The nationalization of foreign-owned property presents problems which put a severe strain upon some of the accepted principles of international law. Chandler Anderson, one of the founding members of the American Society of International Law, pointed out nearly a quarter of a century ago that the principle which safeguards foreign-owned property from confiscation in time of peace “has become a part of the law of nations not merely because it represents a universally recognized standard ofjustice, but also because it is absolutely essential for the welfare of every nation, for without its protection no commercial, or financial international intercourse could safely be carried on.” Since that time, the practice of expropriating foreign property by "nationalization" has spread from Soviet Kussia to other countries constituting important parts of the free world strongly opposed to Communism.

While there has been general agreement among writers on international law and polities that the recent rapid increase in the number of independent states is significant for the international system, debate about the actual and potential consequences of that increase for the contemporary international legal order continues. Since that debate, which focuses on the attitude of the “new states” toward the existing international legal order, the reasons for that attitude, and the extent to which changes in that order are consequently inevitable, likely or desirable, has so far been conducted primarily on the basis of impressionistic generalities, it appears essential to investigate more closely and empirically the attitudes and behavior of the new states. Egypt has been selected as an important case study because of its leadership in the Arab world, its strategic position in the Afro-Asian world, and its active rôle in the anti-colonial and non-alignment movements, as well as because of its particular yet representative problems and goals.

Erika de Wet has provided a useful and balanced assessment of the current state of the international law of governmental illegitimacy. Her account quite rightly concludes that “democratic legitimacy is not yet a requirement for the recognition of a de jure government under customary international law.” What follows below seeks to expand on her observations in two ways: by developing somewhat further the doctrinal linkages to which she alludes; and by explaining the failure of a consistently legitimist state practice to materialize, in light of the dynamics of the legal order within which the question of governmental illegitimacy is embedded.

On March 8, 2018, President Trump signed Proclamation 9704 and Proclamation 9705 imposing tariffs on imported aluminum and steel articles, respectively. According to Trump, the tariffs are “necessary and appropriate to address the threat that imports” of steel and aluminum articles “pose to the national security.” The imposition of tariffs in the name of national defense is the latest and most high-profile move by the Trump administration to orient the United States toward an “America First” trade policy.