One of the key challenges of regulating internet platforms is international cooperation. This chapter offers some insights into platform responsibility reforms by relying on forty years of experience in regulating cross-border financial institutions. Internet platforms and cross-border banks have much in common from a regulatory perspective. They both operate in an interconnected global market that lacks a supranational regulatory framework. And they also tend to generate cross-border spillovers that are difficult to control. Harmful content and systemic risks – the two key regulatory challenges for platforms and banks, respectively – can be conceptualized as negative externalities.

One of the main lessons learned in regulating cross-border banks is that, under certain conditions, international regulatory cooperation is possible. We have witnessed that in the successful design and implementation of the Basel Accord – the global banking standard that regulates banks’ solvency and liquidity risks. In this chapter, I will analyze the conditions under which cooperation can ensue and what the history of the Basel Accord can teach to platform responsibility reforms. In the last part, I will discuss what can be done when cooperation is more challenging.

The conditional legal immunity for hosting unlawful content (safe harbour) provided by Section 79 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) is central to the regulation of online platforms in India for two reasons. First, absent this immunity, platforms in India risk being secondarily liable for a wide range of civil and criminal offences. Second, the Indian Government has recognised that legal immunity for user-generated content is key to platform operations and has sought to regulate platform behaviour by prescribing several pre-conditions to safe harbour. This chapter examines the different obligations set out in the Intermediary Guidelines and evaluates the efforts of the Indian government to regulate platform behaviour in India through the pre-conditions for safe harbour. This chapter finds that the obligations set out in the Intermediary Guidelines are enforced in a patchwork and inconsistent manner through courts. However, the Indian Government retains powerful controls over content and platform behaviour by virtue of its power to block content under Section 69A of the IT Act and the ability to impose personal liability on platform employees within India.

This paper considers the goals of regulators in different countries working on regulating online platforms and how those varied motivations influence the potential for international coordination and cooperation on platform governance. different policy debates and goals surrounding online platform responsibility. The analysis identifies different policy goals related to three different types of obligations that regulators may impose on online platforms: responsibilities to target particular categories of unwanted content, responsibilities for platforms that wield particularly significant influence, and responsibilities to be transparent about platform decision-making. Reviewing the proposals that have emerged in each of these categories across different countries, the paper examines which of these three policy goals present the greatest opportunities for international coordination and agreement and which of them actually require such coordination in order to be effectively implemented. Finally, it considers what lessons can be drawn from existing policy efforts for how to foster greater coordination around areas of common interest related to online platforms.

This paper summarizes the United States’ legal framework governing Internet “platforms” that publish third-party content. It highlights three key features of U.S. law: the constitutional protections for free speech and press, the statutory immunity provided by 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”), and the limits on state regulation of the Internet. It also discusses US efforts to impose mandatory transparency obligations on Internet “platforms.”

Like information disseminated through online platforms, infectious diseases can cross international borders as they track the movement of people (and sometimes animals and goods) and spread globally. Hence, their control and management have major implications for international relations, and international law. Drawing on this analogy, this chapter looks to global health governance to formulate suggestions for the governance of online platforms. Successes in global health governance suggest that the principle of tackling low-hanging fruit first to build trust and momentum towards more challenging goals may extend to online platform governance. Progress beyond the low-hanging fruit appears more challenging: For one, disagreement on the issue of resource allocation in the online platform setting may lead to “outbreaks” of disinformation being relegated to regions of the world that may not be at the top of online platforms’ market priorities lists. Secondly, while there may be wide consensus on the harms of infectious disease outbreaks, the harms from the spread of disinformation are more contested. Relying on national definitions of disinformation would hardly yield coherent international cooperation. Global health governance would thus suggest that an internationally negotiated agreement on standards as it relates to disinformation may be necessary.

In order to manage the issue of diversity of regulatory vision, States may, to some extent, harmonize substantive regulation—eliminating diversity. This is less likely than States determining unilaterally or multilaterally to develop manageable rules of jurisdiction, so that their regulation applies only in limited circumstances. The fullest realization of this “choice of law” solution would involve geoblocking or other technology that divides up regulatory authority according to a specified, and a perhaps agreed, principle. Geoblocking may be costly and ultimately porous, but it would allow different communities to effectuate their different visions of the good in the platform context. To the extent that the principles of jurisdiction are agreed, and are structured to be exclusive, platforms would have the certainty of knowing the requirements under which they must operate in each market. Of course, different communities may remain territorial states, but given the a-territorial nature of the internet, it may be possible for other divisions of authority and responsibility to develop. Cultural affinity, or political perspective, may be more compelling as an organizational principle to some than territorial co-location.

On October 27, 2022, the Digital Services Act (DSA) was published in the Official Journal of the European Union (EU). The DSA, which has been portrayed as the Europe’s new “Digital Constitution”, sets out a cross-sector regulatory framework for online services and regulates the responsibility of online intermediaries for illegal content. Against this background, this chapters provides a brief overview of recent regulatory developments regarding platform responsibility in the EU. The chapter seeks to add a European perspective to the global debate about platform regulation. Section 3.1 provides an overview of the regulatory framework in the EU and recent legislative developments. Section 3.2 analyses different approaches regarding the enforcement of rules on platform responsibility. Section 3.3 takes a closer look at the regulation of content moderation by digital platforms in the EU. Finally, Section 3.4 adds some observations on the international effects of EU rules on platform responsibility.

While the social media and digital platforms started with an objective to enhance social connectivity and information sharing, they also present a significant challenge in content moderation resulting in spreading disinformation. Disinformation Paradox is a phenomenon where an attempt to regulate harmful content online can inadvertently amplifies it. The social media platforms often serve as breeding grounds for disinformation. This chapter discusses the inherent difficulties in moderating content at a large scale, different responses of these platforms and potential solutions.

This chapter examines China’s approach to platform responsibility for content moderation. It notes that China’s approach is rooted in its overarching goal of public opinion management, which requires platforms to proactively monitor, moderate, and sometimes censor content, especially politically sensitive content. Despite its patchy and iterative approach, China’s platform regulation is consistent and marked by its distinct characteristics, embodied in its defining of illegal and harmful content, its heavy platform obligations, and its strong reliance on administrative enforcement measures. China’s approach reflects its authoritarian nature and the asymmetrical power relations between the government and private platforms. This chapter also provides a nuanced understanding of China’s approach to platform responsibility, including Chinese platforms’ "conditional liability" for tort damages and the regulators’ growing emphasis on user protection and personal information privacy. This chapter includes a case study on TikTok that shows the interplay between the Chinese approach, oversees laws and regulations and the Chinese online platform’s content moderation practices.