Due to Gödel’s incompleteness results, the categoricity of a sufficiently rich mathematical theory and the semantic completeness of its underlying logic are two mutually exclusive ideals. For first- and second-order logics we obtain one of them with the cost of losing the other. In addition, in both these logics the rules of deduction for their quantifiers are non-categorical. In this paper I examine two recent arguments—Warren [43] and Murzi and Topey [30]—for the idea that the natural deduction rules for the first-order universal quantifier are categorical, i.e., they uniquely determine its semantic intended meaning. Both of them make use of McGee’s open-endedness requirement and the second one uses in addition Garson’s [19] local models for defining the validity of these rules. I argue that the success of both these arguments is relative to their semantic or infinitary assumptions, which could be easily discharged if the introduction rule for the universal quantifier is taken to be an infinitary rule, i.e., non-compact. Consequently, I reconsider the use of the $\omega $-rule and I show that the addition of the $\omega $-rule to the standard formalizations of first-order logic is categorical. In addition, I argue that the open-endedness requirement does not make the first-order Peano Arithmetic categorical and I advance an argument for its categoricity based on the inferential conservativity requirement.

We investigate, in ZFC, the behavior of abstract elementary classes (AECs) categorical in many successive small cardinals. We prove for example that a universal $\mathbb {L}_{\omega _1, \omega }$ sentence categorical on an end segment of cardinals below $\beth _\omega $ must be categorical also everywhere above $\beth _\omega $ . This is done without any additional model-theoretic hypotheses (such as amalgamation or arbitrarily large models) and generalizes to the much broader framework of tame AECs with weak amalgamation and coherent sequences.

We show that if $(M,{ \in _1},{ \in _2})$ satisfies the first-order Zermelo–Fraenkel axioms of set theory when the membership relation is ${ \in _1}$ and also when the membership relation is ${ \in _2}$, and in both cases the formulas are allowed to contain both ${ \in _1}$ and ${ \in _2}$, then $\left( {M, \in _1 } \right) \cong \left( {M, \in _2 } \right)$, and the isomorphism is definable in $(M,{ \in _1},{ \in _2})$. This extends Zermelo’s 1930 theorem in [6].

Shelah has provided sufficient conditions for an ${\Bbb L}_{\omega _1 ,\omega } $-sentence ψ to have arbitrarily large models and for a Morley-like theorem to hold of ψ. These conditions involve structural and set-theoretic assumptions on all the ${\aleph _n}$’s. Using tools of Boney, Shelah, and the second author, we give assumptions on ${\aleph _0}$ and ${\aleph _1}$ which suffice when ψ is restricted to be universal:

Theorem.Assume${2^{{\aleph _0}}} < {2^{{\aleph _1}}}$. Let ψ be a universal ${\Bbb L}_{\omega _1 ,\omega } $-sentence.

1. (1) If ψ is categorical in${\aleph _0}$and$1 \leqslant {\Bbb L}\left( {\psi ,\aleph _1 } \right) < 2^{\aleph _1 } $, then ψ has arbitrarily large models and categoricity of ψ in some uncountable cardinal implies categoricity of ψ in all uncountable cardinals.

2. (2) If ψ is categorical in${\aleph _1}$, then ψ is categorical in all uncountable cardinals.

The theorem generalizes to the framework of ${\Bbb L}_{\omega _1 ,\omega } $-definable tame abstract elementary classes with primes.

We give an algebraic description of the structure of the analytic universal cover of a complex abelian variety which suffices to determine the structure up to isomorphism. More generally, we classify the models of theories of ‘universal covers’ of rigid divisible commutative finite Morley rank groups.

We prove that any tame abstract elementary class categorical in a suitable cardinal has an eventually global good frame: a forking-like notion defined on all types of single elements. This gives the first known general construction of a good frame in ZFC. We show that we already obtain a well-behaved independence relation assuming only a superstability-like hypothesis instead of categoricity. These methods are applied to obtain an upward stability transfer theorem from categoricity and tameness, as well as new conditions for uniqueness of limit models.

Quasiminimal pregeometry classes were introduced by [6] to isolate the model theoretical core of several interesting examples. He proves that a quasiminimal pregeometry class satisfying an additional axiom, called excellence, is categorical in all uncountable cardinalities. Recently, [2] showed that the excellence axiom follows from the rest of the axioms. In this paper we present a direct proof of the categoricity result without using excellence.

We describe a model-theoretic setting for the study of Shimura varieties, and study the interaction between model theory and arithmetic geometry in this setting. In particular, we show that the model-theoretic statement of a certain ${\mathcal{L}}_{\unicode[STIX]{x1D714}_{1},\unicode[STIX]{x1D714}}$-sentence having a unique model of cardinality $\aleph _{1}$ is equivalent to a condition regarding certain Galois representations associated with Hodge-generic points. We then show that for modular and Shimura curves this ${\mathcal{L}}_{\unicode[STIX]{x1D714}_{1},\unicode[STIX]{x1D714}}$-sentence has a unique model in every infinite cardinality. In the process, we prove a new characterisation of the special points on any Shimura variety.

While the back-and-forth method has been often attributed to Cantor, it turns out that in the original proof of the characterisation of countable linear dense orders, the mapping is constructed in a single direction. Cameron has called this method Forth and has shown that it can fail to build an automorphism for some homogeneous structures. We give in this paper a characterisation of those homogeneous structures for which Forth always builds an automorphism. This generalises results by Cameron and McLeish.

We propose a criterion to regard a property of a theory (in first or second order logic) as virtuous: the property must have significant mathematical consequences for the theory (or its models). We then rehearse results of Ajtai, Marek, Magidor, H. Friedman and Solovay to argue that for second order logic, ‘categoricity’ has little virtue. For first order logic, categoricity is trivial; but ‘categoricity in power’ has enormous structural consequences for any of the theories satisfying it. The stability hierarchy extends this virtue to other complete theories. The interaction of model theory and traditional mathematics is examined by considering the views of such as Bourbaki, Hrushovski, Kazhdan, and Shelah to flesh out the argument that the main impact of formal methods on mathematics is using formal definability to obtain results in ‘mainstream’ mathematics. Moreover, these methods (e.g., the stability hierarchy) provide an organization for much mathematics which gives specific content to dreams of Bourbaki about the architecture of mathematics.

We prove that under reasonable assumptions, every cat (compact abstract theory) is metric, and develop some of the theory of metric cats. We generalise Morley's theorem: if a countable Hausdorff cat T has a unique complete model of density character λ ≥ ω, then it has a unique complete model of density character λ for every λ ≥ ω.