Devika Hovell raises deeply significant questions about the role of due process in the legitimacy of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Hovell gives us a fine-grained analysis of what exactly makes due process so compelling; in her approach, the reasons why it is compelling will vary in different contexts, depending upon the particular value and function it serves. In particular, she discusses three ways of articulating the values underlying due process, and the models of due process that would follow from each. She then discusses how her analysis would play out in two situations: The Council’s use of asset freezes, and the role of the UN in the cholera epidemic in Haiti. In her case studies, she looks at situations where due process has been insufficient, and discusses some of the UN’s attempts to remedy this, and the organizational difficulties in doing so.

There is at present considerable discussion regarding questions with respect to “the freedom of the seas.” These questions, so often vaguely referred to, should presumably be understood to relate to the exercise of belligerent rights on the sea and to embrace such matters as a possible codification of international law touching this subject, proper compliance with rules heretofore generally accepted if not always strictly observed, the desirability of amendments to such rules, and the formulation of principles to meet new problems that have grown out of the recent conflict. In the light of events in connection with the war the present situation with regard to the disposition of such questions through international agreement unhappily appears more difficult than that which confronted the delegates who assembled in conference at London in 1908 on the invitation of the British Government to reach an understanding among the nations represented relative to the rules of international law concerning the laws of naval warfare, and formulated the so-called London Declaration signed February 26, 1909.

The treatment of civilian alien enemies, either in the national jurisdiction of a belligerent or in occupied territory, presents questions of public international law as well as of municipal law and administration. It appears that in some of the United Nations in the present war the problem of internment of such persons has become less acute as the tide of battle has turned against the Axis. In Great Britain, for example, the number of aliens of enemy nationality interned under the Royal Prerogative, and whose release had not been authorized, was only 6,123 at the beginning of 1944 as compared with 17,940 at the beginning of 1941.

In this essay, I take up two concerns raised by Harold Koh and Todd Buchwald in their critique of the Kampala amendments on aggression: what they term “proxy prosecution” and the notion of aggression as a uniquely political question. I also take issue with the argument in Alain Pellet’s response on attacks by nonstate actors.

These areas of contention notwithstanding, there are important issues on which I think that Koh and Buchwald get it right. In forthcoming work, I argue that the object and purpose of the criminalization of aggression precludes an interpretation of Article 8bis of the Rome Statute that would include humanitarian interventions not authorized by the Security Council. Nonetheless, the failure to make this textually explicit at Kampala was a mistake that the authors are correct to lament. Similarly, they accurately identify the ambiguities in the provisions on the amendments’ entry into force as an entirely avoidable defect that creates unnecessary confusion. These important points notwithstanding, the article takes some misleading positions on the politics of the crime.

The comprehensive revision of the nationality laws of the United States, now being formulated in pursuance of an Executive Order issued by President Roosevelt on April 25,1933, lends special interest and value at the present time to a comparative study of the laws of foreign states relating to nationality at birth and to the loss of nationality.