This article investigates the Taveta Road phenomenon, whereby women garment informal traders occupy a whole street in the central business district in Nairobi, Kenya. It also discusses the implications for urban planning of the presence of women informal traders in the central business district. The article demonstrates that the ability of these traders to move from the margins into the heart of the city is based on their ability to cross borders, organize collectively, and develop entrepreneurial skills that make use of social networks, group agency, and personal initiative. It also illustrates that over time, their gradual encroachment has led to an acceptance of their presence and their integration into the urban economy. These developments—which are referred to as “subaltern urbanism” or “solidarity entrepreneurialism”—have far-reaching implications in terms of the traders’ relationship with the city, state laws, and the national economy.

On 17 August 1884, the flag was raised at Bimbia in Kamerun and the territory was annexed as a German colony. Gustav Nachtigal, Consul General, distributed Schnaps in celebration and then billed the liquor to the German government: “Schnaps shared at the festive celebration was to be paid by Berlin” (Stoecker 1960, 69; Hueckirtg and Launer 1986, 62). This fleeting event is a commanding metaphor for the crucial role which bottled alcoholic beverages came to play under German imperialism in Cameroon; spirits, above all other trade goods, helped to secure Germany's annexation of Cameroon, its control over indigenous labor, and access to the country's interior. The occasion sets the stage for a continuous history linking bottled European alcohol to capital accumulation, elite power structures, and changing social relations in Cameroon.

Today it is impossible to overlook the significance of bottled alcohol production and consumption in the Republic of Cameroon. Bars selling bottled beers mark rural commercial centers and proliferate on city streets. They are so pervasive that it is difficult to imagine city, town, or village without them, though this image is of relatively recent origin. Just as European alcohol played an important role in the penetration of West African trade, so too bottled European beers permeate many contemporary African economies as highly remunerative commercial activities serving both state and international interests.

Unlike certain area studies disciplines (Russian Studies and Oriental Studies, for example), African Studies has largely attracted scholars whose commitment to their subject transcends mere professionalism. The sensible assumption with regard to African Africanists is, of course, that their orientation would be decidedly pro-African, but within the discipline, the notion is widespread that at least for the most part, even non-African Africanists hold a patronal attitude towards the continent, its peoples and cultures and their future, routinely combining the role of champions with that of students. This paper will argue that very often, Africanist practice, while purporting to be responsive to the best interests of Africa and Africans, in fact has the effect of perpetuating notions of an Africa that never was. It will also call attention to some significant incongruities between the methodology of African Studies and the well known relational principles that inform inter-personal commerce in African cultures. Beyond exposing these discrepancies between the expected and the actual, and the incongruities between methodology and spirit, the discussion will argue for an infusion of the practice of the discipline with the attitudes that characterize African familial discourses.

I will warn at the outset that the ensuing argument adopts the position that one can make valid general statements about Africa, Africans, African cultures, African relational habits and the like, without necessarily suggesting a monolithic uniformity over the entire continent in any of the particulars. Furthermore, descriptions of, and assertions about, aspects of African life in the following pages cannot be construed as implying their eternal fixity and immutability through history.

This article examines the impact of Chinese textile imports on the organization and politics of women’s textile trading networks in Benin. The incursion of cheap Chinese textiles into markets formerly dominated by imported European fabrics has shifted the balance of power between networks of traders in Benin’s textile market, reconfiguring relations between textile traders, state officials, and international companies. Focusing on political and economic dimensions of trading networks, the article reveals how global linkages transform local economic networks and how local actors structure networks for global economic partners. Far from bypassing state actors, this process is shown to incorporate state officials from above and from below, splintering established trading networks and weaving new ones from emerging configurations of traders, state officials, and global textile exporters.

Marriage cases discussed by Catholic missionaries in Uganda at the turn of the twentieth century showcase considerable diversity in relationships between women and men. While these cases reflect the turbulence of the late nineteenth century, the history of marriage and divorce in the region since around 700 CE demonstrates that diversity in marital arrangements was a long-standing phenomenon. This article sets out the history of aspects of marriage and divorce in Buganda, Bugwere, Busoga, and Bushana, and their ancestral communities to show how women and men conceptualized their domestic relationships and adapted them as they dealt with political and social change.

A quarter of a century after independence, few would dispute that African industry is in crisis. In a recent survey of 343 factories in over 16 African countries, spanning sectors as diverse as beverages, textiles, pulp and paper, flour milling, sugar refining and cement, fully 23 percent of the companies were found to have ceased production by mid-1980 and a further 57 percent were functioning at less than 70 percent of nominal capacity—well below their break-even point (Inst. de l'Entreprise, 1985: 16). No African country has been spared, including those that, like the Ivory Coast, had been regarded as economic miracles in the first two post-independence decades.

From both the left and the right have thus come serious questions about the net contribution that industry has made to development in sub-Saharan Africa. The architects of Africa's industrialization process—multinational firms, states and foreign aid agencies— have also come under attack. But if the critiques have been rich, they have generated surprisingly little new data and few innovative prescriptions. Policy initiatives thus flow mainly from a single source, the international lending community, and within it, from the IMF and the World Bank, which have become its guiding spirits.

Two features are common to their proposals (Bernstein, 1986; Loxley, 1984; Marsden and Belot, 1987; World Bank, 1981, 1984, 1987). One is an implicit movement away from industry and towards agriculture through the implementation of policies to liberalize tariffs, reduce the role of the state, “get prices right,” and encourage exports. The other is an explicit move towards the rehabilitation of African industry within existing structures, thus tacitly accepting the particular paradigm that has given to African industry its current form and fragility.

This paper explores the political meaning of Ghanaian Highlife songs, which are generally regarded as pure entertainment. The paper is the result of a close cooperation between a Ghanaian insider (Asante-Darko) and a European outsider (Van der Geest). More than one hundred Highlife songs were collected, transcribed, and translated. All these texts are recorded songs. Nearly all Highlife songs examined in this paper are in the Twi (or Akan) language. (The Akan are a collection of culturally related societies with mutually intelligible languages. They number about four million people and live in the southern part of Ghana.) It should be made clear, however, that Highlife is also performed in other languages, within and outside of Ghana.

This brief paper does not discuss the methodological problems involved in the use of artistic expressions for anthropological purposes. This has been done elsewhere (Fabian, 1978; Asante-Darko and Van der Geest, 1981). Instead, it analyzes the meaning of songs and people's reactions to them. The first section of the paper provides background information about Highlife music in Ghana. The second section deals with the hidden meaning of art in general and, in particular, with the hidden political meaning of Ghanaian Highlife songs.

Highlife is a blend of traditional Akan rhythms and melodies with European musical elements, such as the use of European instruments and harmony. It encompasses a variety of artistic expressions: music, dancing, story-telling, and theater. Performances by Highlife bands are called concerts, even in the Twi language. They usually start with a comic or tragi-comic play filled with musical effects and intermezzos and end with a performance of Highlife songs (Richard, 1974; Collins, 1976a). Both the play and the songs can be about many different topics, rural or urban, modern or traditional, true events or stories. Generally, however, the songs deal with the problems of everyday life: poverty, marriage problems, hatred, gossip, shame, sickness, and death (Bame, 1974; Ricard, 1974). Apart from live performances, Highlife owes its popularity to recordings, which are produced in Ghana.

In Senegal, love, respect, and compatibility have historically figured into marital calculations, yet prospective husbands must also provide material support. After decades of stagnant economic growth, good providers are hard to find. In this article we examine two strategies that women employ in an attempt to achieve economic security: nonmarital sex and transnational marriage. Though recent anthropological literature proposes a global transition toward companionate marriage, evidence from Dakar suggests that Senegalese women are prioritizing short-term material gain over longer-term projects of social reproduction. Transnational marriage and nonmarital sexual relationships illuminate women’s new strategies to stabilize their social positions in increasingly precarious times.

War, drought and the failure of centrally planned economic policies have resulted in a reorientation of government priorities in Mozambique. Since the late 1980s, agricultural policy regarding food and cash crop production has shifted away from a dependence on state farms towards a reliance on commercial enterprises and the family sector. The government also has applied market principles to the purchase and processing of cash crops and allowed private companies to replace inefficient and poorly managed state enterprises. These decisions have not been adopted hastily; they have been accompanied by numerous studies that try to anticipate the possible impact of these changes at the micro and macro economic level.

Several of these studies are noteworthy in their attention to the position of rural women in Mozambique. They acknowledge the significant role played by women and they detail the numerous productive activities that rural women engage in, from planting and weeding to childcare and collecting firewood (Liberman 1988,1989,1992; Casimiro, Laforte, and Pessoa 1991; Andrade, Cardoso, Casimiro, and Louro 1992; UEM 1993). In light of the tremendous economic changes that the country is undertaking, many of the studies warn the government against policies that will marginalize women and urge officials to incorporate a gender component into projects and policies (Casimiro, Laforte, and Pessoa 1991; Liberman 1992).

The article argues for an approach to studies of sexuality in Africa that considers the subject of female sexuality from the perspective of capacity and power. Based on data from Mozambique, and informed by conceptual frameworks as well as by research findings from other African countries, the article investigates preparations of the erotic female body such as body tattoos, hip belts of glass beads, and elongated labia. It also discusses how “traditional” sexual capacity-building has been transferred from rural contexts into urban settings, empowering young women in love relationships with older, richer men.

Female prostitution in Africa has attracted a few interesting studies since the 1970s (Bujra, 1975, 1977; White, 1980; 1983, 1989; Van Onselen, 1982; Van Heyningin, 1983). Hitherto the subject received casual mention or was at best treated as a minor aspect of broader social categories in studies dealing with African urban conditions (for example, Southall and Gutkind, 1956; Cohen, 1969; Little, 1973). However, even these recent studies concentrate primarily on two cases—Kenya and South Africa. This paper is intended to make a small contribution to the as yet limited knowledge of African prostitution by examining the growth and consequences of prostitution and its relationship to accumulation in the Upper Cross River Basin of Nigeria during the period 1930 to 1950.

Explanations of prostitution vary widely. In many societies the traditional attitude toward the subject, defined by religion and custom, is basically moralistic. Prostitutes are thus seen as deviants, or even criminals, who are unable to exercise control over base instincts. This is a simplistic and unhelpful view which, in the present state of knowledge about the complex phenomenon that prostitution actually is, can hardly stand even elementary analytical scrutiny. What is more, such an attitude tends to put the blame for prostitution squarely on the women without regard to the role of the men who encourage it.

The sale of sexual services thrives because there is a ready market for it. Even Victorian society with all its presumed modesty and “civilized values” had a soft underbelly as far as sexuality was concerned.

The growth of the private security industry on the African continent has resulted in an expanding labor force engaged in surveillance-type activities. This article analyzes various levels of regulation of private security officers as a form of surveillance. Based on qualitative methodology, it compares the numerous regulatory efforts implemented by the state, industry, and companies of the private security industry in Kenya and South Africa and shows that although different, they essentially share the ultimate aim of controlling private security officers, i.e., to implement a means of “surveillance of the surveillers.”

The scholars of Gabon have explained Bongo's political longevity by his corrupt appropriation of the country's economic resources. They have also attributed Bongo's long political survival to the creation of an impressive military machinery to repress rebellions, intimidate opponents, and discourage opposition to his regime. The objective of this article is to demonstrate that Bongo's political longevity is not due solely to his efficient use of economic and military resources. He was also able to establish domination over the symbolic sphere of Gabonese society. The manipulation of such religious institutions as Christianity, Freemasonry, and traditional secret societies allowed Bongo to gain control over the minds of the Gabonese by convincing die masses that he was die ideal leader for the country. Despite these manipulations, die Gabonese masses were able to use this very same symbolic system to challenge Bongo's regime and threaten the lives of members of his government.

This paper surveys the state of research on ideology and belief in Africa, a subject made up of two often separated notions but significant as a conjunction in current African history and in need of theoretical elaboration. Although there have been writings on this subject in numerous disciplines, this essay will concentrate on the anthropological perspective of the relationship of ideology and belief, as stimulated by anthropologists' confrontations with African developments

The paper presents three major arguments or themes. First, it contends that the distinction between ideology and belief is invidious and should be transcended. Second, it documents that the study of these phenomena in Africa, whether labeled cultural superstructure or labeled ideology and belief, has become increasingly a historical rather than a mythological science. This trend should be hastened. The argument applies to the study of belief principles similar to those that Professor Ajayi (1967:274) invoked in a well known essay for the study of history. It was time, Ajayi said, to replace the mythical Africa of colonial thought with knowledge of what real men did in real situations. The third theme of this essay is that although the models of society constructed by its members and the models constructed by outside observers are, as Lévi-Strauss says (1967:274), phenomena of the same order, the models belong to different cultures, meet different requirements, cannot be reconciled, and should not be confused, although they often have been in the past, in African studies in particular.

Voluntary associations are significant mechanisms by which migrants can be integrated into a new urban milieu, yet not all individuals or sectors of city populations belong to them. While it is widely accepted that associations have a role to play in urban west Africa by offering welfare services (Little, 1965), providing political outlets in the broad sense of that term (Wallerstein, 1966), or defining status (Eisenstadt, 1956), little is known about the configurations of membership (but see Meillassoux, 1968). In order to understand more fully the part that voluntary associations play in the lives of city dwellers it is still necessary to ask fundamental questions. For example:

1) What percentages of urban populations actually belong to, and are active in, voluntary associations?

2) What kinds of voluntary associations are preferred?

3) Who belongs to what kinds of associations?

In other words we still need to know to whom voluntary associations are important and to whom they are relatively unimportant.

This essay addresses itself to these questions by examining voluntary association behavior among residents of one suburban neighborhood of Lagos, Nigeria. In so doing it argues that membership varies substantially according to ethnicity and sex. Yoruba and Ibo-speaking residents are known for their high level of participation in several types of voluntary associations, yet Hausa-speaking residents rarely join any but religious groups. The same contrast can be made between men and women, whose membership preferences are not necessarily similar. Examination of the variables of sex and ethnicity, therefore, begins to provide membership profiles of the various types of associations, but these factors do not stand alone.

Throughout the history of Liberia, the Mandingo have stood at the margins of citizenship-always taken to be “something more” than the other indigenous groups of Liberia but “something less” than the full citizens the Settlers consider themselves to be. In the shifting definitions of Liberian citizenship, Mandingo marginality has always played a curiously ambivalent role, an ambivalence that reflects the ambiguities of the state's self-conception.

While the question of “who are the real citizens of Liberia” has been debated for many years by the various ethnic groups, no group has been more impacted by the debate than the Mandingo. Against this historical background, this paper seeks to address the issue of citizenship which is currently being discussed as Liberia attempts to reestablish itself as a nation state following its recent civil war.

Eighteen U.S. soldiers were killed and dozens were wounded in a fierce battle in Mogadishu, Somalia, on October 3–4, 1993. Their deaths were a direct outgrowth of the Clinton administration’s handling of a series of United Nations (UN)-sanctioned military interventions in Somalia, which are popularly referred to as Operation Restore Hope. With the Cable News Network (CNN) providing almost instantaneous transmission to audiences in the United States and abroad, the victorious Somali forces not only paraded a captured U.S. helicopter pilot, Corporal William Durant, through the streets of Mogadishu, but also dragged the naked corpse of a U.S. soldier past mobs of Somali citizens who vented their anger by spitting on, stoning, and kicking the body.

Depending on who you listen to, structural adjustment has led to either rapid economic growth or a decline in living standards within Africa. And while in different places both circumstances are probably true, neither scenario describes what I have seen in rural Tanzanian villages since 1984. Despite the predictions about the effects of structural adjustment, my impression is that life goes on with only marginal changes in the daily economic activity of villagers. Economically, things are a little better on some fronts: the clothing is nicer, there are a few more bicycles, etc., but the changes are not dramatic; the daily economic activity is still hoe-based agriculture. It is also unclear whether such incremental improvements would not have occurred given any other macro-economic policy.

Indeed in such villages, past macro-economic policies including Ujamaa socialism, market capitalism or even mercantile colonialism can also be correlated with one economic improvement or the other. But as with these past cases, unraveling the relationship between correlation and causation is a tricky business. This paper does this for structural adjustment policies in a single village. This is done by comparing economic activity and relationships in 1985, before structural adjustment policies were adopted, and in 1995-6, well after the policies had had a chance to take effect.