• The world economy is expected to grow by 3.0 per cent in 2015, unchanged from our August forecast, and by 3.4 per cent in 2016, marginally weaker than projected last time. Growth in emerging market economies has weakened further; recoveries have remained hesitant in the advanced economies.

• The projected pickup in global growth next year will be supported by accommodative monetary policies and lower oil prices. Growth should strengthen further in 2017 as recoveries take hold in some key emerging markets. But considerable risks remain.

• We expect the US Federal Reserve to lead the turn in official interest rates in December, with the Bank of England following next February.

• The economy will grow by 2.4 per cent this year and 2.3 per cent in 2016.

• Unemployment rate to remain at 5¼ per cent throughout the rest of this year and next year.

• The rate of consumer price inflation rises from close to zero per cent in 2015 to 1.1 per cent in 2016.

• The Bank of England to raise interest rates at the start of 2016 and then gradually increase by 50 basis points a year, reaching 2 per cent by the end of 2018.

The production of this forecast is supported by the Institute's Corporate Members: Bank of England, HM Treasury, Mizuho Research Institute Ltd, Office for National Statistics, Santander (UK) plc and by the members of the NiGEM users group.

A drop in net FDI investment income has been the primary factor in the recent deterioration in the measured UK current account balance, with the trade balance relatively stable. We argue that financial engineering (with little net impact on the underlying international investment position for the UK) may have contributed to the decline in net FDI investment income, such that the headline current account balance cannot be interpreted as a sufficient indicator of the state of the UK's external position. A more granular analysis of cross-border financial linkages than is possible with currently-published data would be required in order to provide a comprehensive assessment of external sustainability.

As long as all interest rates move in tandem – including the rate of return on paper currency – economic theory suggests no important difference between interest rate changes in the positive region and interest rate changes in the negative region. Indeed, in standard models, only the real interest rate and spreads between real interest rates matter. Thus, in most respects, negative interest rate policy is conventional. It is only (a) what needs to be done with paper currency, (b) difficulties in understanding negative rates or (c) institutional features interacting with negative rates that make negative interest rate policy unconventional.

Since the onset of the Federal Reserve's unconventional programme of large-scale asset purchases, known as quantitative easing (QE), some economists and financial practitioners have feared that the consequent buildup of the Fed's balance sheet could lead to a large expansion of the money supply, and that such an increase could cause a sharp rise in inflation. So far fears about induced inflation have not been validated. This article examines the basis for the original concerns about inflation in terms of the classic quantity theory of money, which holds that inflation occurs when the money supply expands more rapidly than warranted by increases in real production. The article first reviews the US experience and shows that whereas rapid money growth might have been a plausible explanation of inflation in the 1960s through the early 1980s, subsequent data have not supported such an explanation. It then shows that the quantity theory of money has not really been put to the test after the Great Recession, because a sharp increase in banks’ excess reserves and corresponding sharp decline in the ‘money multiplier’ has meant that the rise in the Federal Reserve's balance sheet has not translated into increased money available to the public in the usual fashion. The most likely aftermath of quantitative easing remains one of benign price behaviour. However, if nascent inflationary conditions materialise, the Federal Reserve will need to manage adroitly the large amounts of banks’ excess reserves that have accumulated as a consequence of QE in order to limit inflationary pressures.

This article outlines some of the intellectual lessons learnt by central bankers during the financial crisis. The key question is whether a broader range of policy options than simple inflation targeting has to be considered in order to limit instability. Interactions with overseas pools of savings, government debt markets and financial risk have all conspired to complicate significantly the task of monetary policymaking. These developments do not mean that the target for inflation has to be modified or dropped but that setting policy will be a more complex task and require more explanation than it has in the recent past.

Through its quantitative easing programme the Bank of England has looked to manage the supply of nominal UK government securities in order to lower interest rates. In doing so it has removed more than 25 per cent of the overall supply of those securities from the publicly accessible market. The benchmark New Keynesian model suggests this should only have an impact on interest rates insofar as it affects expectations of future policy rates, whilst alternative theoretical frameworks imply a direct effect of changes in supply onto yields. Our aim is to test for the existence of these potential transmission mechanisms. We find empirical evidence to support the existence of both channels. Our analysis suggests the Bank's quantitative easing programme reduced yields by around 25 basis points through the supply channel alone. Importantly, we find that such supply effects have remained significant in recent years, suggesting that as quantitative easing is unwound the increase in publicly available supply will put upward pressure on interest rates. Lastly we highlight the monetary-fiscal interaction inherent in our result and discuss some of the issues it raises for policymakers.