The Hague Conference of 1907 had for one of its objects the formation of an international court of justice, the decisions of which were to systematize international law and resolve its inconsistencies. Such an international court, the “Court of Arbitral Justice,” was approved in principle by the Conference, but failed to be established because the Conference was unable to agree on the composition of the court.

At the forty-seventh session of the General Assembly, the Sixth Committee1reviewed the annual reports of the International Law Commission (ILC), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization (Charter Committee), and the Committee on Relations with the Host Country. The Sixth Committee also considered proposals for new legal instruments relating to some aspects of sovereign immunity, consular functions, the diplomatic courier and bag, and environmental protection in wartime; a proposal to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on questions relating to extraterritorial jurisdiction; and aspects of such other topics as national liberation movements, humanitarian law, protection of diplomats, and the United Nations Decade of International Law.

There was concluded in Washington on December 15,1931, an arbitration between the Central Powers and the United States of claims arising out of the seizure by the United States of enemy-owned ships, patents and radio stations during the World War. The arbitration was unique in that, instead of being brought about as the result of a treaty or a convention between the Powers in question, it was instituted as the result of an Act of Congress by which a special tribunal was established for the hearing of such claims against the United States. Thus we are confronted with the unusual spectacle of a Power against whom the claims were asserted, recognizing such claims by a legislative act on its own part, without any bilateral agreement, and establishing of its own accord a special tribunal for the determination of the claims. It was consequently an arbitration international in its scope, but conducted before a domestic tribunal.

This essay focuses on the understanding of positivism in Prosper Weil's time, its trajectory since, and how that trajectory reflects changes that have occurred in global society in the intervening years. The world to which Weil spoke is neither in scientific nor in political and cultural terms the same as ours. Key positivist notions, such as neutrality or Weil's critique of the ideal of the unity of the international community and of the invocation of higher moral values, appear to chain sound normative principles while letting loose real power. At any rate, Weil's ideas have not survived globalization or the critical and historical turn taken in the discipline of international law. And yet “Towards Relative Normativity?” arguably owes its lasting significance to its grasp of the weight of the authority of law in international society.

It is not uncommon for decisions of international tribunals to be reported in the pages of the Washington Post or feature on the BBC News website. It is rather less common for awards to feature on the giant screens of New York’s Times Square. But less than two weeks after the Arbitral Tribuna lunder Annex VII to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea issued its Awardin Philippines v.China, a three-minute video featuring China’s position was broadcast repeatedly on the screen better known forbroadcasting New Year’s Eve festivities than argumentation on the competence of international tribunals. The video asserted that China’s “indisputable sovereignty over [the South China Sea islands] has sufficient historic and legal basis” and that “the Arbitral Tribunalvainly attempted to deny China’s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South China Sea.” It further stated that “China did not participate in the illegal South China Sea arbitration, nor accepts the Awardso as to defend the solemnity of international law.” This latter statement goes to the very heart of the Arbitral Tribunal’s jurisdiction under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (the Convention) and its competence to decide the case despite China’s nonparticipation in the proceedings.

At the review conference in Kampala, States Parties adopted three new provisions on the crime of aggression for inclusion in the Rome Statute, as well as consequential amendments to the Elements of Crimes. However, states parties did not consider revisions to the procedural arrangements that may be required to accommodate the crime of aggression. The crime of aggression requires a link to states, being limited to acts of aggression by one state against another state. The individuals that can be charged with the crime of aggression are persons “in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.” The crime is also connected to the international security framework, in particular the UN Charter. Given that aggression is intrinsically linked to state acts, it is “likely that the ICC [International Criminal Court] would need relevant states to cooperate, present evidence, and argue the case.” Yet the existing framework does not include an adequate right of participation for affected states. This contribution suggests one possible revision to provide a clearer legal basis for states to participate directly in ICC proceedings in respect of the crime of aggression.

Until the great goal of the peace movement, that is to say, the world peace treaty without reservation of any kind and extending to all nations, shall at some future time have been concluded, two periods in the development of arbitration, each of which is in turn marked by three successive stages of growth, are clearly discernible. The first embraces the development of special treaties; the second that of the world treaty. In point of time, these two periods follow one another; yet the world treaty is ushered in even before the special treaty has reached its highest stage.