Hamilton appears in the draft of a constitution which he gave to Madison, towards the close of the convention. In the debate on the report, Pinkney urged that it “would be singular for one authority to make war, and another, peace.” Butler, who followed him, thought the President was the proper depositary. It was then moved to make the clause read “to declare war,” instead of “to make war.” Gerry said that he had “never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the executive alone to declare war.” Mason thought that neither the executive nor the Senate could safely be intrusted with the power of war; and finally the word declare was substituted for make by the large majority of States.

There can be no doubt that the principle of self-determination is applicable to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. The UN Charter applies it. The United States as administering authority under its 1947 trusteeship agreement with the Security Council has explicitly and repeatedly recognized its applicability. The real question is precisely what elements of the principle are applicable, how they are to be applied, and within what framework.