In this chapter, the law scholar Ralf Poscher sets out to show how AI challenges the traditional understanding of the right to data protection and presents an outline of an alternative conception that better deals with emerging AI technologies. Firstly, Poscher explains how the traditional conceptualisation of data protection as an independent fundamental right on its own collides with AI’s technological development, given that AI systems do not provide the kind of transparency required by the traditional approach. Secondly, the author proposes an alternative model, a no-right thesis, which shifts the focus from data protection as an independent right to other existing fundamental rights, such as liberty and equality. He argues that this allows us to step back from the idea that each and every instance of personal data processing concerns a fundamental right. Instead, it is important to assess how an AI system ‘behaves’, what type of risks it generates, and which substantive fundamental rights are being affected.

In this chapter, the law scholar Jan von Hein analyses and evaluates the European Parliament’s proposal on a civil liability regime for artificial intelligence against the background of the already existing European regulatory framework on private international law, in particular the Rome I and II Regulations. The draft regulation (DR) proposed by the European Parliament is noteworthy from a private international law perspective because it introduces new conflicts rules for AI. In this regard, the proposed regulation distinguishes between a rule delineating the spatial scope of its autonomous rules on strict liability for high-risk AI systems (Article 2 DR) on the one hand, and a rule on the law applicable to fault-based liability for low-risk systems (Article 9 DR) on the other hand. The latter rule refers to the domestic laws of the Member State in which the harm or damage occurred. In sum, compared with Rome II, the conflicts approach of the draft regulation would be a regrettable step backwards in many ways.

The law scholars Weixing Shen and Yun Liu focus on China’s efforts in the field of AI regulation and spell out recent legislative actions. While there is no unified AI law today in China, many provisions from Chinese data protection law are in part applicable to AI systems. The authors particularly analyse the rights and obligations from the Chinese Data Security Law, the Chinese Civil Code, the E-Commerce Law, and the Personal Information Protection Law and explain the relevance of these regulations with regard to responsible AI and algorithm governance. The authors introduce as well the Draft Regulation in Internet Information Service Based on Algorithm Recommendation Technology. This adopts many AI specific principles such as transparency, fairness, and reasonableness. Regarding the widely discussed field of facial recognition by AI systems, they introduce a Draft Regulation, and a judicial Opinion by the Supreme People’s Court of China. Finally, Weixing Shen and Yun Liu refer to the AI Act proposed by the European Commission, which could also inspire future Chinese regulatory approaches.

In this chapter, the law scholar Christine Wendehorst analyses the different potential risks posed by AI as part of two main categories, safety risks and fundamental rights risks. Based on this, the author considers why AI challenges existing liability regimes. She spells out the main solutions put forward so far and evaluates them. This chapter highlights the fact that liability for fundamental rights risks is largely unchartered while being AI-specific. Such risks are now being addressed at the level of AI safety law, by way of prohibiting certain AI practices and by imposing strict legal requirements concerning data governance, transparency, and human oversight. Wendehorst nevertheless argues that a number of changes have to be made for the emerging AI safety regime to be used as a ‘backbone’ for the future AI liability regime if this is going to help address liability for fundamental rights risks. As a result, she suggests that further negotiations about the AI Act proposed by the European Commission should be closely aligned with the preparatory work on a future AI liability regime.

In this chapter, the philosopher Thomas Metzinger lists five main problem domains related to AI systems. For each problem field, he proposes several measures which should be taken. Firstly, there should be worldwide safety standards concerning the research and development of AI. If not, Metzinger fears a ‘race to the bottom’ in safety standards. Additionally, a possible AI arms race must be prevented as early as possible. Thirdly, he stresses that any creation of artificial consciousness should be avoided, as it is highly problematic from an ethical point of view. He argues that synthetic phenomenology could lead to non-biological forms of suffering and might lead to a vast increase of suffering in the universe, as AI can be copied rapidly. While AI might improve different kinds of governance, there is the risk of unknown risks, the ‘unknown unknowns’. Accordingly, as a fourth problem domain, the author proposes allocating resources to research and prepare for unexpected and long-term risks. Finally, Metzinger highlights the need for a concrete code of ethical conduct for anyone researching AI.

Introduction, synopsis, and acknowledgments.