In this chapter, we sketch out a preliminary account of the normative questions raised by an emerging form of human-machine interaction that we call the “hybrid mind.” By hybrid mind, we consider the direct coupling of the human cognitive system with an artificial cognitive system, so that cognitive processes of the two systems are functionally integrated through bi-directional interactions and mutually adapt to each other. This inquiry is provoked by the development of novel technologies such as closed-loop or adaptive neuroprostheses that can consist of implanted or external components and establish a direct communication pathway between the human brain and an external computing device. This communication pathway is typically mediated and facilitated by artificially intelligent components such as machine learning algorithms. This development represents only the latest step in the evolution of human beings and their technologies, a process that has necessitated a parallel evolution in our moral concepts and practices over time. Our objective as ethicists and legal scholars is to propose a concept of this hybrid mind as an interesting unit of analysis.

This chapter argues that the notion of human dignity provides an overarching normative framework for assessing the ethical and legal acceptability of emerging life sciences technologies. After depicting the increasing duality that characterizes modern technologies, this chapter examines two different meanings of human dignity: the classical meaning that refers to the inherent worth of every individual, and the more recent understanding of this notion that refers to the integrity and identity of humankind, including future generations. The close connection between human dignity and human rights is outlined, as well as the key-role of dignity in international human rights law, and very especially in the human rights instruments relating to bioethics. The chapter concludes by briefly presenting the challenges to human dignity and human rights posed by neurotechnologies and germline gene editing technologies.

Technology has been at the heart of our species since the dawn of mankind. The genus homo, to which we all belong, split from a common hominin ancestor about 7 million years ago. This means ‘yesterday’ in geological time: if life on Earth were a 24-hour day, the genus homo would have inhabited this planet for only a couple of minutes. This recency is attested by our genetic heritage as our DNA is 98.8% identical to that of chimpanzees. In this relatively short time, our species and our species’ proximal ancestors established a dynamic and creative relationship with their environment. In particular, they developed the ability to modify their environment with the goal of developing technological tools by means of which they could, in turn, further modify that environment in a more radical and transformative way and thereby even modify themselves. We call ‘technology’ any product of human (and also, in principle, other species’) labor resulting in physical systems that would not be present in the natural environment in the absence of such labor. It has been estimated that as early as 3.4 million years ago, our remote ancestor Australopithecus afarensis, a small-brained early hominin species, used stone tools to separate meat from the bones of large mammals.

Conventional medical ethics, medical law and human rights protect us against the technological manipulation of our bodies, in part through recognising and enforcing a right to bodily integrity. In this chapter, we will explore the possibility of that we might also protect ourselves against the technological manipulation of our minds through recognising an analogous right to mental integrity. In the first part of the chapter, we describe some of the recent developments in the areas of persuasive and monitoring technologies, and how they are currently being used, e.g., in criminal justice and on the internet. In the second part we survey existing and proposed novel human rights law relevant to mental integrity. In the third part we argue that, though the right to mental integrity has thus far particularly been debated regarding neurointerventions, it would also apply to at least some persuasive and monitoring technologies. Finally, fourth, we consider how existing (i) law and (ii) philosophical scholarship might help to resolve the thony question of which persuasive and monitoring technologies would infringe the right to mental integrity.

Human beings are technical beings. Their lives cannot be accomplished without technique. At the end of modernity, the symbiosis between science and technique has become so tight that we can now speak of technoscience that gives us more power and responsibility than simple traditional techniques, as in the case of the new biotechnologies. In this chapter we offer a critical reflection on the two major anthropotechnical proposals, that is, the bio-project and the info-project and present arguments and criteria crucial to human rights development and their relevance for an adequate technological humanism. More concretely, we carry out a philosophical analysis of the importance of responsibility for safeguarding the duties of future generations and a non-dualistic anthropology. We also highlight the relevance of societal responsibility, care and solidarity in making the impossible detachment of human beings from technology an opportunity to develop a fruitful debate on human rights based on a deeper understanding of human beings’ relational nature.

This chapter discusses the right to have a child in the context of the latest developments of the reproductive technologies. According to the author, while no one can be legitimately deprived of the right to have a child, this statement does not equate to claiming a positive right to have a child. This question has become more complicated since the first in vitro baby was born in 1978 and as more and more new reproductive technologies have been developed since then. In particular, ethical dilemmas emerge when in vitro fertilization involves donated gametes, or when the intending mother needs a surrogate mother because she does not have a womb. Legal regulations of surrogacy agreements vary from total ban to acceptance, or simply remain silent on their legitimacy. In this diverse legal landscape, Sandor discusses on the ethical legal framework of the claims to have access to the latest reproductive services, including those technologies that replace or transplant the human womb.

This chapter proposes using Artificial Intelligence (AI) to reposition the place of the child in society. Advancements in digital technology and applied statistical analysis offer an opportunity to dislodge the largely entrenched view of the child as an inferior rights holder. As currently positioned, the child’s power is derived from the parent(s) or legal guardian(s). This currently accepted derivative power structure limits the child’s autonomy to wield power independently from the parent. This structure was successful in the past. However, technological advances and the modern child’s dependence on digital resources requires a re-examination of this parent-based derivative power structure. Parents may now have less capability to perform protective and preparatory duties owed to children in the digital context. An analysis of the parent as gatekeeper for participatory rights in the modern digital context is critiqued and the ability of AI to alleviate this problem is proposed.

Freedom of expression and association are at once themselves fundamental human rights and also necessary for the promotion and protection of other rights. In many contexts, anonymity is essential for the realization of these rights, affording citizens the ability to speak without fear of retribution. Yet while there is a growing acknowledgement of the importance that anonymity plays in enabling free expression and association in the online world, debates about the right to remain anonymous in the physical world are lagging behind.

This handbook intends to offer a comprehensive and authoritative overview of the human rights implications of emerging technologies in the fields of life sciences and information and communication technologies (ICT). To this end, the volume brings together leading experts whose expertise encompasses several disciplinary domains (law, ethics, technology, basic science, medicine, business etc.) with the purpose of gathering extensive multidisciplinary knowledge about the evolutive transformation of the human rights framework in response to technological innovation.

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted that leveraging medical big data can help to better predict and control outbreaks from the outset. However, there are still challenges to overcome in the 21st century to efficiently use medical big data, promote innovation and public health activities and adequately protect individuals’ privacy. The metaphor that property is a “bundle of sticks” applies equally to medical big data. Understanding medical big data in this way raises a number of questions, including: Who has the right to make money off its buying and selling, or is it inalienable? When does medical big data become sufficiently stripped of identifiers that the rights of an individual concerning the data disappear? How have different regimes such as the General Data Protection Regulation in Europe and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act in the US answered these questions differently? In this chapter, we will discuss three topics: (1) privacy and data sharing, (2) informed consent, and (3) ownership.

Robotic technologies have shown to have clear potential for providing innovation in treatments and treatment modalities for various diseases and disorders that cover unmet needs and are cost-efficient. However, the emergence of technology that promises to improve health outcomes raises the question regarding the extent to which it should be incorporated, how, made available to whom, and on what basis. Since countries usually have limited resources to favour access to state-of-the-art technologies and develop strategies to realize the right to health progressively, in this article, we investigate whether the right to health, particularly the core obligations specified under this right, helps implement medical robots.

Digital government has enabled the automation of numerous public services and improved the efficiency and openness of the public administration. Nevertheless, for senior citizens, undeserved communities, individuals with low literacy and limited digital skills, the shift to governmental portals, online payments, and smartphone applications remain considerable obstacles to their daily interactions with public authorities. Drawing on a review of interdisciplinary literature, this chapter contributes to the legal literature with an account of the underlying causes of digital exclusion and a discussion of its most relevant legal implications through the lenses of fundamental rights (e.g., due process, equal treatment) and the principles of good administration.

This chapter analyses rights in the context of reproductive technology. It begins by examining the evolving nature of reproductive rights, situating reproductive rights within broader debates over health and human rights. The chapter also explores the role of developments in assisted reproductive technology in shaping debates over rights. In analysing the evolution of rights in the context of assisted reproduction, the chapter explores: the role of ethics in regulatory debates over assisted reproduction; the issue of access to assisted reproduction; and the globalisation of health care, including health tourism, and its relevance for assisted reproduction. The analysis of each of these areas will include consideration of the role of law in defining reproductive rights.

Since the CJEU’s ruling of May 2014 in the Google Spain case (also known as the Costeja case), the “right to be forgotten” on the internet has been hotly debated in Europe and beyond. The Court in Strasbourg has been reluctant so far in upholding erasure or anonymisation of news archives (or parts of them), but it suggested that ‘less restrictive measures’ might be tolerable. The latter arguably enables one to tailor approaches to what the balancing requires in individual cases.