This brief chapter, closing Part I, concludes that the individual is procedurally involved in such contexts to a minor extent and offers reflections on the reasons for this. It discusses the culture of state-centrism at the Court, its passive approach to procedural mechanisms, and certain fears it likely has. The reasons are challenged in this chapter, which ends with a brief word on how transparency practices can also contribute to the further integration of individuals in the procedural law of the World Court.

This chapter argues that the implications of territorial disputes for individuals are seldom considered in the Court’s legal reasoning and proposes ways to do so. It first observes that the Court traditionally resolves territorial disputes with reference to a firm hierarchy of titles, few of which allow for the consideration of individuals. It then considers how the title of effectivités could potentially allow for the consideration of individuals and acknowledges that their rights and needs have been mentioned by the Court as an afterthought in certain judgments. It analyses the reasons for the Court’s approach and argues that the principle of equity could play a stronger role in allowing for the consideration of individuals in territorial disputes.

This chapter argues that while great strides have been made to humanise the law of diplomatic protection, its practice in the courtroom is not in alignment with this as the protected individual does not participate in proceedings. It first dismantles the famous Mavrommatis fiction and argues that other conditions for diplomatic protection (such as nationality and the exhaustion of local remedies) and its features (such as state discretion and state responsibility) have been increasingly humanised to place emphasis on the individual. Second, it analyses the case law to show how the individual does not participate in proceedings at the Peace Palace. Finally, it provides suggestions to advocate for stronger procedural participation for the injured individual in cases of diplomatic protection at the ICJ.

This chapter concludes that the individual is considered in the legal reasoning of the Court in the identified contexts to a minor extent and offers reflections on the reasons for this. It recapitulates reflections on formalism and stability that are key in maritime and territorial boundary disputes. It notes that the Court is correctly limited to the request of the parties and cannot innovate beyond their submissions. However, across all chapters it was observed that state litigants often raise concerns about individuals in their custody. It therefore challenges the Court’s judicial caution when faced with potentially developing international law in addressing state’s concerns. It argues that while the Court does not have a formal law-making function, it develops international law nonetheless through its interpretations and clarifications and should not hesitate to do so when clarification is sought by state litigants on matters relating to the affected individuals in such disputes.