It is always advisable while laying down any rule whereby human actions are framed, to ascertain the basis on which such principle or rule rests. Such an inquiry is by no means useless in dealing with the science of international law, even though one may regard this branch of knowledge as being merely “positive”; for the conduct of states, just as that of individuals, is generally modelled according to some idea or principle. It will not be unprofitable, therefore, to begin this study with a note, short as it must necessarily be, on the grounds of the liability of states, so that in this manner it may become comparatively easy to ascertain what are the rights of states whose citizens or subjects have suffered damages in the course of riots or insurrections that have taken place in a foreign country.

On August 9, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt proclaimed that the International Load Lines Convention of 1930 was no longer binding on the United States "for the duration of the present emergency." He based this unilateral suspension of the treaty on "changed conditions" which, he said, had conferred on the United States "an unquestioned right and privilege under approved principles of international law" to declare the treaty inoperative.The President's proclamation was made on the advice of Acting Attorney General Francis Biddle who had informed the President that: "It is a well-established principle of international law, rebus sic stantibus, that a treaty ceases to be binding when the basic conditions upon which it was founded have essentially changed. Suspension of the convention in such circumstances is the unquestioned right of a state adversely affected by such essential change."

It is well settled in Anglo-American law that national courts are competent, in general, to adjudicate rights and duties with respect to all things or persons found within the territory which the process of the court controls. Exceptions find an especial justification in considerations of national or international convenience. A situation which seems to have been insufficiently considered, however, is presented by the case of the thing or person which has been seized or arrested abroad, in violation of international law, and brought within the state and thus within reach of the process of the state's courts. Should the courts be considered competent, on the basis of physical presence thus procured, to adjudicate in the usual way?

On March 13,1930, a conference will meet at The Hague to make progress in the codification of international law about territorial waters. Implicit in the plans for this meeting are two assumptions. The first, that it is better to codify the law rather than to follow the road traveled by the American Law Institute and “ restate” it. The second, that codification may more wisely be expressed in spatial than in causal terms. As to the first assumption, is it right? As to the second, it is submitted that, irrespective of whether one is drafting a custom or a code, the particular subject of territorial waters should be examined and set forth in causal rather than in spatial terms. It is submitted that the law of territorial waters has been, is, and in its nature must remain a thing of custom, not statute or treaty, and that any attempt to treat it differently will have the effect which thirtyfour years ago the late F. W. Maitlan prophesied was to be expected from the excesses of restricting by putting enactments into constitutions in the United States. “ First,” he said, “ you will get the effect of a dam,—and then you will get the effect of a flood.” Both have been seen.

Immediately after the outbreak of the World War in 1914, Secretary of State Bryan wisely approached the belligerent governments proposing that both sides agree to conduct their naval warfare in accordance with the rules embodied in the Declaration of London. This document was drawn up at the London Naval Conference called by Great Britain in 1908, and was signed by the delegates of all the nations represented. The conference agreed that the rules contained in the document “correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law.” The Declaration never became legally binding on the nations, however, having failed of ratification by the British Government itself. Legally, therefore, Great Britain was not bound by it in 1914, except in so far as it embodied preexisting rules of law.