The climate emergency is unfolding. Efforts to reduced greenhouse gas emissions globally, including the efforts of the European Union and the Member States, are severely insufficient to hold global warming below the 1.5°C temperature limit. In light of this public institutional failure, civil society actors increasingly resort to strategic climate litigation. However, the EU has very restrictive standing requirements for direct actions against general acts. Therefore, most strategic climate litigation is brought to national courts. In 2023 and 2024, national judges have in several cases allowed defendant states to use EU law as a shield against the litigants’ demands to declare national climate targets and policies insufficient. This Article argues that in light of the fact that EU climate policy is inadequate and nearly impossible to challenge, it is highly problematic when national judges accept EU law to be an obstacle to (full) judicial review. First, EU law itself is not an obstacle to judicial review of national climate policy. Second, the European Convention on Human Rights, read in light of KlimaSeniorinnen, imposes higher requirements on Member States than EU law. Third, the European Court of Human Rights would not accept the “EU law as a shield” argument.

This Article discusses the emerging strategic litigation practice in the European Union through the lens of participatory democracy. After situating such a practice both historically and conceptually within the specificities of the EU legal order, it explores whether and the extent to which strategic litigation, understood as an additional form of participation in the Union’s democratic life, may contribute to EU participatory democracy and under which conditions. It unveils that while strategic litigation carries the potential to enhance democratic participation in the EU, it also risks—due to limited judicial literacy and unequal access to justice—empowering those already powerful. For strategic litigation to unleash its democratic potential at scale, EU courts must—as required by the “Provisions on Democratic Principles” of the Treaty of Lisbon—ensure a participatory enabling environment capable of proactively catalyzing and facilitating the ability of ordinary citizens—as well as diffuse, under-resourced and traditionally overlooked groups—to be better able to contribute to the Union’s democratic life. Ultimately, no legal order worth of its name should rely on the heroism of its citizens and residents to keep its legal system in check.

Generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) has gained significant popularity in recent years. It is being integrated into a variety of sectors for its abilities in content creation, design, research, and many other functionalities. The capacity of GenAI to create new content—ranging from realistic images and videos to text and even computer code—has caught the attention of both the industry and the general public. The rise of publicly available platforms that offer these services has also made GenAI systems widely accessible, contributing to their mainstream appeal and dissemination. This article delves into the transformative potential and inherent challenges of incorporating GenAI into the domain of judicial decision-making. The article provides a critical examination of the legal and ethical implications that arise when GenAI is used in judicial rulings and their underlying rationale. While the adoption of this technology holds the promise of increased efficiency in the courtroom and expanded access to justice, it also introduces concerns regarding bias, interpretability, and accountability, thereby potentially undermining judicial discretion, the rule of law, and the safeguarding of rights. Around the world, judiciaries in different jurisdictions are taking different approaches to the use of GenAI in the courtroom. Through case studies of GenAI use by judges in jurisdictions including Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and India, this article maps out the challenges presented by integrating the technology in judicial determinations, and the risks of embracing it without proper guidelines for mitigating potential harms. Finally, this article develops a framework that promotes a more responsible and equitable use of GenAI in the judiciary, ensuring that the technology serves as a tool to protect rights, reduce risks, and ultimately, augment judicial reasoning and access to justice.

England and Wales have no public law libraries, so how does the general public find legal information? This article, written by Abi Reader, Assistant Librarian at Certara Predictive Technologies, provides a starting point in understanding the availability of publicly available legal information. It explores the intersection of two austerity measures, cuts to legal aid and public library spending, through searching public library catalogues for primary sources of law. Public libraries provide computers and internet access to search free online legal information sites but overall provide limited access to print law reports. This article is based on research presented at the 54th Annual BIALL Conference.

Appropriate Dispute Resolution (ADR) is rooted in Africa. However, this is not reflected in scholarship and practice. The last few decades have witnessed the supposed introduction of ADR in Africa, masquerading as an innovation imported from the USA and aiming to extend access to justice. This is a pure revisionism. While African communities rely on ADR to solve disputes, ADR epistemology has not developed in its scientific form. Hence, there is a dearth of literature on what emic unadulterated justice would look like in Africa. This article seeks to provide a framework for how to think about ADR in Africa by presenting five normative conceptions that are latent in African ADR: dispute avoidance; reconciliation; all-inclusive justice; consensus building; and matching disputes to the best process.

This paper calls for the lawyering profession – which is often viewed as unabridged – to be reframed into two distinct occupations: legal aid practice and private practice, to better incorporate the divisions in labour. In order to better understand contemporary legal aid work and its workers, the hidden realities must be unveiled from behind their private counterparts, which opposingly signify wealth, professionalism, autonomy and privilege. Set within a context of crumbling professional identities, a shrinking industry and financial constraints, the paper draws on ethnographic and interview data. It finds that those working in legal aid undoubtedly face a more stagnated, under-resourced and precarious working environment, which means that their professional experience is vastly different from their private counterparts. Likewise, those in the field face toxic narratives from the government, the media, the public, and their private counterparts alike, resulting in persistent discourse of vilification. Ultimately, it calls for a refocus of legal aid work as a separate vocation due to its altruistic underpinnings, unique ‘professional’ identity, and values.

Individuals routinely engage in instrumental transactional legal behavior, from generating tax returns to signing leases to negotiating employment terms. While some individuals undertake these activities equipped with the skills, knowledge, and capacity to behave strategically, others do not. In this article, we introduce the concept of legal actuation to describe this legal behavior and theorize its role as a source of inequality under the law. Using estate planning as an empirical example, we consider how variation in legal actuation may serve to reproduce economic inequalities and investigate the role of legal socialization, knowledge, and capability as mechanisms of advantage. In doing so, we draw attention to an understudied dimension of everyday legal behavior that has important implications for equal justice and the relationship between law and inequality.

Public interest lawyers seek to empower clients through collaborative approaches to direct representation that redistribute legal knowledge and affirm clients’ agency; however, the legal settings in which attorneys operate shape their capacity to subvert dynamics they consider oppressive. Based on twenty months of ethnographic fieldwork at a legal nonprofit serving asylum seekers in Los Angeles, this study explores how the broader environment of a restrictive immigration system transforms the aspirations, possibilities, and strategies of public interest lawyering. Drawing from sociolegal literature on cause lawyers, access to justice, and the U.S. immigration system, the article argues that the politicization of the U.S. immigration bureaucracy destabilizes foundational legal norms, hindering the agenda of public interest attorneys. Procedural formalism constitutes one of the only resources at attorneys’ disposal, yet here it often impedes lawyers’ ability to disrupt perceived power hierarchies. Specifically, the prevalence of complex legal procedures that obstruct access to asylum reconfigures opportunities to uplift clients. These findings illuminate how hostile legal settings strain lawyers. They also contribute to timely debates around how attorneys protect access to justice and advance meaningful social transformation.

Les modes alternatifs de règlement des conflits s’inscrivent dans une volonté de transformation de l’organisation de la justice en cherchant à régler « autrement » les litiges judiciarisés. L’émergence de ces modes répond également aux impératifs de la nouvelle gouvernance publique, où les questions de l’efficacité et de la célérité de la justice deviennent cardinales. Ces modes alternatifs exigent que les parties y participent volontairement. Or, les justiciables composent avec certaines contraintes subjectives qui se répercutent sur leur motivation à s’engager sur la voie d’un mode alternatif de règlement des conflits. À partir de données empiriques, ce texte présente de quelle façon les coûts humains et financiers qu’assument les justiciables sont susceptibles de se répercuter sur leur décision de s’engager sur une telle voie, laquelle découle généralement de l’atteinte d’un point de rupture par rapport à ces coûts. Cette recherche, effectuée au Québec, fait état de la situation en droit civil, en droit criminel et en droit administratif.