Chapter 4 introduces the second regiment in this study, the 2nd Texas Infantry. It describes its founding and officers, largely representative of the Texas elite. Like the Fire Zouaves, white male Texans had a reputation for bravery, so the expectations that they would make good and courageous soldiers were equally high. But there were signs of problems even in their early days, including discontent by some of their leaders and concerns over supplies. The chapter ends with the regiment hurriedly rushing to the front for expected battle.

Although the 13 United States courts of appeals are the final word on 99 percent of all federal cases, there is no detailed account of how these courts operate. How do judges decide which decisions are binding precedents and which are not? Who decides whether appeals are argued orally? What administrative structures do these courts have? The answers to these and hundreds of other questions are largely unknown, not only to lawyers and legal academics but also to many within the judiciary itself. Written and Unwritten is the first book to provide an inside look at how these courts operate. An unprecedented contribution to the field of judicial administration, the book collects the differing local rules and internal procedures of each court of appeals. In-depth interviews of the chief judges of all 13 circuits and surveys of all clerks of court reveal previously undisclosed practices and customs.

Although the 13 United States courts of appeals are the final word on 99 percent of all federal cases, there is no detailed account of how these courts operate. How do judges decide which decisions are binding precedents and which are not? Who decides whether appeals are argued orally? What administrative structures do these courts have? The answers to these and hundreds of other questions are largely unknown, not only to lawyers and legal academics but also to many within the judiciary itself. Written and Unwritten is the first book to provide an inside look at how these courts operate. An unprecedented contribution to the field of judicial administration, the book collects the differing local rules and internal procedures of each court of appeals. In-depth interviews of the chief judges of all 13 circuits and surveys of all clerks of court reveal previously undisclosed practices and customs.

Chapter 1 sets up the founding of the 11th New York and the heightened expectations put upon them from the start. It introduces their famed colonel, Elmer E. Ellsworth, who had dreams of reinventing the citizen soldiery with his Zouave drill. But he found that converting boisterous firemen into disciplined soldiers was not quite as easy as he had anticipated. Ellsworth struggled with challenges to his authority and harsh public scrutiny. The chapter ends just as the Fire Zouaves receive orders to embark for Alexandria, confident that success on the battlefield beckoned.

Chapter 3 assesses the effects of the defeat at Bull Run and how the Fire Zouaves became scapegoats for the Union loss. Despite efforts to defend themselves, the regiment imploded, formally disbanded in June 1862. Their demise demonstrated that brave men did not (and do not) always make effective and good soldiers.

Originally established by “we the people,” as its preamble majestically states, the Constitution belongs to us all. But Americans increasingly treat it as the property of one political faction or the other. In keeping with their own preferences, conservatives interpret the Constitution to protect religion, limit gun control, and obstruct administrative governance while allowing state-level regulation of moral questions like abortion. Progressives see a mirror-image constitution that advances social justice, confers broad federal power, and allows flexible administrative regulation while at the same time limiting state and local police authority and guaranteeing sexual and reproductive autonomy. As national politics have grown ever more divided and polarized, preventing either side from implementing its goals through federal legislation, both coalitions have dreamed of capturing the courts and implementing their vision instead through constitutional interpretation. A document that should be a source of unity and shared commitments has become a vehicle for extending political conflict.

The current constitutional partisanship is bad for courts because it undermines the apolitical commitment to law on which their authority depends. It is bad for the Constitution because it converts protections that should be points of unity into vectors of division. And it is bad for the polity because it risks undermining consensus support for the basic ground rules that a functioning political process requires. To interrupt this trend and forestall these bad outcomes, judges should embrace what this book calls constitutional symmetry.

Chapter 6 delves deeper into how the anger rule affects Black political decision-making by extending our analysis to three adult national samples of Black Americans. We investigate how Black Americans evaluate a Black and white male politician’s expression of anger. We expect Black Americans to abide by the anger rule in spaces controlled by whites. In our first experimental study, Black Americans evaluate a Black or white Democratic politician running for United States Senate. The results show some evidence that Black Americans are more supportive of a non-angry Black politician relative to an angry Black politician and an angry white politician. In the second study, we provide a clearer signal of the racial makeup of the voting population – majority Black or white Congressional district. We find that Black Americans only reward a non-angry Black politician relative to an angry Black politician when running in a majority white congressional district. Black Americans do not prefer this type of Black politician running in a majority Black congressional district. In the third study, we show that when Black Americans are encouraged to express anger, they gravitate toward politics challenging their group’s status.

Although the 13 United States courts of appeals are the final word on 99 percent of all federal cases, there is no detailed account of how these courts operate. How do judges decide which decisions are binding precedents and which are not? Who decides whether appeals are argued orally? What administrative structures do these courts have? The answers to these and hundreds of other questions are largely unknown, not only to lawyers and legal academics but also to many within the judiciary itself. Written and Unwritten is the first book to provide an inside look at how these courts operate. An unprecedented contribution to the field of judicial administration, the book collects the differing local rules and internal procedures of each court of appeals. In-depth interviews of the chief judges of all 13 circuits and surveys of all clerks of court reveal previously undisclosed practices and customs.

Our final chapter puts all of the results together and explores their implications. We revisit our argument in relation to our findings of how the “anger rule” sustains group-based inequality between Black and white Americans. We take up how the anger rule can apply to other groups in American society and hampers their ability to fight against injustice. We also evaluate spaces (e.g., counter-public) these groups have had to operate in to express themselves emotionally and challenge their group’s status.

Chapter 4 investigates if whites apply an “anger penalty” to a Black politician relative to a white politician. We examine if an angry Black Democrat politician is racially handicapped among racially prejudiced whites. We test our predictions using several survey experiments on adult national samples of whites. We uncover evidence of an anger penalty in that racially prejudiced whites evaluate an angry Black Democrat politician more unfavorably than a non-angry Black Democrat politician and an angry white Democrat politician. Additionally, we find a similar effect among whites oriented to supporting group-based social hierarchies (i.e., having a social dominance orientation). In another study, we examine if this anger penalty depends on the issue. We expect an anger penalty is greater when the issue implicates Black Americans than if it is unrelated to the group. The findings show that racially prejudiced whites penalize a Black politician only when the anger is related to a racialized issue and not when the issue is unrelated to race. In our final experimental study, we examine whether a Black female politician’s anger is treated differently than a Black male’s; the anger penalty does not appear to be conditioned on gender.