When the United States terminated its seven-year occupation of Japan in 1954, it did so having signed a peace treaty. By contrast, the United States tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade Hamid Karzai to sign a Bilateral Security Agreement to accompany the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Even if Karzai had agreed to sign, the draft agreement bears much stronger resemblance to an alliance than to a peace treaty; it does not reference hostilities between the United States and Afghanistan, nor does it include any version of the term “peace treaty.”

In Cortec v. Kenya, an investor-state arbitral tribunal established under a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) held it lacked jurisdiction to hear a dispute concerning a mining project that the tribunal found did not comply with domestic environmental law. The award raises significant issues of public international law, including how questions of investor compliance are considered in investor-state dispute settlement and the legal implications of investor noncompliance. The issues resonate with wider debates about balancing investor rights and obligations in the international investment regime.

The contemporary human-animal relationship is highly ambivalent. It is characterized by both the exacerbating exploitative use of animals and a progressing moral concern for the life, dignity, and welfare of animals. With regard to the agricultural use of animals (which is the quantitatively most significant area of animal use and accounts for more than sixty billion land animals slaughtered globally each year), these two poles stand in particular contrast. On the one hand, agriculture has been increasingly industrialized and intensified over the course of the Twentieth Century. The modern system of industrialized animal production (or the “animal-industrial complex”) is marked by a high degree of rationalization, automatization, efficiency, mass production, and profitability, and has turned animals into mere production units—biomachines that convert feed into meat, milk, and eggs. On the other hand, the transformation of agriculture to industrialized animal production has raised grave ethical concerns, and societal discomfort at the systemic disregard for the welfare of farmed animals has grown. Most people cringe at the sight of footage showing the horrifying conditions prevailing in factory farms and slaughterhouses, and the vast majority of society subscribes to the basic moral principle that inflicting unnecessary pain and suffering on animals is wrong (a dictum also underlying the nearly universal prohibition of animal cruelty and which is so ingrained it could be considered a “rule of civilization,” as noted by the dissent in a Canadian appeal decision regarding an elephant in a city-run zoo).

Erika de Wet has provided a useful and balanced assessment of the current state of the international law of governmental illegitimacy. Her account quite rightly concludes that “democratic legitimacy is not yet a requirement for the recognition of a de jure government under customary international law.” What follows below seeks to expand on her observations in two ways: by developing somewhat further the doctrinal linkages to which she alludes; and by explaining the failure of a consistently legitimist state practice to materialize, in light of the dynamics of the legal order within which the question of governmental illegitimacy is embedded.

A lawsuit pending in U.S. courts against the United Nations for its responsibility for Haiti’s cholera out-break is the largest challenge yet to the impunity of the organization, which has thus far refused to comply with its legal obligations to provide a settlement mechanism to the victims. With no such avenue of redress available to them, those affected by the epidemic have been left in the bizarre situation where in order to obtain justice they must file lawsuits against the United Nations, whose mandate is to defend the rule of law and promote human rights. If successful, the suit would improve accountability for the organization and underscore the need for it to comply with international law.

On March 8, 2018, President Trump signed Proclamation 9704 and Proclamation 9705 imposing tariffs on imported aluminum and steel articles, respectively. According to Trump, the tariffs are “necessary and appropriate to address the threat that imports” of steel and aluminum articles “pose to the national security.” The imposition of tariffs in the name of national defense is the latest and most high-profile move by the Trump administration to orient the United States toward an “America First” trade policy.

At first blush, the recent judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in Zivotofsky v Kerry (Zivotofsky II) reads as a strikingly American affair concerning the enduring force of the separation of powers under a written Constitution. Finding that the President has the exclusive power to recognize foreign states and their territory, the Court holds that a statute of Congress encroaches upon this power and declares it unconstitutional. The reasoning of both the Court and the minority justices is largely a narrative of U.S. Constitutional history. So one might ask: does this decision really have anything to say of significance outside the U.S. context about the scope of the executive function in foreign relations?

With the submission to the Permanent Court of International Justice of the dispute over the sovereignty of East Greenland, a controversy of long standing between Denmark and Norway approaches a solution. The question first became acute in 1919, but an understanding of the conflicting claims upon which the parties rest their cases can be gained only by an examination of the more remote historical factors involved. Without attempting definitive opinions in a case concerning which complete information is not available, the writer wishes to examine the various claims which have been advanced, and to evaluate their relative importance in the settlement of the dispute.

Prosper Weil's scintillating intervention of 1983 warned against pathological doctrinal tendencies that threatened to “disable international law from fulfilling what have always been its proper functions.” Weil concluded his sweeping critique of these supposed pathologies with an urgent call for remedial action: “[A]ll is not yet lost . . . . There is still time for jurists to react.” But, as José Alvarez points out in his contribution to this symposium, the manifestations of “relative normativity” that Weil decried—such as the doctrine of jus cogens and the transmutation of customary law into universal law—have only entrenched themselves more firmly in the decades since his famous article was published. So, what is the point of engaging with “Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?” today beyond its historical significance as a celebrated, but ultimately failed, rallying cry against the doctrinal revolution that has swept over international law in the period since decolonization?

In Yesh Din v. Chief of General Staff, IDF, the Israeli Supreme Court (Court) unanimously dismissed two petitions by six human rights NGOs who challenged the rules of engagement (RoE) governing Israel Defense Forces (IDF) activities in clashes near the fence separating the Gaza Strip and Israel between March and May 2018. The decision discusses several controversial international law issues relating to the use of force in response to cross-border mass demonstrations. In addition, it provides a closer look at the application of international law by a domestic court that is conscious of a potential International Criminal Court (ICC) investigation.

On January 28, 2021, a Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) dismissed all of the respondent's preliminary objections in Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Mauritius and Maldives in the Indian Ocean (Mauritius/Maldives). The proceeding arose out of Mauritius's long-running effort to regain sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, which was originally “detached” from Mauritius in 1965 by the United Kingdom (UK). Although the Judgment will allow the case to proceed to the merits, it is significant in its own right for its engagement with several earlier legal decisions, including the arbitral award in Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration and the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, as well as UN General Assembly Resolution 73/295 affirming the Advisory Opinion. The Special Chamber stitched together a series of legal documents that, considered individually, were either non-binding or limited in scope to achieve a determination greater than the sum of its parts—one that effectively resolved the disputed sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago.

These have been heady times for those interested in foreign relations law. The last twenty years have seen the field transformed. In the 1970s and 1980s, Vietnam had triggered significant attention on constitutional war powers, but that interest was more political than scholarly. Other foreign relations law issues were debated only at the margins. The Restatement (Third) supplied a largely unchallenged conventional wisdom in the area, even if some of its main points were more aspirational than descriptive. The courts had long been missing in action; though they had been active in the first century or so of the Republic on international law and foreign relations law issues, probably the most important Supreme Court ruling in the area from the second half of the twentieth-century merely served to confirm the judicial timidity. On many of the most important issues of foreign relations, sparse judicial precedents (such as they existed) had no more than oracular application to contemporary questions. Other actors nonetheless managed to achieve constitutional equilibria with little help from the courts or scholars. The second half of the twentieth-century was characterized by a remarkable level of constitutional stability regarding the allocation of foreign relations powers.

This contribution explores the implications of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) referrals under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for the immunity ratione personae of officials of states that are not party to the ICC Statute. While Article 13(b) of the ICC Statute allows the ICC to receive referrals of situations by the UNSC, disagreement remains among authors as to when such a referral removes the customary immunity attached to a head of state of a nonstate party to the ICC Statute. In particular, it remains disputed whether the broad obligation placed on Sudan by UNSC Resolution 1593 (2005) had the implicit effect of doing so. In referring the situation in Darfur (Sudan) to the ICC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC determined that “the government of Sudan, and all other parties to the conflict in Darfur, shall cooperate fully with and provide any necessary assistance to the Court and the prosecutor pursuant to this resolution.”