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The inherent bias in positing an inherence heuristic

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  24 October 2014

Muhammad Ali Khalidi  and
Joshua Mugg
Muhammad Ali Khalidi
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, York University, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada. [email protected]@gmail.comhttp://www.yorku.ca/khalidi/http://yorku.academia.edu/JoshuaMugg
Joshua Mugg
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, York University, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada. [email protected]@gmail.comhttp://www.yorku.ca/khalidi/http://yorku.academia.edu/JoshuaMugg
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Abstract

There are two problems with Cimpian & Salomon's (C&S's) claim that an innate inherence heuristic is part of our cognitive makeup. First, some of their examples of inherent features do not seem to accord with the authors' own definition of inherence. Second, rather than posit an inherence heuristic to explain why humans rely more heavily on inherent features, it may be more parsimonious to do so on the basis of aspects of the world itself and our relationship to it.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 37 , Issue 5 , October 2014 , pp. 493 - 494
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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References

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