“Theoretically,” says Hall, “a politically organized community enters of right into the family of states and must be treated in accordance with law, as soon as it is able to show that it possesses the marks of a state.”

International law allows a belligerent two means of preventing wholly or in part sea-borne commerce between his enemy and neutral states. These are: first, the right to seize and confiscate absolute contraband goods destined to enemy territory and conditional contraband intended for the use of the armed forces or government of the enemy state; and, second, the right to blockade the ports and coasts of the enemy and thereby to prevent commercial intercourse with him in all articles whether contraband or not. In the April number of this Journal (pp. 372–401) I discussed in the light of the rules of international law applicable thereto the measures that have been adopted by the British Government in respect to trade in contraband since the beginning of the present war. The present article will be devoted mainly to a consideration of the British order in council of March 11,1915, the purpose and effect of which was to establish a blockade of all commerce entering and leaving Germany.

The Arbitral Tribunal of the Permanent Court at The Hague, by its award of the 7th of last September, in the case of the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries, brought to a close a controversy which in its various phases has been an almost constant source of vexatious dispute between the United States and Great Britain for the past seventy years.

A treaty, granting exceptional rights, such as that which this Tribunal was called upon to consider, is peculiarly susceptible to different interpretations as the course of time brings new conditions not contemplated by its negotiators. The relations of the parties are changed. A liberty which at the date of the treaty was considered indispensable may become worthless, while one which was deemed insignificant may in years assume a place of vital importance to the beneficiaries under the grant. This change of conditions and of the value of rights has been especially true of the liberties acquired by the United States for its inhabitants under the first article of the Treaty of October 20, 1818.

Conventional wisdom holds that a lawyer who represents himself has a fool for a client. Perhaps surprisingly, several of the highest profile accused persons before the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) have received some form of legal training. Less surprisingly, it is precisely those accused who are asserting a right to self-representation. Slobodan Miloševic, for example, has a degree in law and by the end of his trial will have earned himself several years of advocacy experience. Vojislav Šešelj, a professor of law at Belgrade University, was somewhat affronted by the judge's suggestion that he should request legal assistance and exclaimed in open court, “I have never met a better lawyer dian I am in my whole life.” Are these accused fools to want to represent themselves? What about an accused with no legal experience at all who asserts this right in the face of charges of genocide and crimes against humanity? As one accused remarked when clarifying to the court that he did not wish to represent himself, “No. It would be insane if I did that ….”

In a series of newspaper columns and stories beginning March 19, 1975 the American public was told apparently correctly about the partial success of the Central Intelligence Agency in raising a Soviet submarine, its equipment, and dead crew from the Pacific Ocean floor. The location of the pertinent activities was reported to be well beyond any state's claim to territorial waters, continental shelves, contiguous zones, or other asserted inhibiting zones. The CIA vessel, The Glomar Explorer, was disguised as a commercially operated oceanographic research vessel. No international legal implications seem to have been perceived by the newspapers in the American intelligence activities.