The introduction chapter lays the groundwork for understanding the intricate relationship between Congress and information acquisition, particularly through committee hearings and witness testimonies. Highlighting the pivotal role of information in shaping legislative decisions, the chapter probes into the challenges faced by Congress in navigating the complex landscape of external expertise within a politically charged environment. The chapter delves into the critical questions driving the book’s exploration: How does Congress acquire information, and what factors influence the selection and content of information provided by external witnesses? It introduces the overarching themes of partisan incentives, institutional conditions, and the strategic nature of information acquisition, aiming to dissect their impact on legislative processes. By providing a comprehensive overview of the book’s scope, methodology, and key theoretical insights, the introduction sets the tone for a deep dive into the dynamics of congressional information-seeking behavior.

In this chapter, we examine how the politics of interbranch relations between the legislature and the bureaucracy affect the invitation of bureaucratic witnesses to hearings and how Congress can use hearings to control executive branch influence. We focus on the presence of divided government – when the party controlling Congress is not the party that controls the White House. We find that during periods of divided government, committees invited relatively fewer bureaucrats to testify; instead, they invited relatively more witnesses from think tanks, universities, and within Congress itself. This result is particularly pronounced when hearings were held on issues that the president prioritized. These findings are substantively important, especially given how the existing literature has characterized bureaucrats’ advantages in information and expertise in policy implementation vis-à-vis Congress. We provide evidence that under divided government, committees limited the amount of expert information from the executive branch that could be favorable to a president from the opposing party and instead welcomed outsiders to compensate for the relative loss of information from bureaucrats.

This chapter addresses the role of tax advice in encouraging aggressive and abusive tax planning by high-end taxpayers. It begins with a discussion of the different roles of tax advice, one of which is its use as a form of tax penalty insurance. The chapter then shows how the rich benefit disproportionately from the ability to avoid penalties through tax advice. After describing these effects, we offer a proposal for incorporating means adjustments into the tax penalty defense rules, focusing specifically on tax advice, and we respond to potential objections and concerns.

Chapter 7 scrutinizes how Congress’s internal resources impact the quantity and quality of information received by committees. Amid concerns over diminishing congressional capacity and the waning role of support agencies, the chapter explores the repercussions of downsizing initiatives – such as the elimination of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) – on committee information channels. Employing a difference-in-differences research design, the study reveals a stark decline in technical and scientific witnesses invited by committees heavily reliant on internally produced information post-OTA elimination. The findings underscore the critical role of robust congressional capacity in summoning research-based witnesses, emphasizing its pivotal significance in ensuring legislators’ access to vital scientific and technical insights.

This chapter considers how the statute of limitations can enable high-end tax noncompliance and prevent the IRS from challenging tax positions of high-end taxpayers. The chapter begins by describing the statute of limitations on tax assessment and the rationale underlying its design, which is followed by an explanation of how it encourages and facilitates abusive tax avoidance by high-end taxpayers. Following this discussion, we present a proposal for incorporating means adjustments into the statute of limitations in order to level the playing field between high-end taxpayers and the IRS.

This chapter explains the methodological approach behind the measurement of analytical information in witness testimonies. Focusing on House hearings from the 105th through 114th Congresses, the methodological approach quantifies technical information relevant to policymaking – analytical information – and shows how witness affiliations can capture meaningful differences in the amount of analytical information that witnesses provide Congress in committee hearings. Bureaucrats and research-affiliated witnesses excel in delivering analytical testimony, while citizens and religious institution representatives provide the least. The patterns in this chapter demonstrate that not all testimony provides the same type of information and that committees may receive different amounts of analytical information depending on the types of witnesses they invite. Taken together, the findings and patterns illustrated in this chapter motivate our argument that the composition of witnesses has important implications for committees, as witness invitations not only indicate from whom committees choose to hear but also signify the different types of information committees may ultimately receive.

This chapter turns to the structure of the tax compliance system and how it attempts to address high-end noncompliance. It begins by situating the tax compliance rules within the broader tax system. The discussion considers what they share with all tax rules and what sets them apart. The following sections begin a more detailed dive into the structure of the tax compliance system. After addressing what motivates taxpayers to comply with the tax law, the discussion considers the main components of the tax compliance system, and how these components leverage taxpayer motivations to improve compliance. With this important context on the tax compliance system established, the discussion then returns to the challenges of high-end noncompliance. The final part of this chapter describes the two most prominent approaches in current law and reform proposals. The first general approach is to increase funding of the Internal Revenue Service so it can more effectively deter noncompliance and recover unpaid taxes. The second general approach is what this book terms “activity-based” rules, targeting the specific taxpayer activities that can either indicate or enable tax noncompliance.

This chapter introduces a novel dataset encompassing 731,810 witnesses across 74,077 House, Senate, and Joint standing committee hearings held between 1961 and 2018. The dataset includes comprehensive details such as witness names, organizational affiliations, hearing summaries, committee titles, dates, and bill numbers discussed. The chapter describes the meticulous construction process, emphasizing the extraction of key variables focusing on witness affiliations, affiliation type, and gender. With eighteen categorized affiliation types and nine broader parent categories, this classification captures the diverse spectrum of external groups represented in congressional hearings. The chapter also provides rich descriptive statistics on hearings and witness over time and across committees.

Chapter 5 examines the intent for a legislative hearing and how it affects a committee’s selection of witnesses. Committees, guided by the partisan goals of the committee chair, seek different types of information depending on whether they are considering specific bills in hearings. When the chair has not yet advanced a bill through the committee process, it gives the committee more political flexibility to hear from those who can provide expertise in policy development. Consistent with this argument, we show that committees turned to think tanks, universities, and bureaucrats – witnesses who can provide more analytical information – at higher rates for hearings without a bill (nonreferral hearings), when committees hearings to learn about an issue area. Committees tended to invite witnesses from mass-based groups, such as labor unions, trade associations, and membership associations, at higher rates for hearings on a specific bill (referral hearings). Different witness compositions between referral and nonreferral hearings suggest strategic choices of the identities of witnesses and thus the types of information that the committee hearing generates.

This chapter describes two areas of legal theory that consider when means-based adjustments to legal rules may not be desirable. Under one perspective, means-based adjustments designed for redistributive purposes should be reserved for the tax system alone, since introducing means-based adjustments to other legal rules would entail greater efficiency costs. A second literature considers the desirability of a legal system that is impartial, nondiscriminatory, and general in its application. Subjecting taxpayers to different legal rules based on means could also undermine these important criteria. This chapter considers how means-based adjustments to the tax compliance rules should be evaluated from each of these perspectives, and why they would be justified even in cases where means-based adjustments to other legal rules would not be.

What are the weaknesses of the current tax compliance rules, and how can these rules more effectively address the challenge of high-end tax noncompliance? This chapter first describes the limitations of the traditional responses to tax noncompliance in the law and in prominent reform proposals. It then introduces a new approach: a system of means-adjusted tax compliance rules. As we argue, this approach can both complement the traditional responses to noncompliance and counter their limitations to build a more robust and effective tax compliance system. The final section of this chapter describes how introducing means adjustments to the tax compliance rules would not be a radically new direction for tax reform, but rather an extension and rationalization of principles that are already embedded in the current tax law.

Tax-information reporting is an essential element of the tax compliance system. Despite the power of tax-information reporting to maximize the IRS’s ability to collect taxes owed, these rules also contain significant gaps. High-end taxpayers can often earn their income through transactions that do not require a third party to file tax-information reports with the IRS. This chapter demonstrates how the activity-based approach to information reporting often allows high-end taxpayers to engage in noncompliance with the tax law, while other taxpayers face significant automatic IRS scrutiny. It also shows that the government’s approach to tax-information reporting applies almost exclusively to specific activities, ranging from methods of earning income to designated transactions. This approach is consistent with the government’s design of other tax compliance rules that apply to certain types of activities, such as the use of tax shelters, offshore bank accounts, and transactions lacking economic substance to avoid tax liability.