The article on “Neutralization” in the April number of the American Journal of International Law, written by a prominent member of the New England Anti-Imperialist League, seems to furnish additional evidence of the change of mind which has occurred in recent years among the advocates of the policy of antiimperialism.

The outbreak of the European War found hundreds of merchant vessels of belligerent nationality in enemy ports or on the high seas bound to or from such ports in ignorance of the existence of hostilities, having left their last port of departure before the outbreak of war. The short period antedating the outbreak of the war, during which hostilities may be said to have been imminent, and the suddenness with which the war burst out afforded little opportunity to such vessels to escape, and consequently large numbers were caught either in enemy ports or on the high seas proceeding innocently thereto or therefrom.

The negotiators and drafters of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization(WTO), which includes the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1947(GATT) and the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade(TBT), as well as other subagreements dealing with domestic regulation, such as the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures(SPS), did not do a great job of doctrinal integration among the different documents that comprise the WTO Agreement. To be fair, at the end of the Uruguay Round, the hour was late and they may have felt that the basic ideas were sufficiently clear that it could all be sorted out in litigation. But in several contexts, including within the original GATT, the text of which dates from 1947, they covered the same ground in multiple places, without stating clearly how the different norms relate to one another,and without articulating plausible reasons for different treatment. For example, why is different language used for national treatment in three different places within Article III of GATT, and why is that language different from the language that appearsto have the same purpose in the TBT Agreement or in the SPS Agreement?

Many recent comments have been made with respect to the wisdom of Congress in passing the Act of September 22,1922, entitled, “ An act relative to the naturalization and citizenship of married women, ” commonly known as the Cable Act, and which granted a form of independent citizenship to women.1 Among these comments we find the phrase, “ probably accidental reasons,” and an expressed sentiment that it is “ questionable whether the majority of the women of this country really wanted the new law, ” and simi- ‘lar suggestions. It has been intimated that the law was passed solely as the result of the persuasive efforts of a minority of women.2 In many instances little cognizance has been taken of the reasons for, and the actual facts involved in, the change.

On the surface, the two books under review seem to have little in common. The Bonnitcha/Poulsen/Waibel (BPW) book, written by two legal academics and a political scientist, provides a balanced, fact-grounded account of international investment agreements (IIAs) and investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). This is the “international treaty regime” in that book's title which the authors argue needs to be distinguished from the broader “international regime complex” that their book explicitly does not address, namely the number of other international instruments that at least incidentally also protect foreign investments (including, for example, political risk insurance, tax treaties, certain World Trade Organization agreements, and certain human rights treaties like the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)) (p. 7 and Figure 1.2). As one of the encomiums on its back cover page suggests, the BPW book seeks to answer the fraught competing contentions of defenders and critics of the regime that all too frequently generate “more heat than light.” Their book dispassionately synthesizes the available legal, economic, and political literature relevant to understanding the investment treaty regime's oft-proclaimed “legitimacy crisis.” It seeks to supply lawyers needing political context and political scientists needing legal knowledge with the unfiltered facts required to assess whether such a “crisis” exists and, if so, what the ways forward might be.

The decisions of international bodies may be based either on the rigid principle of unanimity or on the more convenient doctrine that the majority shall govern. In a world where national sovereignty is so widely stressed, the former method has a natural appeal. The rule of unanimity has, in fact, been treated by many persons as an inevitable corollary of the theory of sovereignty, which, as it is generally understood, would subject no state to any limitation against its will. Such an idea was very probably in the mind of former Secretary of State Hughes when he stated in the opening address of the Conference on Central American Affairs in December, 1922, “ Unanimity is a part of the consequence of the status of states in international law.” Writers on internationallaw have often so defined sovereignty and independence that the requirement of unanimity for any concerted action of a group of nations would follow.