This chapter examines Daniel Boorstin’s contention that historically Americans’ special genius grew from taking a practical, nonideological approach to politics and government. For Boorstin, this approach allowed Americans, unfettered by ideology, to react to changing circumstances with deliberation and confidence. Boorstin argued that even the American Civil War was a nonideological conflict, emerging from a practical sectional disagreement over the need to manage the slavery question. Since Boorstin, scholarship has revealed that he failed to grasp the ideological nature of American politics in the Age of Civil War and the conflicting ideologies that drove North and South to war. Given the horrific conflict, the sweeping nature of emancipation, and the promise, later abandoned, of full citizenship to African Americans, how can the nation now have confidence that the political “genius” of American politics can survive the current era of polarization and disillusionment?

This chapter reviews the leading explanations for the creation of the US “New Navy” and then proposes the book’s core argument: that US naval expansion in the 1880s and 1890s was disproportionately a reaction to the Pacific’s navies and their wars. In a regional context, the US New Navy was one among many newly made, industrial fleets racing for security and prestige. The Introduction then explains the implications of this thesis for historical accounts of the “Pacific World,” US Empire, and military technological development. It concludes with a chapter outline of the book.

The Conclusion emphasizes the book’s primary argument, that its proposed system of means-based adjustments to the tax compliance rules would more effectively deter tax avoidance and evasion by the rich than would reforms focused solely on increasing the IRS’s funding or on rules targeting specific potentially abusive activities. It notes that the book has provided four practical applications of this approach – as adjustments to tax penalties, penalty defenses, the statute of limitations, and information reporting – but that these examples are just the beginning. The book concludes that its analysis and new approach to tax administration should be relevant to legislators and other tax policymakers, scholars of both tax law and progressivity, and federal and state tax administrators.

This chapter outlines the advantages and limitations of both third-party and first-party reporting requirements. We begin by evaluating the Biden Administration’s 2021 bank information reporting proposal as an example of a third-party information reporting reform. Then, we provide a model for introducing first-party information reporting from high-end taxpayers regarding their finances through an annual wealth reporting form, which we call the Annual Net Asset Statement. Next, we introduce a hybrid system that incorporates both first- and third-party information reporting and explain how this system would have offered an alternative approach to the Biden Administration’s proposal for reporting inflows and outflows from financial accounts. Finally, we describe how this framework can help improve the tailoring of penalties for noncompliance in two areas: with information-reporting obligations, and in the use of audit resources. We explain how a means-adjusted approach can improve the operation of these information-reporting rules and complement the activity-based focus in current law.

The Introduction sets the stage by describing the intense focus on abusive tax avoidance and tax evasion by the rich among political figures, legal scholars, and the general public. The Introduction also describes the stakes for the tax system in addressing high-end tax noncompliance. It then provides an overview of two conventional approaches to the problem of high-end tax noncompliance: increasing IRS funding and “activity-based rules” targeting specific strategies that enable tax avoidance and evasion. The Introduction describes the book’s argument that both of these responses are incomplete solutions. It then describes the overlooked role that tax compliance rules – which govern critical aspects of tax administration and enforcement but that currently apply to all taxpayers without regard to their income or wealth – play in enabling tax avoidance and evasion by the rich. The Introduction provides a summary of the core argument and contribution of the book: that policymakers should introduce a system of means-based adjustments to the tax compliance rules for high-end taxpayers.

This chapter addresses the weaknesses of tax penalties in current law as deterrents of high-end tax noncompliance and describes how Congress could introduce tax penalties that vary depending upon taxpayers’ means. The chapter begins with a discussion of the possible motivations for individual tax compliance, including potential adverse consequences of noncompliance and, specifically, civil tax penalties. It then considers why current civil tax penalties often fail to deter high-end tax noncompliance. Finally, the chapter presents means-adjusted tax penalties as a new approach to the design of civil tax penalties, illustrates this approach with several examples, and addresses additional concerns.

How much tax revenue is lost each year as a result of noncompliance? How much of this lost revenue is from the richest taxpayers? How do the rich avoid paying taxes and why does it matter? This chapter considers these basic and important questions. The answers explain our motivation for writing this book and provide a starting point for the arguments that follow. This discussion also begins to explain why this book focuses on high-end tax noncompliance as a distinct challenge for the tax system. To answer these questions, we begin by describing exactly what we mean by tax noncompliance. The discussion then presents research findings on the scope of tax noncompliance and how it is shared across the income distribution. It then explains how high-end taxpayers can often avoid paying the taxes they owe by taking advantage of strategies that are not available to low- and middle-income taxpayers. Finally, we discuss why high-end noncompliance is harmful to the tax system, and why policymakers should treat it as a pressing challenge.

Policymakers face many design possibilities when implementing means-adjusted tax compliance rules. This chapter serves as the bridge from theory to legal design. We begin this transition by identifying some of the key design considerations that policymakers should take into account when attempting to introduce means adjustments to the tax compliance rules. In general, we propose means adjustments to certain tax compliance rules that favor high-end taxpayers when they are applied the same to everyone. These adjustments should also be designed to preserve core prerequisites of procedural fairness, and should also include an underpayment-based threshold to exempt less consequential tax offenses from these heightened tax compliance rules.

The introduction chapter lays the groundwork for understanding the intricate relationship between Congress and information acquisition, particularly through committee hearings and witness testimonies. Highlighting the pivotal role of information in shaping legislative decisions, the chapter probes into the challenges faced by Congress in navigating the complex landscape of external expertise within a politically charged environment. The chapter delves into the critical questions driving the book’s exploration: How does Congress acquire information, and what factors influence the selection and content of information provided by external witnesses? It introduces the overarching themes of partisan incentives, institutional conditions, and the strategic nature of information acquisition, aiming to dissect their impact on legislative processes. By providing a comprehensive overview of the book’s scope, methodology, and key theoretical insights, the introduction sets the tone for a deep dive into the dynamics of congressional information-seeking behavior.